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PROJECT
EDUCATION AND THE LAW: STATE INTERESTS
AND INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS

No government activity exerts a more pervasive influence on
Americans for a longer period of their lives than the regulation of
education. The state seeks through its educational system to achieve
two goals: the development of the basic reading, writing and other
academic skills that any productive member of society must possess;
and the inculcation of values deemed essential for a cohesive, harmonious and law-abiding society. Basically, through uniformity and
standardization of the education experience the state attempts to
guarantee that children will not become liabilities to society and that
a minimal acceptance of shared values and norms will be attained.
These ends can be achieved only through a certain degree of educational "egalitarianism"-that is, through a common exposure of all
children to values that educational decision-makers deem essential.
To explore the significance of the educational system in shaping
our social order, the Michigan Law Review has chosen education law
as the subject of this year's Project.
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INTRODUCTION

This Project focuses on how the "collectivist" functions of the
educational system, 1 which are to inculcate community norms and
a minimum scholastic ability, may conflict with, and then ultimately
be reconciled with, rthe interests that parents, students and teachers
have in defining the particular norms and in seeking to preserve auton1. For a fuller discussion of the meaning of the term "collectivist," see note 48
infra and text at notes 43-52 infra.
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omy fu-om ,the standards J.mposed by eduoational authorities. It will be
demonstrated that these interests in autonomy, which are identified
in the Project as being "pluralistic," 2 do not necessarily repudiate
goals of the established decision-makers 3-the development of responsible, stable, self-sufficient, •and capable citizens ,able to live •and function together. Pluralistic interests can, in fact, reflect varied ideological content; ,they may be advanced either in favor of or in opposition
to such controversial programs as sex education and religious observance in schools. What unites these pluralistic interests is that :they
are all -associated with individuals or groups seeking, in various conteXJts, rto avoid the specific means of impar.ting ,academic skills and of
socializ,ation that a given educational system is using.

A.

Background: Institutions of the Educational System

A survey of the institutional framework within which educational
policy decisions are made reveals that the initial accommodation of
interests is performed by the state legislature; pursuant to its reserved power to control education, the legislature formulates general
policy and frequently delegates to local community institutions broad
powers to effectuate that policy. It is within these local institutions
that the community ·articulates its values •and desired norms and
translates them into affirmative goals and practices of the school
system. When the formulation ·or effectuation of these values intolerably infringes on the interests of one or more groups in society,
recourse may be had either .through judicial intervention or through
the exertion of political and economic pressure.

1.

The Authority of the States

The several states have plenary power in the sphere of education4 so long as they do not violate provisions of the United States
2. See note 54 infra and text at notes 53-59 infra.
3. See section I-A infra.
4. Horton v. Meskill, 31 Conn. Supp. 377, 332 A.2d 113 (Super. Ct. 1974); State
v. Haworth, 122 Ind. 462, 23 N.E. 946 (1890). The plenary power of the states
derives from the tenth amendment of the United States Constitution, which reserves
all powers not specified in the Constitution to the states. Because the Constitution
is silent on the issue of education, and because it does not prohibit the states from
maintaining systems of public education, the tenth amendment effectively reserves
public education to state control. See, e.g., L. GARBER, HANDBOOK OF ScHOOL LAw
4 (1954); Comment, Compulsory Education in the United States: Big Brother Goes
to School, 3 SETON HALL L. REV. 349, 351-53 (1972).
State control over education typically originates in a state co·nstitutional provision
for the encouragement of education. See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. 8, § 1; N.C. CONST.
art. IX, § 1. Some state constitutions further provide for public educational systems.
See, e.g., MASS. CONST. pt. 2, ch. V, § 2; MICH. CONST. art. 8, § 2; N.C. CONST.
art. IX, § 2; PA. CONST. § 44. Such provisions are held to vest state legislatures
with broad authority over education. See, e.g., Child Welfare Soc. v. Kennedy
School Dist., 220 Mich. 290, 296-98, 189 N.W. 1002, 1004-08 (1922); Coggins
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Constitution. 5 In delegating considerable educational policymaking
v. Board of Educ., 223 N.C. 763, 28 S.E.2d 527 (1944). This authority generally
results in extensive state legislation, including regulation of both private and public
schools. See, e.g., School Code of 1955, MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 340.l-.329a,
as amended, MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 340.329c-.330v (1976) (public schools);
MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. §§ 388.551-.558 (1967) (private schools); MINN. STAT.
ANN. §§ 100.01-.80 (Supp. 1975).
5. See Cumming v. Richmond County Bd. of Educ., 175 U.S. 528, 545 (1899)
("[T]he education of the people in schools maintained by state taxation is a matter
belonging to the respective States, and any interference on the part o( Federal authority with the management of such schools cannot be justified except in the case
of a clear and unmistakable disregard of rights secured by the supreme law of the
land").
Although education is primarily a state function under the tenth amendment, the
federal government also exerts considerable influence on educational policy. It can
levy and collect taxes for educational purposes pursuant to its delegated power to promote the general welfare of the United States, see generally United States v. Gettysburg Blee. Ry., 160 U.S. 668 (1896), and can specify how funds accepted by a state
pursuant to a federal program must be spent. Failure of the state to comply with the
federal standards may result in termination of the assistance. See Steward Mach.
Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937). However, because the method of financing education, the distribution of money among districts, and the policies and procedures
involved in organizing districts are within the realm of state authority, see note 4
supra, the federal government can assert a national interest in education only by
tying federal outlays to desired state reform. See THE PRESIDENT'S CoMMN. ON
ScHOOL FINANCE, ScHOOLS, PEOPLE & MONEY: FINAL REPORT xxi (1972),
The federal government first became involved in education by providing funds
for school lunch programs in the 1930s. During World War II and the Korean
War, the federal role increased when Congress passed legislation to assist communities that were financially overburdened by increased school enrollments due to the
proximity of war factories and military installations. See A. LAPATI, EDUCATION AND
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 20-22 (1946). The National Defense Education Act
of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-864, 72 Stat. 1580, further increased the federal role by
providing federal aid for specific educational purposes and types of instruction. Although the Act did not alter the fact that primary responsibility for education rests
with the states and localities, it did recognize for the first time that the federal government has a major role in encouraging and assisting the states to meet national
educational goals. See H.R. REP. No. 2157, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1958). To
help achieve the objectives of the Great Society programs of the 1960s, Congress
passed the Elementary and Secondary Education Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-10,
79 Stat. 27. The ESEA represented a fundamental change in federal policy; instead
of providing federal aid for specific purposes or types of instruction as did the
NDEA, the ESEA provided federal aid on a general basis. See A. LAPATI, supra,
at 35. Generally, federal programs are not designed to promote changes in decisionmaking at the local level. Instead, federal efforts primarily encourage experimentation and innovation. Few such programs are intended to increase participation. See
M. GITIELL & T. HOLLANDER, SIX URBAN ScHOOL DISTRICTS 194-200 (1968).
Federal educational programs are administered by the Office of Education
(USOE), which is directed by the Commissioner of Education. The Office is responsible to the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, which presents reports and evaluations to Congress on all federal educational programs. The authority
of the USOE is specific: to utilize the services and agencies of the national government in order to expedite federal educational programs. See generally A. LAPAn,
supra, at 7-13.
To what extent federal programs have succeeded in meeting specific educational
objectives is uncertain. One observer who has analyzed the implementation of Title
I of the ESEA has concluded that the limited capacity of federal and state agencies
to carry through with the federally initiated reform has left local schools fairly free
to function according to their own priorities. Murphy, Title I of ESEA: The Poll-
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authority to local agencies, 6 states have "not surrendered their prerogatives, but have merely determined the machinery by which the
state function shall be performed. " 7
Only rarely have legislatures taken a broad interest in formulating and controlling educational policy. 8 Most states have left such
matters to administrative agencies and various elected bodies at the
state and local levels. At the summit of the administrative hierarchy
is a board that has been established in all the states. 0 The powers
of the various state boards differ. In some, the board may control
all aspects of the state's educational program; in others, wide delegation to local agencies may limit the board to a very narrow range
of activities. While the boards are responsible for implementing legislation and ,also possess ·policy-making discretion, 10 out of deference
to local institutions this policy-making power is rarely exercised.11
All states also have a superintendent of schools who typically performs such functions as the enforcement of laws, adoption of regulations, distribution of funds and financial accounting. In recent years,
the state superintendents have been given greater responsibility for
research and development and for general supervision of the
schools. 12 An institution at the state level, usually referred to as the
tics of Implementing Federal Education Reform, in EDUCATION AND THE LEGAL
STRUCTURE 64, 89 (Harv. Educ. Rev. Reprint No. 6, 1971 ).
6. See text at notes 31-33 infra.
7. E. BOLMEIER, THE ScHOOL IN THE LEGAL STRUCTURE 63 (1968).
8. C. FITZWATER, STATE ScHOOL SYSTEMS: PATTERNS AND TRENDS 4-5 (1968).
California offers the leading example of a state legislature that has taken a major
interest in education policy. See generally CAL. EDuc. CODE §§ 1-45047 (West
1969-1975-1976); J. KOERNER, WHO CONTROLS AMERICAN EDUCATION? 81-82 (1968).
9. The state board is provided for either in the constitution or in specific legislation.
KEESECKER, STATE BOARDS OF EDUCATION AND CHIEF STATE SCHOOL OFFICERS 11 (1950). See generally note 4 supra. The members of the board are generally either appointed by the governor (32 states) or directly elected (11 states).
C. FITZWATER, supra note 8, at 50; THE PRESIDENT'S COMMN. ON ScHOOL FINANCE,
supra note 5, at 122-23. See L. PETERSON, R. ROSSMILLER & M. VOLZ, THE LAW
AND PUBLrC SCHOOL OPERATION 14-16 (1969). See also F. BEACH & R. WILL, THE
STATE AND EDUCATION (1955).
10. L. PETERSON, supra note 9, at 14-16.
11. One survey of curriculum requirements has revealed that few states, either
through the legislatures or the boards, have strict standards. Instead, most curriculum decisions are left to the localities. Almost all states require instruction on the
dangers of alcohol and narcotics. However, only a slight majority require study of
United States history, only half require physical education, and less than half require
instruction in other specific subjects. See Marconnit, State Legislatures and the
School Curriculum, 49 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 269, 272 (1968). However, California,
Indiana and Iowa require instruction in 30 different subjects. See CAL. Eouc. CODE
§§ 8551-53, 8571 (West 1975); IND. ANN. STAT. §§ 20-10.1-3-1, -4-1 to -9 (Burns
Supp. 1976); IowA CODE ANN.§ 257.25 (Supp. 1976).
12. L. PETERSON, supra note 9, at 16-17. The superintendent is appointed by
the governor in 5 states and by the state board in 25 states; in 20 states, however,
the superintendent is directly elected, sometimes on a partisan basis. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMN. ON SCHOOL FINANCE, supra note 5, at 122-23.
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"department of education," consists of supporting personnel who assist the superintendent in his administrative duties.
Many of the functions performed at the state level, such as the
distribution of research data and the publication of journals, merely
aid the schools in their daily operations. 13 These have little direct
impact on the student and thus rarely lead to conflicts among the
various interests within the educational community. Other, typically
regulatory, state functions are designed, however, to serve collectivist
interests in education. Most important are the controls on citizens
that devolve from the legislature. Thus, socialization of all children
is assured by compulsory education requirements, 14 while the particular values and standards of achievement sought through socialization are defined by state curriculum requirements. 111 Moreover,
states have other, less direct means of defining the community norms
that the educational system is designed to further. For example, all
states require teachers to be certified. 16 Licensing requirements
narrow the class of individuals that will be allowed to teach to those
who possess traits considered worthy of being nurtured in students.
Thus, successful applicants must have a good, moral character, 17
though what activities or traits satisfy this requirement is often uncertain.18 In addition, minimum education requirements for teacher's certification10 are typically prescribed by a state administrative
13. See Layton, Historical Development and Current Status of State Departments
of Education, in STRENGTIIENING STATE DEPARTMENTS OF EDUCATION 5, 10 (R.
Campbell, G. Sroufe & D. Layton eds. 1967).
14. E.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 340.731-.746, .754 (1976); N.Y. Eouc.
LAW§ 3205 (McKinney 1970).
15. State constitutions sometimes require instruction in certain areas deemed to
be particularly important. See, e.g., LA. CONST. art. XII, § 3 (1955) ("There shall
be taught in the elementary schools only fundamental branches of study, including
instruction upon the constitutional system of State and national government and the
duties of citizenship"); N.D. CoNST. art. VIII, § 149 (instruction to be given to
inculcate "vital importance of truthfulness, temperance, purity, public spirit and respect for honest labor of every kind"); OKLA. CONST. art. XIII, § 7 ("Legislature
shall provide for the teaching of the elements of agriculture, horticulture, stock feeding, and domestic science ..•"); TENN. CONST. art. XI, § 12 (duty of legislature
"to cherish literature and science").
16. See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 340.85~-.852 (1976); N.Y. Eouc. LAw
§ 3001 (McKinney Supp. 1975). See generally H. PuNKE, THE TEACHER AND nm
COURTS 65-144 (1971). Cf. N.Y. Times, July 7, 1976, at 34, col. 1 (city ed.) (proposal for licensing of teachers).
17. L. PETERSON, supra note 9, at 485.
18. The technique of defining fitness by isolating characteristics of unfitness is
frequently used. See, e.g., Burton v. Cascade School Dist. Union High School No.
5, 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975) (homosexuality);
Wood v. Goodman, 381 F. Supp. 413 (D. Mass. 1974), a/fd., 516 F.2d 894 (1st Cir.
1975) (mem.) (offensive language and striking a pupil); Application of Bay, 233
Ore. 601, 378 P.2d 558 (1963) (grand larceny conviction ten years earlier).
19. See, e.g., CAL. Ao. CooE tit. 5, §§ 5900-91 (1976); MICH. AD. CODE, Rule
390.1101-.1199 (Supp. 1966-1969); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 16, §§ 1792-93 (Cum. Supp.
1975).
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agency. 20 Such standards are intended to guarantee that teachers
possess a minimum level of competence. 21 They exemplify the
state's interest in ensuring that students in all localities achieve a certain level of academic prowess through their exposure to teachers
with adequate credentials. States also prescribe certain standards
for such facilities as buildings,22 libraries,23 and equipment.24 This
exercise of control over the quality of the student's environment is
perfectly consistent with the state's interest in academic achievement. 25 Yet the state may actually go further and impose requirements, such as the displaying of an American flag in each school, 26
that advance the state's interest in inculcating patriotism in the
young.
Despite these examples of control at the state level, the management of the educational system for the most part occurs at the local
level. In recent years, state concern has been largely focused on
increasing financial support for programs managed by the local communities. Great differences in wealth and resources exist among
communities27 and some districts are unable to support an adequate
system of public schools without state aid. 28 Thus, much of the state
effort in education in the past few years has been directed at these
20. The New York legislature, for example, has delegated this authority to the
commissioner of education. See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 3004 (McKinney Supp. 1975).
21. See An Act To Establish an Alternative Standard for Teacher Certification,
2 HARV. J. LEGIS. 147, 150 (1965).
22. See, e.g., CAL. Eouc. CODE § 1530 (West 1969); IND. ANN. STAT. § 20-5-32-1
to -33-1 (Burns 1975).
23. See, e.g., CAL. Eouc. CODE§§ 27000-28802 (West 1976); MICH. COMP. l.Aws
ANN. §§ 340.901-.914 (1976).
24. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 122, § 35-11 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976); MICH.
COMP. LAws ANN.§ 340.298a(l)(b) (1976).
25. See generally E. REUTTER, JR. & R. HAMILTON, THE LAW OF PUBLIC EDUCATION 107-27 ( 1970).
26. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LA.ws ANN. § 340.367 (1976): "Each district shall
purchase a United States flag of a size of not less than 4 feet 2 inches by 8 feet
• . . and shall display said flag . • . [at] a conspicuous place upon the school
grounds thereof, at all times during school hours . • . ."
27. See authorities cited note 689 infra. See generally A. LAPATI, supra note 5,
at 142-47.
28. One analysis of this problem uses the illustration of two students living across
the street from each other, one in the Oakland, California, school district and the
other in Emeryville. Because of this slight locational difference they attend separate
schools, resulting in expenditures of $600-$700 for the first child and nearly three
times that amount for the second. The authors note that these figures are neither
the highest nor the lowest in the State of California. As a final irony, the tax rate
for Oakland is nearly twice that of Emeryville. J. CooNs, W. CLUNE & S. SUGARMAN, PRIVATE WEALTii AND THE PUBLIC EDUCATION xviii-xix (1970).
One proposed solution to the problem is a statewide equalization with the state's
share of the funds depending on the tax rate of the district. Simon, The School
Finance [)ecisions: Collective Bargaining and Future Finance Systems, 82 YALE L.J.
409,414 (1973).
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problems,29 but enormous discrepancies in expenditures per pupil
remain. 30
2.

The Nature of Local Control

Historically, Americans have considered schools to be an extension of the local community.31 Thus, although state legislatures possess plenary power over the educational system, 32 local initiative with
respect to education is so highly regarded that most states have delegated extensive authority over the actual administration of the
schools to local institutions. 33 States have divided their territory into
"school districts" that perform the sole function of establishing and
maintaining the public schools. 34 Boards of education, commonly
referred to as school boards, have been created as the governing
body of the school district and are typically responsible for the dayto-day operation of the public schools. 35
Although the diversity of state statutory schemes makes it difficult to generalize about school 1board composition and authority,
it is clear that the school board is -intended ,to be the instrument
for the public's expression of educational policy. That educational decision-making is regarded as requiring closer ,ties ,to the public than other governmental functions is demonstrated by the unique
status accorded most boards. For example, school districts are usually distinct from their corresponding political units-village, city, or
29. For a discussion of the effort of Texas to ensure an adequate statewide system of public education, see San Antonio Jndp. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 41 t U.S.
1, 6-14, 44-46 (1973).
.
30. See San Antonio Indp. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. J, 15 (1973)
(discrepancies in expenditures per pupil between school districts does not violate
equal protection clause if state supports adequate statewide system of public education).
31. 2 EDUCATION IN TIIE STATES: NATIONWIDE DEVELOPMENT SINCE 1900, at 134
(E. Fuller & J. Pearson eds. 1969).
32. See text at note 4 supra.
33. See e.g., CAL. Eouc. CODE §§ 1001-1086 (West 1969); IND. ANN. STAT. §§
20-5-2-1 to -3 (Burns 1975); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 340.561-.641 (1976); sec
2 EDUCATION IN THE STATES: NATIONWIDE DEVELOPMENT SINCE 1900, supra note
31, at 73; E. BoLMEIER, supra note 7, at 63.
34. See Prescott Community Hosp. Commn. v. Prescott School Dist. No. t, 57
Ariz. 492, 115 P.2d 160 (1941); Ridge v. Boulder Creek Union Jr.-Sr. High School
Dist., 60 Cal. App. 2d 387, 140 P.2d 990 (1943); Horton v. Meskill, 31 Conn. Supp.
377, 332 A.2d 113 (Super. Ct. 1974); Campbell & Gilbert, The Governance and
Political Implications of Educational Finance, in ScHOOL FINANCE IN TRANSITION!
THE COURTS AND EDUCATIONAL REFORM 199, 204 (J. Pincus ed. 1974).
As of 1970 there were about 17,500 school districts operating schools in the
United States. THE PRESIDENT'S COMMN .. ON ScHOOL FINANCE, supra note 5, at 12627. The consolidation movement of the past 25 years has significantly reduced the
number of districts. G. JOHNSON, EDUCATION LAW 15 (1969).
35. L. PETERSON, supra note 9, at 225. See also N. EDWARDS, THE COURTS AND
THE PUBLIC ScHOOLS 147-48 (2d ed. 1955).
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county-even though the boundaries may be identical. 30 In states
in which the school board is elected directly by a district's voters, 37
the contests are held separately from those for municipal government
offices38 and are almost always conducted on a nonpartisan basis. 39
The severing of education from general local politics caused by
,these distinctions 40 is generally respected by municipal officials, who
avoid direct involvement in educational matters. 41
B.

State Interests and Individual Rights: An Overview

Educational policy can never satisfy all the needs and desires of
all members of society. Ideally, the various state and local institu·tions charged with formulating and implementing policies ·reflect the
values and norms of ,the "people" as well as ,possible, considering
,the limitations of "pure democracy" in any complex society. Inevitably, however, groups or individuals do feel that governmental institutions are not responsive to them and that the achievement and
socialization aims of any educational system are incompatible with
-their personal interests ·and rights.
At times, such dissatisfactions are reflected in efforts either to
reorganize the decision-making institutions or to reallocate power
within the process. More often, however, individuals and groups
challenge certain practices and policies of the school system itself.
These challenges do not question the basically democratic nature of
the system for developing and implementing educational policies.
Instead, the visible assertion of these complaints exemplifies the inevitable tension between the majority's goals and its methods of implementing them, as articulated through state legislatures or through
local school boards, and the interests of individuals and groups that
wish to deviate from the majority in a particular context. .
The organization of the Project preserves the demarcation between challenges to practices within the system and attempts to alter
the system itself. Sections II and III focus on judicial intervention
36. See N. EDWARDS, supra note 35, at 93-94.
37. See, e.g., IND. ANN. STAT, CODE § 20-4-8-18 (Bums 1975); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 25-2022 (1973); N. EDWARDS, supra note 35, at 111-12.
38. See, e.g., IowA CODE ANN. § 277.1 (Supp. 1976); MICH. COMP. LAws ANN.
§ 340.519 (1976).
39. G. LANOVE & B. SMITH, THE POLITICS OF SCHOOL DECENTRALIZATION 12
(1973).
This does not mean school board contests are not affected by local politics. See
F. MICHELMAN & T. SANDALOW, MATERIALS ON GOVERNMENT IN URBAN AREAS 463
(1970); Eliot, Toward an Understanding of Public School Politics, 53 AM. PoL. Ser.
REV. 1032, 1040 (1959).
40. See Lyke, Representation and Urban Schoolboards, in COMMUNITY CONTROL
OF ScHOOLS 138, 155-56 (M. Levin ed. 1970).
41. This may not be true in large cities. See F. MICHELMAN & T. SANDALOW,
supra note 39, at 463.
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required when majoritarian educational institutions infringe on the
interests of groups and individuals in maintaining their autonomy.
Section IV focuses on efforts of groups or individuals to protect their
rights through reorganization of the institutions that define community norms and values and through exertion of organized pressure
on educational decision-making institutions from other sources
within the community.
Specifically, section II discusses conflicts over access to education. It first explores the nature and underlying purposes of the
state's compulsory education requirement. It then analyzes the
problems that arise when individuals, in pursuit of equal education
opportunities, seek not an exemption from compulsory education but
greater access to public schooling.
In this section, the central theme is the accommodation of society's collectivist interest in standard socialization of students to
core consensus values with the pluralistic interest of groups and individuals in diversity of belief and action. The judicial role is to
achieve a balance that best protects the welfare of both the individual
and society. In section II this process is predominantly a contest
between educational decision-makers who purportedly represent the
"state's" interest and parents who seek either to shelter their children from socialization in the public schools or to gain access to that
socialization experience.
Following the determination of who receives an exemption from or
greater access to education, section III of the Project explores the
scope of individual rights within the educational system. Two
broad areas of controversy, challenges to the academic curriculum
and to noncurricular activities, are discussed. In this section, the accommodation of parental and state interests described above is complicated by the need to consider the interests and rights of other parties, primarily teachers :and students. These include the freedoms of
religion, speech and personal expression, the right of nurture and
the right -of privacy. An -additional complication arises from the frequently expressed interest of still another group-school administrators-in the smooth and efficient operation of the system. The educational system's tendency toward uniformity and standardization is
strengthened by the imperatives of administrative "necessity," which
often generate conflict with the rights of individuals.
Finally, section IV demonstrates how various members of the educational community seek to advance their interests by altering an
institutional structure they consider unfair or unrepresentative or. by
exerting external pressure through organized demands on the system. Advocates of school district decentralization, for instance,
complain that the purportedly democratic school system is structurally unable to accommodate the interests of large segments of the
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population, either because it is composed of over-sized units or because of bureaucratization. Decentralization is a demand for power;
it is a rejection of the basic fairness of the decision-making and enforcing process in :the field of education. Unionization of teachers
is also analyzed as a similar effort to exert pressure on the institutions
charged with education and to reallocate power within the system.
The Project's analysis of the issues summarized above does not
purport to offer a conclusive reconciliation of the diverse, competing
interests of the members of the educational community. Instead,
the discussion sketches :the contours of the various conflicts and provides an analytical framework with whioh it:o probe questions of greaJt
importance for American society.
II.

THE STATE'S REQUIREMENT OF COMPULSORY EDUCATION
AND THE INDIVIDUAL'S RIGHT OF ACCESS TO EDUCATION

The system of universal compulsory education is such an integral
part of American society42 that its underlying assumptions _are rarely
questioned. 43 Yet conflicts arise both when the state ~eeks to force
42. See Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954); Yudof, Equal Educational Opportunity and the Courts, 51 TEXAS L. R.Ev. 411, 411-12 (1973).
As the Court in Brown stated:
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for
education both demonstrate our recognition of the importance of education to
our democratic society. It is required in the performance of our most basic
public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the
child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional tralning, and
in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied
the opportunity of an education.
Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). See San Antonio Indp. School
Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 30 (1973). See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 221 (1972); Davis v. Ann Arbor Public Schools, 313 F. Supp. 1217, 1225
(E.D. Mich. 1970).
43. The first state compulsory education law was passed in Massachusetts in
1852. Ch. 240, §§ 1, 2, 4 [1852] Mass. Laws (now MASS. ANN. LAws ch. 76,
§ 1 (Supp. 1976) ). By 1918, all states had enacted compulsory education laws.
Woltz, Compulsory Attendance at School, 20 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROB. 1, 4 (1955).
See generally F. ENSIGN, COMPULSORY ScHOOL ATTENDANCE AND CHILD LABOR
(1921); M. KATZ, CLASS, BUREAUCRACY, AND ScHOOLS 45-48 {1971); Rothbard,
Historical Origins, in THE TwELVE YEAR SENTENCE 11-32 (W. Rickenbacker ed.
1974).
Compulsory education laws typically require regular attendance at either private
or public schools. See, e.g., ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 122, § 26-1 (1973). Some statutes
require school instruction or its equivalent. See, e.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 18A:38-25
(1968). Although the various state statutes establish similar basic requirements, they
differ both in language and detail. For a compilation of laws effective as of 1966,
see A. STEINHILBER & C. SoKOLOWSKI, STATE LAw ON CoMPULSORY ATTENDANCE
(1966).
Concerned over the pressure to integrate public schools, Mississippi, South Carolina, and Virginia repealed their laws in the 1950s. Law of April 11, 1924, ch. 283,
§ 161, [1924] Miss. Laws 464 (repealed 1956); Act of May 15, 1937, No. 344,
[1937] S.C. Acts 556 (repealed 1955); Act of March 27, 1918, ch. 412, § 1, [1918]
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public education upon those who do not want it44 and when individuals demand greater access to the benefits of public education than
the state is willing to provide. 45 Increasingly, individuals have resorted to both federal and state courts for the resolution of these disputes.46
Underlying these conflicts between individuals47 and the state is
a fundamental tension inherent in virtually any system of public eduoation. Public education is intended primarily to serve the collectivist function of promoting equality of attitude and of experience, thus
advancing social uniformity and national cohesion. 48 Both the indiVa. Acts 752 (repealed 1959). Virginia has since reinstated its compulsory attendance law. VA. CODE ANN. § 22.275-1 (1973). The fact that fear of racial integra•
tion prompted some states to abandon compulsory school attendance is evidence that
compulsory schooling facilitates a generally valued social integration. See Rothbard,
supra, at 21-22 ("educationists of the mid-nineteenth century saw themselves as using
an expanded network of free public schools to shape and render uniform all American citizens, to unify the nation, to assimilate the foreigner, to stamp all citizens as
Americans, and to impose cohesion and stability on the often unruly and diverse
aspirations of the disparate individuals who make up the country"), See also D.
TYACK, 1iIE ONE BEST SYSTEM (1974). The "melting pot" effect of compulsory
schooling is not examined in this section of the Project, although the degree to which
education may legitimately be used to further achieve it will be emphasized,
44. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
45. See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974) (remedial language instruction); San Antonio Indp. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973) (monetary
expenditures per pupil); Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (racially
integrated public schools); Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972)
(admission of and special instruction for the mentally retarded in public schools),
46. The recent intrusion of the courts into the realm of educational policy began
with the application of the equal protection clause to public schools in Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). See notes 273, 284 infra and accompanying
text. See generally D. KIRP & M. YUDOF, EDUCATIONAL POLICY AND TIIE LAW
(1974).
47. For the purpose of this section of the Project, parental and children's interests in education are assumed to be identical and are together called the individual
interest. For discussion of a child's legal interest in education, see Knudsen, The
Education of the Amish Child, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1506 (1974), See generally Forer,
Rights of Children: The Legal Vacuum, 55 A.B.A.J. 1151 (1969).
48. As one observer noted, "the equality on which our institutions are founded
cannot be too intimately interwoven in the habits of thinking among our youth; and
it is obvious that it would be greatly promoted by their continuance together, for
the longest possible period, in the same schools of juvenile instruction , • • ," C.
MERCER, A DISCOURSE ON POPULAR EDUCATION 76 (1826), quoted in L. CREMIN,
THE AMERICAN COMMON ScHOOL: AN HISTORIC CONCEPTION 87 (1951), See note
43 supra. See also Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216, 222-24 (D. Mass. 1975),
aftd., 530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1976).
"Collectivist," as used in this Project, is synonymous with "integrationist," and
refers to that pertaining to the "collective." "Collective" is defined as that (1) "in•
volving . . . all members of . • . [a] group as distinct from • . . individuals";
(2) "marked by . . . similarity ..• among all the members of a group (as a whole
society)." WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 444-45 (1971). "Integration" is defined as "the act, process, or an instance of integrating • • . a unification and mutual adjustment of diverse groups or elements in a relatively coordinated
and harmonious society or culture with a consistent body of normative standards,"
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vidual and society benefit when each individual achieves the academic competence needed for political literacy and economic selfsufficiency49 and acquires sufficient social awareness to assure his
adherence to fundamental societal norms. 50 Through its academic
and socialization functions, 51 public education substantially furthers
these goals, but it naturally tends to do so through standardization
of the educational experience. 52 This tendency infringes upon the
right of parents to control the upbringing of their children53 and
therefore necessarily conflicts with the freedom of choice and the
cultural diversity of a pluralistic society. 54
In all cases involving state-individual conflicts over compulsory
education and access to education, the courts must accommodate the
collectivist interest of achieving academic and socialization goals and
the pluralistic interest of preserving autonomous spheres free from
Id. at 1174. Thus, the realization of collectivist goals necessarily includes a process
of integration.
49. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972).
50. See, e.g., Stephens v. Bongart, f5 N.J. Misc. 80, 82, 189 A. 131, 132 (Juv.
& Dom. Rel. Ct. 1937) ("[I]t is within the police power of the state to compel
every resident of New Jersey so to educate his children that the light of American
ideals will permeate the life of our future citizens"). See also H. MANN, REPORT
FOR 1848, in 4 LIFE AND WORKS 278 (1891) -("Had the obligations of the future citizen been sedulously inculcated upon all the children of this Republic, would the patriot have had to mourn over so many instances where_ the voter, not being able
to accomplish his purpose by voting, has proceeded to accomplish it by violence
. . . ?").
51. The distinction between the academic and socialization functions of education, more conceptual than descriptive, is most clearly conveyed by example: Mathematical instruction exemplifies the academic function, while the experience of social
group interaction that necessarily arises from school attendance illustrates the socialization function. Both purposes of education are advanced through the choice
of curriculum and instructional methods.
52. "For reasons which may have been valid in the 19th and early 20th centuries,
schools were given the mandate to teach children a common language, common
political and economic goals and common standards of behavior. In the process
of monopolizing most of the child's time and energy . . . today's schools still encourage an unnecessary degree of cultural and psychologic uniformity . . ••" R.
KAY, OUR AMERICAN EDUCATION SYSTEM 8 (1969).
53. The common law has always recognized a natural right of parents to control
the education of their children. See, e.g., Gordon v. Board of Educ., 78 Cal. App.
2d 464, 480, 178 P.2d 488, 498 (1947); Rulison v. Post, 79 Ill. 567, 573 (1875);
School Bd. Dist. No. 18 v. Thompson, 24 Okla. 1, 4, 103 P. 578, 579 (1909).
54. See R. KAY, supra note 52, at 8 ("[Public schools] still risk destroying a
healthy diversity in points of view, in styles of life, in underlying value commitments
and innate capacities"); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972) (public schools
conflicting with the integrity of an Amish community).
WEBSTER'S THnu> NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY, supra note 48, at 1745, defines "pluralism" as "a state or condition of society in which members of diverse
ethnic, racial, religious, or social groups maintain an autonomous participation in
and development of their traditional culture or special interest within the confines
of a common civilization." Parental control over the education of their children
is a central tenet of pluralism, for through such control parents maintain the autonomous development of their families and cultural beliefs.
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the uniformity of universal public education. 65 During the course
of litigation, both the state and individuals may appeal to either collectivist or pluralistic interests to justify their positions. Thus, when
the state attempts to compel education, it asserts the intellectual and
socializing interests in public education;56 in response, the individual
asserts his interest in being free from the standardizing effects of
state-imposed educational requirements.u 7 Conversely, when individuals attempt to force the state to grant them greater educational
benefits, they frequently do so in terms of equality of educational
opportunity;58 the state responds by emphasizing the importance of
local control of public schools to parental participation in educational
decision-making. 59
This section of the Project analyzes how courts have responded
to the assertions of countervailing collectivist and pluralistic interests
in education. It concludes that, despite the dissimilarity in remedies
sought, courts have accommodated these conflicting values consistently, both in cases in which the individual seeks to escape from
state-imposed educational requirements and in cases in which the individual seeks to compel the state to confer increased educational
benefits. It is submitted that in both controversies, courts have allowed core collectivist interests to be realized through education but
have not permitted collectivist interests, whether invoked by the state
or by individuals, to supersede entirely the countervailing interests
of pluralism. Thus, it appears that whenever practical within a
framework of state control, 60 courts ensure the participation of parents in the process of educational decision-making. 61
A.

The Conflict over Compulsory Education

Courts have been forced to accommodate these antagonistic interests in education both in statutory and constitutional challenges
to state compulsory education laws. In each case, pluralistic interests have been asserted in terms of a parental right to control the
55. The conflict between collectivist and pluralistic values is deeply ingrained in
American history and institutions. See Diamond, The Declaration and the Constitution: Liberty, Democracy, and the Founders, 41 THE PuBLIC INTEREST 39 (1975).
See also Ravitch, Integration, Segregation, and Pluralism, 45 THE AMERICAN SCHOLAR
206, 214 (1976).
56. See, e.g., Stephens v. Bongart, 15 N.J. Misc. 80, 82-84, 189 A. 131, 13233 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1937).
51. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 519 (1925).
58. See, e.g., San Antonio Indp. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
59. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Keyes v. School Dist.
No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 245-48 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
60. See note 4 supra•
. 61. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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upbringing of their children. In constitutional challenges, 62 parents
have sought to educate their children without any sort of interference. In contrast, parents in statutory challenges63 generally have
not contested the legality of basic state-imposed education requirements, but have urged that these requirements be fulfilled in an unregulated, noninstitutional setting. 6 '
This discussion will focus on the constitutional limits that have
been imposed upon the state's power to regulate education. However, a brief examination of various judicial responses to statutory
claims of parents who seek to educate their children at home illustrates the conflict between pluralistic and collectivist interests 65 that
also confronts the courts on the constitutional level. Such statutory
challenges have compelled courts to define the kind of educational
experience that fulfills the state's interests. 66 Since the goal of academic achievement is rarely questioned in these cases, 67 the focus
has been on the socialization function of education.
62. See, e.g., Scoma v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 391 F. Supp. 452 (N.D. III. 1974).
63. See, e.g., State v. Massa, 95 N.J. Super. 382, 231 A.2d 252 (Morris County
Ct., L. Div. 1967); People v. Levisen, 404 Ill. 574, 90 N.E.2d 213 (1950); State
ex rel. Shoreline v. Superior Ct., 55 Wash. 2d 177, 346 P.2d 999 (1959), cert. denied,
363 U.S. 814 (1960). Often, both constitutional and statutory challenges are made
in the same suit. See, e.g., People v. Turner, 121 Cal. App. 2d 861, 263 P.2d 685,
appeal dismissed, 347 U.S. 972 (1953); State v. Hoyt, 84 N.H. 38, 146 A. 170
(1929).
64. The unregulated setting can range from the education of one's children in
the home, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Renfrew, 332 Mass. 492, 126 N.E.2d 109
(1955), to private but unapproved schools, see, e.g., Commonwealth v. Roberts, 159
Mass. 372, 34 N.E. 402 (1893).
65. "To many who support compulsory schooling, the use of compulsion is necessary to bring up the young to respect and practice the virtues and customs of the
society. To the critics of compulsory schooling, it is precisely this coercive intrusion
of the collective into the life and mind of the individual that represents the most
damnable feature of compulsory schooling." Introduction, THE TwELVE YEAR SENTENCE 2 (W. Rickenbacker ed. 1974).
66. A few compulsory education statutes, however, contain a provision allowing
for education in the home. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3321.04(A) (2)
(Baldwin 1976 Supp.).
Courts sometimes avoid the question of whether home education fulfills the state's
interests by making technical distinctions. For example, if the statute requires attendance at approved private schools, courts have held that home education does not
satisfy the state interest solely on the ground that the home has not been approved
as a private school rather than on the ground that the term "private school" can
never be construed to include instruction at home. See State v. Hoyt, 84 N.H. 38,
146 A. 170 (1929); State ex rel. Shoreline v. Superior Ct., 55 Wash. 2d 177, 346
P.2d 999 (1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 814 (1960). Contra, State v. Coumort, 69
Wash. 361, 363, 124 P. 910, 911 (1912).
67. Courts are very reluctant to allow academic instruction lower in quality than
that provided in the public schools. See People v. Levisen, 404 Ill. 574, 578,
90 N.E.2d 213, 215-16 (1950) ("No parent can be said to have a right to deprive
his child of education advantages at least commensurate with the standards prescribed
for the public schools, and any failure to provide such benefits is a matter of great
concern to the courts"). See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 239 (1972)
(White, J., concurring).
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Two New Jersey cases, 68 both interpreting the same statute but
decided thirty years apart, reveal the wide divergence in judicial perceptions of the nature of socialization warranted by the state's collectivist interests. The New Jersey compulsory education law requires
public or private institutional education or its equivalent. 00 The
issue presented by such a statute is whether social as well as academic equivalency is required. In Stephens v. Bongart, 10 decided
in 1937, the phrase "equivalent education elsewhere than at
school"71 was interpreted to exclude home education. The court
clearly viewed education as primarily society's responsibility;72 based
on its observation that "the instilling of worthy habits and attitudes,
appreciation and skills is far more important than [the] mere imparting of subject matter," 73 it concluded that an institutional setting was
necessary to socialize children properly. In the 1967 case of State
v. Massa, 14 however, another New Jersey court concluded that
"equivalent education elsewhere than at school" did not require social equivalence that could be achieved only through group instruction; otherwise, it reasoned, the phrase "elsewhere than at school"
would be meaningless because only public education or equivalent
private-school education -w.ould suffke. 75 The court therefore rejected Stephens and held that the statute did not require social contact and development equivalent to that obtained through public education. 76
A result identical to Massa was reached by the Illinois supreme
court under a statute that, unlike New Jersey's law, required education in a public or private school. 77 The issue was whether th~ home
68. State v. Massa, 95 N.J. Super. 382, 231 A.2d 252 (Morris County Ct., L.
Div. 1967), and Stephens v. Bongart, 15 N.J. Misc. 80, 189 A. 131 (Juv. & Dom.
Rel. Ct. 1937).
69. N.J. SrAT. ANN, § 18A:38-25 (1968).
70. 15 NJ. Misc. 80, 189 A. 131 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1937).
71. N.J, SrAT. ANN. § 18A:38-25 (1968).
72. 15 N.J. Misc. at 84-85, 189 A. at 133 ("[T]he natural right of the father
to the custody of his child cannot be treated as an absolute property right, but rather
as a trust reposed in the father by the state, as parens patrie for the welfare of
the child"). See Allison v. Bryan, 21 Okla. 557, 569, 97 P. 282, 286 (1908)
("The rights of the parent in his child are just such rights as the law gives him;
no more, no less"); Ex parte Crouse, 54 Pa. 9, 11 (4 Whart. 1839) ("It is to be
remembered that the public has a paramount interest in the virtue and knowledge
of its members, and that of a strict right, the business of education belongs to it"),
73. 15 N.J. Misc. at 92, 189 A. at 137.
74. 95 N.J. Super. 382,231 A.2d 252 (Morris County Ct., L Div. 1967).
75. To avoid rendering the phrase "elsewhere than at school" meaningless and
thus to reach its result, the court, relying on Rainbow Inn, Inc. v. Clayton Natl.
Bank, 86 N.J. Super. 13, 205 A.2d 753 (App, Div. 1964), applied the rule that, if
possible, a court must interpret a statute in such a way as to uphold the statute's
validity. 95 NJ. Super. at 390,231 A.2d at 257.
76. 95 NJ. Super. at 390, 231 A.2d at 257.
77. ILL. REV. SrAT. ch. 122, § 26-1 (1973),
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could qualify as a private school under such a statute. 78 In People
v. Levisen, 79 the court held that the defendant's home was a private

school despite clear legislative history to the contrary. 80 The court
determined that the role of compulsory education was merely "to enforce the natural obligation of parents to provide an education for
their young, an obligation which corresponds to the parents' right
of control over the child." 81 Thus, it concluded that, if academic
standards were satisfied, 82 the manner and place of education was
a matter of parental discretion. 83 The court clearly viewed the
state's basic collectivist interests as limited to the academic component of education and thus interpreted the act narrowly to restrict
the scope of state regulation.
These statutory cases are ostensibly judicial attempts to interpret
the legislatively intended scope of compulsory education laws. In
reaching conflicting conclusions, however, the courts have manipulated canons of statutory construction and selectively read legislative
history to achieve an accommodation between state goals and individual interests that they considered appropriate. 84 Yet while these
78. See People v. Turner, 121 Cal. App. 2d 861, 263 P.2d 685, appeal dismissed,
347 U.S. 972 (1953); People v. Levisen, 404 Ill. 574, 90 N.E.2d 213 (1950); State
v. Petterman, 32 Ind. App. 665, 70 N.E. 550 (1904); State v. Hoyt, 84 N.H. 38,
146 A. 170 (1929); State ex rel. Shoreline v. Superior Ct., 55 Wash. 2d 177, 346
P.2d 999 (1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 814 (1960); State v. Coumort, 69 Wash.
361, 124 P. 910 (1912).
.
79. 404 Ill. 574, 90 N.E.2d 213 (1950).
80. 404 111. at 577, 90 N.E.2d at 215; see Comment, Private Tutoring, Compulsory Education and the Illinois Supreme Court, 18 U. CHI. L. REv. 105-06 (1950).
81. 404 Ill. at 577, 90 N.E.2d at 215, citing Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923).
82. The parents, Seventh-Day Adventists, established regular daily hours for instruction, recitation and study. Tests proved the child to have average academic
proficiency for her age. 404 Ill. at 576, 90 N.E.2d at 214.
83. 404 Ill. at 577, 90 N.E.2d at 215. See also Trustees of Schools v. People, 87
Ill. 303, 308 (1877); Rulison v. Post, 79 Ill. 567, 573 (1875). The position that
parents should have a primary role in directing the education of their children was
endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly in The Universal Declaration
of Human Rights, G.A. RES. 217 [Ill], art. 26 (1948) ("Parents have a prior right
to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children").
84. The statutory interpretation in the two New Jersey cases, Stephens v. Bongart,
15 N.J. Misc. 80, 189 A. 131 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1937), and State v. Massa,
95 N.J. Super. 382, 231 A.2d 252 (Morris County Ct., L. Div. 1967), provides a
good example. In Massa, in order to limit the scope of the collectivist socialization
interest, the court relied heavily on the rule that a statute should not, if at all possible, be interpreted to render one of its provisions inoperative; in Stephens, however,
the court had ignored the fact that its interpretation of the statute requiring institutional education rendered certain language of the statute meaningless.
A further example is provided by the legislative history of the statute interpreted
in People v. Levisen, 404 Ill. 574, 20 N.E.2d 213 (1950). The statute originally
provided for home education. The option was eliminated in 1929 in an amendment
that incorporated all other previous legislation on school attendance. Under a rule
of statutory construction, expressly adopted by Illinois courts, portions of an old statute not repeated in its successor are· automatically repealed. See Comment, supra
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cases ,all -address ithe question whether the socializing influence of
institutional education should be deemed a basic colleotivist interest of
the state, they do not discuss -the constitutional issue of what accommodation the states, if they do in fact intend to compel institutional
schooling, are required to achieve between collectivist and countervailing pluralistic interests.
As a general rule "[t]here is no doubt as to the power of a State,
having a high responsibility for education of its citizens, to impose
reasonable regulations for the control and duration of basic education."85 State and federal courts have almost universally upheld the
constitutionality of compulsory education requirements that have
been challenged as violative of the parents' right to control the upbringing of their children. 80 However, in two cases, Pierce v. Society of Sisters8 7 and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 88 the Supreme Court has
declared that compulsory education requirements exceeded the
bounds of permissible state regulation and thus has limited the power
of the state to utilize education to achieve collectivist goals.
In Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 89 ,the Court held unconstitutional
an Oregon compulsory education act that required public school attendance. 00 The Oregon law had been enaoted by a popular referendum after a volatile campaign during which public debate focused
on the merits of social diversity. The stated goal of the act's nativisnote 80, at 106 n.8. The court, ignoring both the legislative history and rule of
construction, held home education to be an acceptable fulfillment of the statute's
requirements.
85. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 213 (1972). See State v. Bailey, 151
Ind. 324, 329, 61 N.E. 730, 731-32 (1901) (natural rights of parent to custody and
control of infant child are subordinate to power of state and may be restricted and
regulated by municipal laws); DeLease v. Nolan, 185 App. Div. 82, 84, 172 N.Y.S.
552, 554 (1918) ("The State is sovereign in the matter of the attendance of a child
at school. The dominion of the State is absolute as far as attendance upon instruction is concerned . . . . The consent of the parent to the absence of the child has
no effect upon this lawful dominion of the State").
86. See, e.g., Scoma v. Chicago Bd. of Educ., 391 F. Supp. 452 (N.D. Ill. 1974):
Concerned Citizens for Neighborhood Schools, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 379 F. Supp.
1233 (E.D. Tenn. 1974); People v. Turner, 121 Cal. App. 2d 861, 263 P.2d 685,
appeal dismissed, 347 U.S. 972 (1953); State v. Bailey, 157 Ind. 324, 61 N.E. 730
(1901); State v. Hoyt, 84 N.H. 38, 146 A. 170 (1929); Stephens v. Bongart, 15
N.J. Misc. 80, 189 A. 131 (Juv. & Dom. Rel. Ct. 1937): DeLease v. Nolan, 185
App. Div. 82, 172 N.Y.S. 552 (1918); State v. Williams, 56 S.D. 370, 228 N.W.
470 (1929).
87. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
88. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
89. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
90. The Oregon Compulsory Education Act, ch. 1, § 1 [1923] Or. Laws 9,
adopted November 7, 1922 under the initiative provision of the Oregon constitution,
see generally note 4 supra, provided exemptions from public school attendance only
"for children who are not normal, or who have completed the eighth grade, or who
reside at considerable distances from any public school, or whose parents or guardians
hold special permits from the County Superintendent." 268 U.S. at 530-31.
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tic supporters, which included the Ku Klux Klan, was to extirpate
pluralism in society by eliminating it in education. They envisioned
a "common school" in which all children would receive a standardized education and thereby develop a uniform outlook on social and
political issues. Thus, the Oregon act manifested the collectivist interest in education in its most extreme form. 91
The law was challenged in the courts by two private schools, the
Hill Military Academy and the Society of Sisters. 92 In holding the
public school requirement unconstitutional, the Court did not question the legitimacy of the state interests in academic achievement
or in inculoating certain basic values in students, both of which could
be adequately served by reasonable state regulation of all schools. 93
What Pierce did say quite emphatically is that, while the state may
seek to achieve individual equality and commonality of outlook
through a moderate socialization program, it may not impose absolute uniformity:
The fundamental theory of liberty upon which all Governments in
this Union repose excludes any general policy of the state to standardize its children by forcing them to accept instruction from public
teachers only. The child is not the mere creature of the state; those
who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right coupled with
the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for additional obligations.94
91. See Tyack, The Perils of Pluralism: The Background of the Pierce Case, 74
AM. HIST, REV. 74 (1968).

92. These two private schools challenged the act in the courts after many groups
had unsuccessfully campaigned against it. As one author has stated:
A sense of outrage united an otherwise miscellaneous collection of opponents
of the school bill. Religious leaders-Catholic, Protestant, and Jewish-deeply
resented the implication that "sectarianism" was "unpatriotic." Businessmen
feared increased taxes for new schools and a lower rate of investment and population growth because of such "freak legislation". Minority groups, like Negroes, Jews, and the foreign-born, detected totalitarian undertones in the arguments of the bill's supporters. Private-school proprietors fought for their very
existence. And citizens of many persuasions saw the tyranny of the majority
in a Jaw that threatened religious freedom, parental duty, and constitutional
rights.
Tyack, supra note 91, at 86.
93. No question is raised concerning the power of the State reasonably to regulate all schools, to inspect, supervise and examine them, their teachers and
pupils; to require that all children of proper age attend some school, that
teachers shall be of good moral character and patriotic disposition, that certain
studies plainly essential to good citizenship must be taught, and that nothing
be taught which is manifestly inimical to the public welfare.
268 U.S. at 534. Thus, Pierce affirms the constitutionality of the state's promotion
of collectivist socialization goals through compulsory school attendance. See Board
of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 245-46 (1968) ("Since Pierce, a substantial body
of case law has confirmed the power of the States to insist that attendance at private
schools, if it is to satisfy State compulsory-attendance laws, be at institutions which
provide minimum hours of instruction . . . • Indeed, the State's interest in assuring
that these standards are being met has been considered a sufficient reason for refusing to accept instruction at home as compliance with compulsory education statutes")
(footnotes omitted).
94. 268 U.S. at 535.
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Thus, the Court was able to accommodate the state's collectivist interests in academic regulation and institutional socialization with the
parents' pluralistic interest in affecting the socialization of their children.
In contrast to Pierce, in which the Court's recognition of this
parental interest did not infringe on the state's control over the academic function of education, the facts of Yoder did not allow the
Court a means of distinguishing the academic and socialization functions of schools. In Yoder, the Court used the balancing test that
the decision in Sherbert v. Verner 95 requires in free exercise adjudications96 and held that a Wisconsin compulsory education statute, 01
in so far as it compelled education beyond the eighth grade, was unconstitutional as applied to members of the Amish faith. 08 The
Court determined that the fundamental Amish belief in nonworldliness was totally incompatible with both the socialization and aca95. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In Sherbert, the Court held that the first amendment
free exercise right of the plaintiff, a member of the Seventh-Day Adventist Church
who was denied unemployment compensation when she could not find a job because
of her refusal to work on Saturday, was unconstitutionally infringed. In so holding,
the Court declared that state action indirectly interfering with the free exercise of
religion could only be justified by a showing of a compelling need to regulate without
exception. 374 U.S. at 403-04.
In Yoder, Chief Justice Burger apparently interpreted the Sherbert test to require
a balancing of the conflicting interests: "[W]e must searchingly examine the interests that the State seeks to promote by its requirement for compulsory education
to age 16, and the impediment to those objections that would flow from recognizing
the claimed Amish exemption. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner . . . ." 406 U.S. at
221. "[A] State's interest in universal education, however highly we rank it, is not
totally free from a balancing process when it impinges on other fundamental rights
and interests, such as those specifically protected by the Free Exercise Clause , , . ,"
406 U.S. at 214.
96. See Note, The Amish and Compulsory School Attendance: Recent Developments, 1971 WIS. L. REV. 832, 836-40.
97. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 118.15 (1973), as amended, (Supp. 1975-1976).
98. See 406 U.S. at 234. By so holding, the Supreme Court vindicated the Amish
who had been convicted for violating the compulsory education laws. See State v.
·Garber, 197 Kan. 567,419 P.2d 896 (1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 51 (1967); Commonwealth v. Smoker, 177 Pa. Super. 435, 110 A.2d 740 (1955); Commonwealth
v. Beiler, 168 Pa. Super. 462, 79 A.2d 134 (1951) (per curiam); Commonwealth
v. Petersheim, 70 Pa. D. & C. 432 (Somerset County Ct. 1949), affd., 166 Pa. Super.
90, 70 A.2d 395 (1950) (appellate court affirmed acquittal of particular defendant
to avoid possibility of double jeopardy, but held tpere was no constitutional bar to
prosecutions of the Amish for failure to comply with compulsory education laws).
For discussions of the Amish conflict with public education before the Supreme
Court decided Yoder, see Casad, Compulsory High School Attendance and the Old
Order Amish: A Commentary on State v. Garber, 16 KAN. L. REV. 423 (1968);
Erickson, The Plain People and the Public Schools, SATURDAY REVIEW, Nov. 19,
1966; Littell, State of Iowa vs. the Amish, 83 CmusT. CENT. 234 (1966); Scalise,
The Amish in Iowa and Teacher Certification, 31 ALBANY L. REv. 1 (1967); Note,
The Amish School Controversy in Iowa, 10 ST. Louis U. L.J. 555 (1966); Note,
The Right Not To Be Modern Men: The Amish and Compulsory Education, 53
VA. L. REv. 925 (1967).
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demic goals of public education beyond the eighth grade.99 This
total incompatibility forced the Court to choose between the state's
collectivist interests and the individuals' pluralistic interests; no middle ground was possible. Although the Court conceded that compulsory education was a compelling state interest in the "generality
of cases,"100 it concluded that the interests of individuals outweighed
those of the state once the Amish students had received a "basic"
education. tot
The state in ·yoder asserted two major rationales for applying
the full compulsory education requirement to the Amish. First, it
advanced the collectivist argument that "some degree of education
is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in our open political system if we are to preserve freedom
and independence. Further, education prepares individuals to be
self-reliant and self-sufficient participants in society."t 02 The Court
accepted this formulation but held that, because of the unique character of Amish society, eight years of school was sufficient to fulfill
the state's interest. toa In justifying its conclusion, the Court repeatedly emphasized the success of the Amish as a cohesive group within
society:
The Amish alternative to formal secondary school education has enabled them to function effectively in their day-to-day life under selfimposed limitations on relations with the world, and to survive and
prosper in contemporary society as a separate, sharply identifiable
and highly self-sufficient community for more than 200 years in the
country. In itself this is strong evidence that they are capable of fulfilling the social and political responsibilities of citizenship without
compelled attendance beyond the eighth grade at the price of jeopardizing their free exercise of religious belief. to 4

Second, the state asserted its power as parens patriae to intervene between child and parent to secure the benefit of secondary
education for the child. 105 In support of this contention, reliance
was placed on Prince v. Massachusetts,1° 6 which had allowed the application of state child labor laws to prevent children of the Jehovah's
Witness faith from publicly distributing pamphlets. The Court, however, interpreted Prince so narrowly as to apply only to situations
99. 406 U.S. at 218. For general discussions of Amish society, see J. HOSTETLER, AMISH SOCIEIT (1968); J. HOSTETLER & G. HUNTINGI'ON, CHILDREN IN
AMISH SOCIEIT (1971); W. SCHREIBER, OUR AMISH NEIGHBORS (1962); E. SMl1ll,
THE AMISH PEOPLE (1958).
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
10S.
106.

406
406
406
406
406
406
~21

U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.
U.S.

at 221.
at 234.
at 221.
at 222, 22S.
at 225.
at 229.
158 (1944).
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dn which a substantial threat of "harm to •the physical or mental
health of the child or to the public safety, peace, order or welfare
is demonstrated or may ·be properly inferred." 107 Conceding that political illiteracy and economic dependency were substantial threats
to society, the Court held that the ,state possessed no power under
Prince to alter the decisions of the Amish parents because the parents had demonstrated that their children posed no such threat. 108
In rejecting the state's arguments, the Court recognized that the
interests of pluralism secured for the Amish a right to be free from
state-regulated education after the eighth grade. At the same time,
the Court implied the existence of a core collectivist function in compulsory education-a compelling state interest in requiring education
to the point at which an individual no longer threatens to be a liability to society either politically, economically, or socially. Although the state continues to have an interest in education beyond
this threshold level, an interest in producing individuals who are in
fact assets to society, the Yoder Court appeared unwilling to label
this as compelling.100
To recapitulate, Pierce focuses on the socialization function of
formal education, which is of greatest significance to individuals who
seek to preserve autonomy from governmental regulation, and establishes a limit beyond which collectivist goals will not be supported.
Standardization of students is not a legitimate state interest in education. Yoder, on the other hand, indicates a limit below which pluralistic interests will not be recognized. The parental desire to control
the upbringing of children is not a legitimate interest if it will produce individuals who may be economic or political liabilities to society.
With tlle holdings of Pierce and Yoder thus stated, it is now necessary to consider their implications for current parental attempts to
escape from the application of state compulsory education laws. The
Pierce Court articulated two grounds for its holding: the "economic
107. 406 U.S. at 230. In limiting Prince in this manner, the Court followed
the "interpretation of Prince articulated in Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 40203 (1963).
108. 406 U.S. at 234.
109. In his concurring opinion, however, Justice White expressed his belief that
the state has an interest in affirmatively developing the productive potential of its
children: "A State has a legitimate interest not only in seeking to develop the latent
talents of the children but also in seeking to prepare them for the life style that
they may later choose ..•." 406 U.S. at 240. Apparently, if it could have been
proved that as a result of an exemption to compulsory education beyond the eighth
grade, these latent talents would not have been realized, Justice White would have
found this state interest to be of a compelling nature and thus sufficient to override
the parents' free exercise claims. However, Justice White, believing that an exemption would not stifle any latent talents of the Amish children, concluded that the
legitimate state interest was not compe]]ing and that full compliance with compulsory
education was not necessary. 406 U.S. at 240,
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substantive due process" right of the private schools to conduct their
business and the "personal substantive due process" right of parents
to control their children. 110 Since the former theory has long been
abandoned by the Court,111 the present vitality of the case now rests
on the parents' personal substantive due process rights, which are
encompassed by the developing constitutional right of privacy.112
The majority opinion in Roe v. Wade 113 specifically indicated that
the fundamental right of privacy protects the parental activities of
child rearing and education. 114 Accordingly, to the extent that the
state's compulsory education requirements abridge this fundamental
right, the state should seemingly be required to demonstrate that the
legislation imposing such requirements is "narrowly and precisely
drawn" in furtherance of a "compelling state interest."115
110. The economic and personal substantive due process theories would appear
to be alternate holdings, if the private schools had standing to assert the rights of
parents. The Court did not explain how the schools could have had such standing;
however, Pierce has been interpreted as involving an exception to usual standing
rules. See Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 257 (1953).
111. See Day-Brite Lighting, Inc. v. Missouri, 342 U.S. 421 (1952); McCloskey,
Economic Due Process and the Supreme Court: An E:rhumation and Reburial, 1962
SUPREME COURT REVIEW 34, 38.
112. See G. GUNTIIER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CoNsrITUTIONAL LAw 616-19
(9th ed. 1975); Runyon v. McCrary, 44 U.S.L.W. 5033, 5039-40 (U.S. June 25,
1976); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211 (1973) (The right of privacy, inhering in
the "liberty" guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment, protects "freedom of choice
in the basic decisions of one's life respecting marriage, divorce, procreation, contraception, and the education and upbringing of children") (Douglas, J., concurring as
to the unconstitutionality of a Georgia statute severely limiting abortion) (emphasis
original). See generally Project--Government Information and the· Rights of Citizens, 73 MICH. L. REV. 971, 1289-91 (1975).
Significantly, in the recent case of Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976),
the Supreme Court, confronted with a police officer's challenge to departmental
grooming standards, revived the terminology of substantive due process. Assuming,
arguendo, that the individual's interest in matters of personal appearance are the
same as his interest in "certain basis matters of procreation, marriage, and family
life," 425 U.S. at 244, the Court, emphasizing the particular needs of the police
department to regulate its personnel, held that no "liberty interest" was infringed
if the regulation was not "so irrational that it could be branded 'arbitrary.'" 425
U.S. at 248. See note 538 infra & text at notes 533-37 infra.
113. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
114. 410 U.S. at 152-53 (citing Pierce and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
(1923) as authority); cf. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 482 (1965).
115. Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179, 211 (1973) (Douglas, J., concurring); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 155 (1973); cf. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634,
637 (1969) ("strict scrutiny" analysis, mandated because of infringement of fundamental right, requires that statute be justified by compelling state interest and that
statute prescribes least restrictive means of achieving end); Aptheker v. Secretary
of State, 378 U.S. 500, 514 (1964) (statute must be narrowly and precisely drawn).
A challenge of parents to compulsory education based on a general interest in
the upbringing of their children should require the same constitutional analysis as
a challenge based on parents' interest in the religious upbringing of their children.
The "strict scrutiny" standard, evoked when a statute infringes upon a fundamental
right, is identical to the standard applied to a statute infringing upon the free exercise
of religion. Both elements of the "strict scrutiny" standard have been applied in
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Yoder's recognition that the state has a compelling interest in
promoting certain academic achievements and in socializing children
takes on added significance in light of this interpretation of Pierce.
For a court to uphold the application of a state's compulsory education statute to particular plaintiffs, the facts must show that the state's
collectivist interests cannot be furthered through less restrictive
means. In other words, the statute, as applied, must be drawn with
sufficient narrowness and precision. Yoder indicates that in most
cases the state will have no difficulty demonstrating the necessity of
fulfilling its statutory compulsory education requirements. 116 But
the rationale of Yoder indicates that if particular parents can demonstrate the existence of an alternative method of achieving the state's
core collectivist interests, they should be able to gain an exemption
from compulsory education. 117
Thus, the crucial question raised by Yoder is what alternatives
to compulsory education ~ill satisfy these interests. In those states
free exercise cases. See, e.g., ·sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963) (compelling state interest); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 296, 307-08 (1940) (statute
must be narrowly drawn).
Despite the fact that Chief Justice Burger, in Wisconsin v. Yoder, expressly
adopted a balancing test to determine the constitutionality of the statute that infringed upon the free exercise rights of the Amish Yoder does not contradict this
analysis. First, Burger cited as authority Sherbert v. Verner, which required that
the statute be justified by a compelling state interest. See note 95 supra. Second,
the balancing in Yoder is similar to a "strict scrutiny" analysis, which involves some
balancing: The asserted fundamental right is inevitably used as a standard against
which to judge whether the state interest is compelling. However, it must be noted
that one court has concluded that the Yoder balancing standard is a substantive departure from the compelling state interest standard. See Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp,
395,399 (D.N.H. 1974).
Even though the constitutional analysis invoked by parental challenges to compulsory education should be the same whether or not the parental challenge has a
free exercise basis, parents' interest in the religious upbringing of their children will
undoubtedly weigh heavier than a general nurture interest in the balnncing of the
asserted parental and state interests. Yoder provides an example of this phenomenon. See text at note 121 infra.
116. The application of this constitutional interplay between Pierce and Yoder
can best be shown in the context of a specific example. In Scoma v. Board of Educ.,
391 F. Supp. 452 {N.D. Ill. 1974), the plaintiff-parents sought a declaratory judgment
against the Board's enforcement of the Illinois compulsory education statute. The
plaintiffs, relying on Pierce, asserted that they had a fundamental right "to be protected in their family privacy and personal decision-making from governmental intrusion." 391 F. Supp. at 460, quoting Complaint for Plaintiff. The court found that
the parents asserted no fundamental right "within the bounds of Constitutional protection," 391 F. Supp. at 461, and thus upheld the statute's constitutionality on the
ground that "the state need not demonstrate a 'compelling interest'; it must act only
'reasonably' in requiring children to attend school." 391 F. Supp. at 461. Although
the result in Scoma would appear to be correct, but see note 119 infra, the court's
determination that the asserted parental right is not fundamental is erroneous in light
of Roe and Doe, see note 112 supra. The state should have been required to demonstrate a compelling interest in compulsory education, see text at note 115 supra, a
demonstration that Yoder indicates will be routine in most cases. 406 U.S. at 221.
117. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 222-26 (1972); Knudsen, supra note
47, at 1512.
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that permit "home education" because their legislatures consider
only the academic interest to be compelling, it is relatively easy to
show that a noninstitutional alternative has satisfied core collectivist
goals in education. For example, whether state requirements such
as curriculum content are met in the alternative setting can be readily
determined, and a child's,rate of academic achievement can be easily
measured. 118 However, in the majority of states, which consider socialization a compelling interest in education, the task of determining
whether the alternative meets Yoder's nonliability-to-society standard is more problematic. Socialization requirements are intapgible
and difficult to measure. As a result, courts must generally rely on
legislative standards that typically define socialization to require an
institutional setting. Thus, the perceived inadequacy of the noninstitutional alternative in fulfilling the socialization requirement is the
major obstacle to parental attempts to remove their children from
traditional public education. 119
In Yoder, the Amish were allowed an exemption from the compulsory education requirement only after they had persuasively demonstrated that their scheme of alternative education beyond the
eighth grade fulfilled core collectivist interests. In fact, the opinion
indicated that the Amish community was perhaps better able than
outsiders to achieve the goals of obedience to law and self-suffi118. See note 82 supra.
119. The home education alternative to institutional education, recognized in
some states either specifically by statute, see note 55 supra, or by judicial construction, see text at notes 55-84 supra, has interesting constitutional implications. The
cases allowing for home education clearly demand that the noninstitutional alternative establish adequate academic standards. See note 67 supra. Rather than recognizing that home education fulfills collectivist socialization interests, however, these
cases simply hold that the compulsory education statute fails to assert a compelling
state interest in the socialization function of education. It follows that if institutional
socialization is not deemed a compelling state interest, then the state's core collectivist interests in education are limited to state required academic instruction; thus,
under the rationale of Yoder, if there is an educational alternative satisfying state
academic requirements, then the state is denied the power to compel institutional
education.
Such an elevation of the home education alternative to the status of a constitutional right is the issue with which the federal district court in Scoma v. Board of
Educ., 391 F. Supp. 452 (N.D. Ill. 1974), should have been concerned. Plaintiffparents sought a declaratory judgment that the Illinois compulsory education statute
was unconstitutional as applied to them. See note 116 supra. As the Illinois Supreme Court declared in People v. Levisen, 404 Ill. 574, 90 N.E.2d 213 (1950),
see text at notes 79-83 supra, the Illinois compulsory education statute is primarily
concerned with the academic education of the state's children; the socialization of
children is left for parental direction in the choices of manner and place of instruction. Under this law, had the district court applied the doctrinal analysis dictated
by Pierce, Roe and Yoder, see text at notes 111-17 supra, the sole issue as to the
constitutionality of the statute as applied to the Scomas would have been whether
the home instruction provided by the Scomas satisfied the state's compelling interest
in the academic function of education. However, the court, avoiding the issue, relied
on the traditionally cited but outdated cases that hold compulsory education to be
within the reasonable exercise of a state's police power. See 391 F. Supp. at 461.
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ciency, even though the means used by the Amish involved autonomy from state regulation. 120 However, the carefully chosen language and the unique fact situation of Yoder indicate that the range
of noninstitutional alternatives that can satisfy the socialization requirement and thereby fulfill the state's asserted interests in education is narrow indeed. First, the Amish did not challenge the requirement of institutional education during the first eight years of
schooling; rather, they only sought an exemption from the one
or two years of state-mandated education beyond the eighth grade.
Second, the Yoder Court, by repeatedly emphasizing the religious
foundation of the Amish claim, strongly implied that the courts
should not be receptive to parental claims that are not firmly rooted
in a bona fide religious belief.1 21 Finally, and most significantly, the
uniqueness of Amish culture itself makes it highly unlikely that other
cultures will possess the characteristics that prompted the Court to
grant an exemption in Yoder. Because the Amish were "a separate,
sharply identifiable and highly self-sufficient community,»1 22 the
Court assessed the individual's potential to be a social liability not
within the framework of mainstream American society but rather
within the Amish community itself. Moreover, the Amish could
point to a history of more than 200 years in this country as an independent and successfully functioning social unit. 123 The Court indicated that these factors compelled its finding that the additional year
or two of compulsory education would yield the state "at best a speculative gain. " 124
In conclusion, it is doubtful that any extant religious or social
group could satisfy the strict standards of Y oder. 1211 Nevertheless,
the case does establish a theoretical foundation upon which further
exemptions to compulsory education could be built. If societal views
evolve to the point at which institutional education is no longer perceived to further core interests,126 then Yoder would support a conclusion that the state interest in institutional education is no longer
compelling. Once that conclusion is reached, parents who assert a
fundamental right to control their children's education should be able
to gain exemptions from state compulsory education requirements,
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
1-26.

See 406 U.S. at 224-25.
406 U.S. at 235.
406 U.S. at 225. See text at note 104 supra.
406 U.S. at 226-27.
See 406 U.S. at 227.
But see Knudsen, supra note 47, at 1512 n.36.
The intellectual foundation for such an evolution exists. See generally I.
BERG, EDUCATION AND Jons: THE GREAT TRAINING ROBBERY (1971); P. GOODMAN,
COMPULSORY MIS-EDUCATION AND TI-IE COMMUNl1Y OF ScHOLARS (1964); I. ILLICH,
DESCHOOLING Soc1E1Y (1971).
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at least if they can demonstrate that society's remaining core collectivist interests can be satisfied in a noninstitutional context.

B.

The Conflict over Equal Educational Opportunity

The second type of conflict over the scope of universal education
involves the demands of individuals for greater educational benefits
than the state is willing to provide. 127 Since the 1954 Supreme
Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education,1 28 such claims for
greater access, usually asserted under the equal protection clause,129
have substantially outnumbered individual efforts to secure exemp-tions from formal education.
As noted above, individuals demanding greater educational opportunities in such cases assert the collectivist interest in equality of
educational experience to support their claims, and the state responds by appealing to such pluralistic interests as "local control''
and parental input in educational decisions. 130 The ultimate accommodation that the courts have achieved is very similar to that reached
in the context of claims for exemption from compulsory education.
An individual claim for increased access to the academic and socialization opportunities of public education is likely to prevail if it coincides with the core collectivist interests of the state (i.e., achievement of sufficient political literacy, economic self-sufficiency, and social integration). However, an aspiration for educational opportunities exactly equal to those enjoyed by others is analogous to the
127. See note 45 supra.
128. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
129. The equal protection clause alone does not create an individual right to education. Individual rights to education arise under the equal protection clause only
when (1) a state maintains a tax-supported school system, and (2) the state laws
governing such system infringe on an individual's right to equal protection of the
Jaw. See Comment, supra note 4, at 351-52.
In equal protection terms, the argument that will be. advanced in section II-B of
the text is that a basic education sufficient to prevent an individual from becoming
a liability to society is a fundamental right, see text at notes 13S-4O infra; any
state interference with this right through discriminatory regulation or administration
of public schools should invoke strict judicial scrutiny. The proposition that a basic
education is a fundamental right includes both the academic and socialization functions of education. However, the proposition will most likely only be an issue when
the academic function of education is the primary concern. An allegation of a deprivation of adequate socialization will usually involve the suspect classification of race,
which would require the strict scrutiny analysis.
The argument in section II-B of the text will be that the individual's interest in
basic socialization should be given greater weight in determining when a suspect state
classification exists. See text at notes 187-204 infra. Of course, the most controversial issue in the public school desegregation area has been the scope of the required
remedy once an unconstitutional state classification has been found. On this issue
the argument below is that the required scope of the remedy is tied to the provision
of an adequate community-wide socializing experience through public education. See
text at notes 212-49 infra.
130. See text at notes S8-S9 supra•.
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state's desire to standardize people asserted in Pierce, and the individual asserting such a claim will generally lose. This section will
first examine individual claims for increased academic opportunities.
It will then analyze the desegregation cases as an example of individual demands for equal access to the socialization function of education.
l.

Access to Academic Opportunities

In. San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 131 the

Supreme Court established constitutional guidelines for the right of
greater exppsure to academic opportunities in education. Specifically, the Court held that the Texas system of local property taxation was a constitutional method of financing public schools even
though it resulted in unequal per pupil expenditures among the
state's school districts. The Court held that there was no fundamental right to education132 and that the Texas financing system had a
reasonable relation to the legitimate state interest in local control of
education.133
Conceptually, Rodriguez is the mirror image of Pierce. 184 The
individual claim for equal dollar expenditures per pupil can be
viewed as a demand for standardization of the educational product
closely akin to the state's demand in Pierce for compulsory attendance at standardized schools. Not surprisingly, therefore, the local
control rationale used by the Rodriguez Court to justify its denial
of the claim for uniform expenditures protects parental input into
public education just as Pierce protected parental direction of the
education of their children.
The plaintiffs in Rodriguez argued that a fundamental constitutional right to education was· implicit in the right of free speech
("[t]he marketplace of ideas is an empty forum for those lacking
basic communicative skills" 135 ) and in the right to vote (",a voter
cannot cast his ballot intelligently unless his reading skills and
thought processes have been adequately developed" 136 ). The
Texas school system indisputably provided every child with at least
the "opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skiIJs necessary for the
enjoyment of the right of speech and of full participation in the political process," 187 ·and the Rodriguez Court strongly implied that individuals have a fundamental right to such a level of schooling. 138
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.
138.

411 U.S. 1 (1972).
411 U.S. at 37.
411 U.S. at 55.
See text at notes 89-94 supra.
411 U.S. at 35.
411 U.S. at 36.
411 U.S. at 37.
Even if it were conceded that some identifiable quantum of education is
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The Court held, however, that the Constitution establishes no fundamental right to education beyond this basic level. It concluded that
while the Constitution guarantees these rights, it does not guarantee
"the most effective speech or the most informed electoral choice" 139
and, accordingly, it does not implicitly guarantee an opportunity to
experience the most effective education.
Thus, the individual apparently does have a fundamental right
to education that coincides with the state's compelling interest in requiring education. Both the right and the interest focus on considerations of political literacy and economic self-sufficiency. Education,
therefore, might be viewed as a reciprocal arrangement between the
individual and the state for their mutual benefit. What a state can
constitutionally compel, it ought to have a constitutional duty to provide, and, conversely, what a state cannot compel, individuals should
not have a right to demand. 140
a constitutionally protected prerequisite to the meaningful exercise of either
right, we have no indication that the present levels of educational expenditures
in Texas provide an education that falls short. Whatever merits appellees' argument might have if a State's financing system occasioned an absolute denial of
educational opportunities to any of its children, that argument provides no basis
for finding an interference with fundamental rights where only relative differences fa spending levels are involved and where-as is true in the present caseno charge fairly could be made that the system fails to provide each child with
an opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary for the enjoyment
of the rights of free speech and of full participation in the political process.
411 U.S. at 36-37. See Dimond, The Constitutional Right to Education: The Quiet
Revolution, 24 HASTINGS L.J. 1087, 1105 (1973) ("In the case of exclusion from
educational opportunity, we deal with a system of public education which does deny
to some children all opportunity to acquire the basic minimal skills necessary to
citizenship [and] therefore we deal with state regulation directly affecting freedoms
guaranteed by the Constitution"); Handel, The Role of the Advocate in Securing
the Handicapped Child's Right to an Effective Minimal Education, 36 OHIO Sr. L.J.
349, 362-64 (1975). For a discussion of the position that the equal protection clause
is most helpfully viewed as a guarantee of a minimal level of certain social benefits,
see Michelman, The Supreme Court, 1968 Term-Foreword: On Protecting the Poor
Through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969).
139. 411 U.S. at 36 (emphasis original).
140. The suggested quid pro quo rationale for imposing upon the state a duty
to provide a minimal education is still valid even if a state should decide not to
compel edu~ation. This follows for two reasons. First, the indivdual's right to demand should arise by virtue of the state's power to compel. The state can compel
one to experience the opportunity of achieving a basic education; thus the individual
should have the right to demand the opportunity of achieving a basic education
whether or not the state chooses to compel. The state's decision not to compel is
equivalent to the individual's decision not to demand.
Second, the equal protection clause supports the imposition of such a duty on
a state that provides public education, independent of the compulsory nature of such
education. Assuming, under the strong implications of Rodriguez, that individuals
have a fundamental right to seek knowledge and education sufficient to guarantee
the meaningful exercise of the rights to vote and speak, then a state system of public
education that interferes with this right is subject to a high degree of judicial scrutiny.
Public education interferes with the right to pursue a basic education in three circumstances: when a child is excluded from public education, when a child is classified
into an educational level beneath the child's intellectual ability and, finally, when
a child unable to achieve a basic level of education from exposu.re to generally pro-
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The pluralistic interest that limited the plaintiffs' rights in Rodriguez, local control of schools, parallels the interest that limited the
state's power in Pierce and Yoder, parental control over the education of children. 141 Pierce recognized the right of parents to direct
the education of their children, at least to the extent of choosing between private and public schools. 142 While the parents of children
who attend public schools are unable to supervise the individual education of their children, local control at least allows such parents
some input into the educational decision-making process. 143 As Justice Powell stated in Rodriguez, local control permits parents both
the opportunity to generate increased revenues for the support of
the public sohools that educate their children and, "[e]qually important, . . . the opportunity . . . [to participate] in the decisionmaking process that determines how these local tax dollars will be
spent."144 Thus, the Court in Rodriguez achieved an accommodation between collectivist and pluralistic interests in academic educavided public instruction is offered only such instruction. Therefore, a state that
decides not to compel education, but classifies students in one of the above ways,
ought to make a compelling showing of why it should not make available to each
child the best possible opportunity for achieving a basic level of education. See Mills
v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 874-75 (D.D.C. 1972); Dimond, supra note
138, at 1121-26; Handel, supra note 138, at 367-74. Contra, Cuyahoga County Assn.
for Retarded Children & Adults v. Essex, 44 U.S.L.W. 2479 (U.S.D.C. Ohio, May
5, 1976) (refusing to find a fundamental right to even a minimal level of education).
141. The Court in Rodriguez clearly viewed local control of public schools as
a manifestation of pluralism:
In an era that has witnessed a consistent trend toward centralization of the functions of government, local sharing of responsibility for public education has survived . . . .
. . • Each locality is free to tailor local programs to local needs. Pluralism
also affords some opportunity for experimentation, innovation, and a healthy
competition for educational excellence. An analogy to the Nation-State relationship in our federal system seems uniquely appropriate. Mr. Justice Brandeis
identified as one of the peculiar strengths of our form of government each State's
freedom to "serve as a laboratory; and try novel social and economic experiments." No area of social concern stands to profit more from a multiplicity
of viewpoints and from a diversity of approaches than does public education.
41 I U.S. at 49-50.
142. See text at note 94 supra.
143. It has been forcefully argued that local control of schools might have some
degree of constitutional protection:
I do not believe recognition of [the] right [to educate one's children as one
chooses, which was recognized in Pierce,] can be confined solely to a parent's
choice to send a child to public or private school. Most parents cannot afford
the luxuzy of a private education for their children, and the dual obligation of
private tuitions and public taxes. Those who may for numerous reasons seek
public education for their children should not be forced to forfeit all interest
or voice in the school their child attends. It would, of course, be impractical
to allow the wishes of particular parents to be controlling. Yet the interest of
the parent in the enhanced parent-school and parent-child communication allowed by the neighborhood unit ought not to be suppressed by force of law.
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 247 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part). See also Wormhoudt, Supreme Court Decisions, in
THE TWELVE YEAR SENTENCE 64-70 (W. Rickenbacker ed. 1974).
144. 411 U.S. at 49-50.
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tion145 parallel to that which was achieved in the compulsory education context. The state can regulate the mode of education and can
itself be required to provide education until the goals of self-sufficiency and political literacy are reached. But beyond that point,
pluralism, whether manifested in enhanced local school board
power or in direct parental control over the education of their children, must prevail over the powers and duties of the state.146
Although this collectivist-pluralist continuum provides an effective method of analyzing the countervailing interests in education,
the determination of the -actual educational level at which the rights
and duties in education should shift poses a difficult problem. The
definitional problems inherent in concepts such as "political literacy"
and "economic independence" have forced the courts in compulsory
education cases to rely substantially upon the meanings given these
terms by the states in their compulsory education requirements. 147
Similarly, the courts in equal educational opportunity cases have usually been forced to defer to the educational offerings actually provided by the state in determining what is meant by a "basic education. "148 In Rodriguez, the Court recognized that no clear relationship between educational input (including resources, methods, and
policies) and educational results has yet been established. 149 Thus,
rather than defining the right to education in terms of either resources or results, it did so in terms of the state's efforts to ensure
145. "The Texas system of school finance is responsive to these two forces.
While assuring a basic education for every child in the State, it permits and encourages a large measure of participation in and control of each district's schools
at the local level." 411 U.S. at 49. One state court has also acknowledged this
accommodation of interests in the educational program:
Where one district may offer a richer program in music and dramatic arts,
another may go beyond the State's requirements in science or social studies, or
physical education or agriculture, and others may emphasize more than one field
of student activity beyond the college preparatory phases. . . . These are
choices which inhere in the idea of viable local participation in establishing,
operating and funding the common schools. If these differences are of constitutional dimension, there exists a remedy in equity to compel the particular
school district or the state in a particular case to provide such services . . . .
Northshore School Dist. No. 417 v. Kinnear, 530 P.2d 178, 191 (Wash. 1974).
146. See text at notes 108-09 supra.
147. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 221 (1972) (indicating that
Court, in generality of cases, would uphold state's system of compulsory education).
148. See, e.g., Mcinnis v. Shapiro, 293 F. Supp. 327, 336 (N.D. III. 1968), affd.
sub nom. Mcinnis v. Ogilvie, 394 U.S. 322 (]969).
149. The relationship between educational inputs and educational outcomes has
been called the education production function. See Yudof, supra note 42, at 42229. Although the production function of education has been extensively discussed,
few definitive conclusions have been reached as to what actually accounts for educational achievement. See generally I. COLEMAN, E. CAMPBELL, C. HOBSON, J. McPoRTLAND, A. MOOD, F. WEINFOLD & R. YORK, EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNl1Y (1966) [hereinafter J. COLEMAN]; J. GUTIIRIE, G. KLIENDORFER, H. LEVIN &
R. STOUT, SCHOOLS AND INEQUALITY (1971); Mosteller & Moynihan, A Pathbreaking
Report, in ON EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUN11Y 347 (F. Mosteller & D.
Moynihan eds. 1972).
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that state-determined basic educational resources are available in all
schools. 150 In effect, this means that for most children, the fundamental right to an adequate education is merely the right to attend
public schools.
However, just ·as a unique showing of "self sufficiency" by the
Amish in Yoder forced the state to alter its compulsory education
requirement because the standard means of advancing collectivist interests were not needed, unique showings of educational need may
force a state to alter its functional definition of "basic education." 1 a1
An example of a group with unique needs is provided by children
whose native language is not English and who are thereby substan,tially more difficult to teach. 152 Such non-English speaking students
have in several cases sought to provide :them with a compensatory educational program. 153 They have asserted that a "basic education"
provided solely in English does not permit them to achieve political
literacy ·and economic self-sufficiency. 154 The state has replied that in
150. See 411 U.S. at 44-45.
151. See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Mills v. Board of Educ.,
348 F. Supp. 866 (D.D.C. 1972).
152. A second group of children that possesses unique educational needs are children with mental, emotional or physical handicaps. See generally Weintraub & Abeson, Appropriate Education for All Handicapped Children: A Growing Issue, 23
SYR. L. REV. 1037 (1972). A right to a basic education for handicapped children
is gaining recognition in both constitutional and legislative contexts. See Fiske, Special Education ls Now a Matter of Civil Rights, N.Y. Times, April 25, 1976, § 12
(Spring Survey of Education), at 1, col. 1 (late city ed.). Constitutional support for
the right to a basic education can be derived from the equal protection clause, guaranteeing exposure to instruction adequate to create for the handicapped child the opportunity to achieve a basic education, or from the due process clause, guaranteeing
proper procedural placement of a handicapped child within an educational system.
See Mills v. Board of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 875-76 (D.D.C. 1972); Dimond,
supra note 138; Handel, supra note 138. The handicapped child's right to a basic
education has been recognized in state and federal legislation. Forty-eight states have
enacted laws mandating special education for handicapped children and enforcement
appears to be growing. Fiske, supra, at 14, col. 5. See, e.g., MICH, COMP. LAws ANN,
§§ 340.10-.12, 340.252b, 340.291a, 340.298c, 340.317a, 340.329c, 340.601-.601b, 340.613-.773a, 340.780k (1976). Congress recently passed the Education of All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L No. 94-142, 89 Stat. 773, which requires states
after 1977, to provide a "free, appropriate education" for all handicapped children.
All Congressional requirements for education of the handicapped are now set out
in 20 U.S.C. §§ 1401-1461 (1970), as amended, (Supp. 1975). In light of these
statutory developments, it is doubtful that courts, in the context of handicapped
children, will have to address as a matter of constitutional law the implication of
Rodriguez that a basic education is a fundamental right for equal protection or due
process purposes. See Harrison v. Michigan, 350 F. Supp. 846, 847 (E.D. Mich.
1972) (plaintiffs' equal protection complaint held moot). See also text at note 177
infra.
153. See, e.g., Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Morales v. Shannon, 516
F.2d 411 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1034 (1975); Serna v. Portales Municipal
Schools, 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974).
154. The overlap between the academic and socialization functions of education,
see note 51 supra, is manifest here. The claim is essentially that the inability to
achieve adequate academic performance, caused by the linguistic obstacle, leads to
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such cases responsibility for educatlional achievement must .rest not on
society but on the individual. 155 Because the collectivist interests asserted in such cases parallel those that prevailed in the compulsory
education cases and were recognized by implication in Rodriguez,
it seems that they should prevail in this context as well. While courts
have consistently recognized in cases brought under the Civil Rights
Act of 1964 that special courses for non-English speaking students
are necessary means of achieving literacy and self-sufficiency,156
they have differed on whether such student claims are supported by
-the equal protection clause. 157
The basic issue in cases that assert a constitutional claim is
whether similar treatment of persons not similarly situated necessarily satisfies the equal protection clause.158 The plaintiffs in these
cases generally do not contend that the state has acted to deprive
them of educational opportunities; ,rather, they ·assert :that the state
has an affirmative duty to ameliorate their linguistic disadvantage to
ensure them opportunities equal to those of individuals who enter
school without such handicaps. Such plaintiffs are faced with a difficult doctrinal obstacle to the establishment of a violation of the fourteenth amendment. Equal protection claims require a showing of
state action. 159
Courts have differed on whether claims that request compensatory programs to ensure equal educational opportunities have successfully demonstrated unconstitutional state action. 100 In Lau v.
Nichols, 161 the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, finding no state acsocial stigmatization; moreover the combination of poor academic achievement and
social isolation prevents the educational training and experience necessary for integrated participation in the political and economic mainstreams of American society:
Undisputed evidence shows that Spanish surnamed students do not reach the
achievement levels attained by their Anglo counterparts. . • . [A]chievement
tests, which are given totally in the English language, disclose that [students with
English language deficiencies] are almost a full grade behind [other] children
• • . in reading, language mechanics and language expression . . • .
. • • [C]hildren who are not achieving often demonstrate both academic and
emotional disorders. They are frustrated and they express their frustration in
lack of attendance, lack of school involvement and lack of community involvement. Their frustrations are reflected in hostile behavior, discipline problems
and eventually dropping out of school.
Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools, 499 F.2d 1147, 1149-50 (10th Cir. 1974).
155. See text at note 162 infra.
156. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970). See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974); Serna
v. Portales Municipal Schools, 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974).
151. Compare Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools, 351 F. Supp. 1279 (D.N.M.
1972) (violation), with Lau v. Nichols, 483 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1973) (no violation).
158. See Serna v. Portales, 351 F. Supp. 1279, 1281 (D.N.M. 1972).
159. See, e.g., Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1973); Burton v. Wilmington
Parking Authority, 365 U.S. 715 (1961); Shelly v. Kramer, 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
160. Compare Lau v. Nichols, 483 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1973), with Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools, 351 F. Supp. 1279 (D.N.M. 1972).
161. 483 F.2d 791 (9th Cir. 1973).
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tion, denied the request of Chinese children in San Francisco for
compensatory education in English:
Every student brings to the starting line of his educational career different advantages and disadvantages caused in part by social, economic and cultural background, created and continued completely
apart from any contribution by the school system. That some of
these may be impediments which can be overcome does not amount
to a "denial" by the Board of educational opportunities within the
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment should the Board fail to give
them special attention, this even though they are characteristic of a
particular ethnic group. 1 62

In support of its conclusion that the plaintiffs had asserted the requisite state action, the Lau dissent argued that because the children
were "functionally" excluded from education, 163 the state had acted
even though it had not actually "classified" such students. 184 The
dissent emphasized that the state's system of universal compulsory
education,165 which was based on English166 and which required
mastery of English as a prerequisite to graduation from public high
sohool, carried with it reciprocal responsibilities: 167 "The pervasive
involvement of the state with the very language problem challenged
forbids the majority's finding of no state action." 168 In Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools, 169 Spanish-speaking plaintiffs brought a sim162. 483 F.2d at 797. However, the court contradicted the above implication
that the achievement of English literacy is essentially an individual responsibility
and hence a pluralistic interest. It asserted that the "use of English as the language
of instruction . . . is intimately and properly related to the educational and socializ•
ing purposes for which public schools were established." 483 F.2d at 798. This
assertion of collectivist interests in individual achievement of English literacy is
meaningless if the state assumes no responsibility for "educating and socializing" isolated cultural and linguistic groups.
163. For a general presentation of the educational and legal problems concerning
exclusion and "functional exclusion" from public schools, see D. KIRP & M. YuooF,
supra note 46, at 628-43.
164. See 483 F.2d at 805 (Hufstedler, J., dissenting from denial of hearing en
bane).
165. CAL. EDuc. CoDE § 12101 (West 1975).
166. CAL. Eouc. CODE § 71 (West 1975).
167. CAL. EDuc. CODE § 8573 (West 1975).
168. 483 F.2d at 806; cf. text at note 191 infra. This argument finds some support in the Supreme Court criminal justice cases of Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
(1956), and Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963), which held that an individual cannot be denied access to various aspects of the criminal justice system on
account of lack of ability to pay, and which required the state to take affirmative
action to provide access. Both criminal justice and educational systems are compulsory. An indigent convict cannot fully utilize the criminal justice system without
money and a non-English speaking student cannot take advantage of an educational
system without compensatory education. A convict's poverty is no more attributable
to the state than is the language deficiency of non-English speaking students. However, the situations are distinguishable in terms of classification. Indigent convicts
were actually deprived of access to state benefits; non-English speaking students were
only functionally denied a state education.
169. 351 F. Supp. 1279 (D.N.M. 1972).
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ilar claim for a compensatory educational program. The court
adopted a position on the state action issue similar to that advocated
by ithe Lau dissent and, in effect, 'held thait the denigration of an individual's interests in education through the "promulgation and institution of a program . . . which ignores the needs of [non-English
speaking] students does constitute state action."170
Because no similar doctrinal obstacle to recognition of an individual's interest in gaining sufficient education exists in claims based
on federal legislation,171 courts in such cases have universally recognized a statutory right to compensatory education for non-English
speaking students.172 Thus, the Supreme Court in Lau v. Nichols1 13
chose not to reach the equal protection issue. Instead, it held that
section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964174 placed an affirmative
duty on the State of California to ensure that the Chinese children
of San Francisco received a "meaningful" education and thus had
their collectivist interests in education satisfied. 175 In so interpreting,
section 601, the Court placed considerable emphasis on the reciprocity rationale articulated by the dissenting Ninth Circuit judges that
a "basic" education becomes a fundamental right when the state undertakes to compel education:
1

170. 351 F. Supp. at 1283.
111. See The Civil Rights Act of 1964, § 601, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970). The
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare guidelines provide: "Where inability
to speak and understand the English language excludes national origin-minority group
children from effective participation in the educational program offered by a school
district, the district must take affirmative steps to rectify the language deficiency
in order to open its instructional program to these students." 35 Fed. Reg. 11,595
(1970). In addition, Congress has enacted The Equal Educational Opportunity Act
of 1974, § 204(f), 20 U.S.C.A. § 1703(f) (Supp. 1976), which provides that no
state shall deny equal educational opportunity by failing "to take appropriate action
to overcome language barriers that impede equal participation by its students in its
instructional programs."
172. The appropriate remedy for non-English speaking students who have been
denied a basic education appears to be within the discretion of the district courts.
See Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 564-65 (1974) ("No specific remedy is urged
upon us. Teaching English to the students of Chinese ancestry who do not speak
the language is one choice. Giving instructions to this group in Chinese is another.
There may be others"); Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools, 499 F.2d 1147, 1154
(10th Cir. 1974) ("[T]he trial court, under its inherent equitable power, can properly fashion a bilingual-bicultural program which will ensure that Spanish surnamed
children receive a meaningful education"). The bilingual-bicultural program ordered
in Serna recognized the necessity of accommodating the pluralistic interests of the
Spanish surnamed in their own language and culture while satisfying the collectivist
goal of a basic education for everyone.
173. 414 U.S. 563 (1974).
174. 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970) ("No person in the United States shall, on the
ground of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance"). See note 171 supra.
175. See 414 U.S. at 566.
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Under those state-imposed standards there is no equality of treatment merely by providing students with the same facilities, textbooks,
teachers, and curriculum; for students who do not understand English
are effectively foreclosed from any meaningful education.
Basic English skills are at the very core of what these public
schools teach. Imposition of a requirement that, before a child can
effectively participate in the educational program, he must already
have acquired those basic skills is to make a mockery of public education. We know that those who do not understand English are certain to find their classroom experiences wholly incomprehensible and
in no way·meaningful.1 76
The fact that courts can point to a statutory right to a meaningful "basic" education would seem to explain, at least in part, why
more courts have not recognized a constitutional right to compensatory programs for non-English speaking students. Because they
have been able to protect the interests of individuals in acquiring
an education without extending the doctrine of state action, courts
have not yet been forced to recognize the implication of Rodriguez
that all individuals have a constitutional right to an academic education sufficient to ensure their political literacy and economic self-sufficiency.177
2.

Access to Socialization Opportunities:
The Example of Desegregation

Individuals have also asked the courts to recognize their fundamental right to take part in the socialization process inherent in a
commonly experienced "basic" education. Indeed, the modern era
of education litigation began with the Supreme Court's acknowledgement in Brown v. Board of Education 118 that racial segregation in
the public schools caused Black students to suffer serious injury by
denying them access to the mainstream of American society: "[T]o
separate [minority children] from others of similar age and qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority
as to ,their status in ,the community that may ·affect their hearts and
minds in a way unlikely to be undone. " 179
176. 414 U.S. at 566.
177. See,note 152 supra.
178. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
179. 347 U.S. at 494. See Fischer, Race and Reconciliation: The Role of the
School, in THE NEGRO AMERICAN 491, 493 (T. Parsons & K. Clark eds. 1967) (noting "the unfortunate psychological effect upon a child of membership in a school
where every pupil knows that, regardless of his personal attainments, the group with
which he is identified is viewed as less able, less successful, and less acceptable than
the majority of the community"). The passage in Brown concerning psychological
effects of segregation has been interpreted both as an accurate empirical statement
and as a specific expression of the morality underlying collectivist ideals. Compare
Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARV.
L. REV. 564, 568-70 (1965), with Yudof, supra note 42, at 456-59. Both interpreta-
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The socialization function of education is to inculcate certain attitudes and behavioral patterns in the young180 so they will not become
social liabilities. Exposure to a common educational experience is
a means of establishing channels of communication between children
of diverse backgrounds, fostering understanding, and thus preventing the development of feelings of inferiority that detract from an
individual's ability to participate effectively in society. Attendance
at integrated schools can create a sense of belonging which is arguably a prerequisite to actually becoming a productive member of a
cohesive and harmonious society. 181 Thus, although individuals may
seek access to greater socialization opportunities in a variety of contexts, 182 the vast majority of such claims have sought to compel racial
desegregation of the schools. Since Brown, the courts have struggled to define and protect the Black child's interest in undergoing
socialization in the public schools-an interest that must be advanced
if the schools are to perform their function as "melting pots" of society.183 However, primarily because racial desegregation is an
emotional issue, courts have not yet arrived at the same accommodation of the collectivist interest in equality of educational experience
and the countervailing pluralistic interest of parents in preserving the
"neighborhood school" achieved in other education disputes.
The following discussion contends that the process of achieving
an accommodation in the desegregation area has heretofore been impeded because courts, in determining the existence of constitutional
violations, have tended to undervalue the interests of socialization,
while in fashioning desegregation remedies, they have overemphasized
these interests to the detriment of pluralism. 184 This undervaluation
has often led courts to deny the existence of constitutional violations
tions attribute to Brown recognition of the legitimacy of an individual's interest in the
socialization function of education and not merely prohibition of racial categorization. See Goodman, De Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical
Analysis, 60 CALIF. L. REV. 275, 285-90 (1972); text at notes 189-92 infra. See
also Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 220-23 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Yudof, supra note 42, at 455-56; Franklin, The
Two Worlds of Race: A Historical View, in THE NEGRO .AMERICAN, supra, at 47.
180. See note 48 supra and accompanying text.
181. See text at note 50 supra.
182. For example, the claims of non-English speaking students for compensatory
education reflect a desire for greater access to the socialization benefits of public
education. See note 154 supra.
183. Compare Cisneros v. Corpus Christi lndp. School Dist., 467 F.2d 142 (5th
Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 920 (1973), with Higgens v. Board of Educ., 395
F. Supp. 444 (W.D. Mich. 1973), affd., 508 F.2d 779 (6th Cir. 1974).
184. Professor Yudof presents two ethical principles, which he believes were the
bases for Brown, as alternative rationales for directing desegregation: The "racial
neutrality principle" is based on pluralistic values and the ''universalist" principle
is based on collectivist values. See Yudof, supra note 42, at 446-64. It is contended
in this section of the Project that judicial direction of desegregation is premised upon
an accommodation of these ethical principles.
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by refusing to find state action sufficient to satisfy the fourteenth
amendment. 185 The result is that despite the integrated nature of
their communities, many Black students are being forced to attend
segregated schools and are thus denied the benefits of socialization.
On the other hand, once the courts have found a constitutional violation, they have often imposed remedies that unnecessarily disrupt
"tJhe deeply felt desire of citizens for a sense of community in their
public education." 186 It is submitted, however, that the courts are
now re-evaluating the countervailing interests in desegregation and,
as a result, have begun both to expand the theory of violation and
to limit the scope of their remedial orders. Thus, courts now appear
to be gradually achieving an accommodation consistent with that
reached in other conflicts over access to education.
The threshold issue in desegregation litigation is, of course,
whether the plaintiffs have asserted a violation of the equal protection clause. As in equal protection claims for access to academic
opportunities, the state has no duty to desegregate racially divided
schools unless the plaintiffs have demonstrated the existence of state
action. 187 In determining whether the requirement has been fulfilled, courts have traditionally distinguished between de facto and
de jure segregation and have required a finding of the latter. 188
However, the utility of this doctrinal distinction has been increasingly
questioned. 189 As the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Cis-

neros v. Corpus Christi Independent School District: 100
The Negro child in Cleveland, Chicago, Los Angeles, Boston, New
York, or any other area of the nation which the opinion classifies
under de facto segregation, would receive little comfort from the assertion that the racial make-up of their school system does not violate
their constitutional rights because they were born into a de facto society, while the exact same racial make-up of the school system in the
17 southern and border states violates the constitutional rights of their
counterparts, or even their blood brothers, because they were born
into a de jure society. All children everywhere in the nation are protected by the Constitution, and treatment which violates their constitutional rights in one area of the country, also violates such constitutional rights in another area. 191
185. See note 159 supra.
186. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 246 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
181. See note 159 supra.
188. See, e.g., Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717, 748-52 (1974); Keyes v. School
Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 208 (1973); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 11-14 (1971).
189. See, e.g., Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 218 (1973), See generally Goodman, supra note 179, at 283-98.
190. 467 F.2d 142 (5th Cir. 1972).
191. 467 F.2d at 148, quoting United States v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ.,
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The de jure-de facto distinction has had the effect of insulating
large numbers of Northern schools from court-ordered desegregation
even though minority students in these -schools are denied the fullest socialization opportunities of public education. Consequently,
courts have begun to expand the concept of de jure segregation. In
Keyes v. School District No. J, 192 the Supreme Court found for the
first time de jure segregation in a school district that had "never been
operated under a constitutional or statutory provision that mandated
or permitted racial segregation in public education."103 In one part
of the school system, the district court and court of appeals had discovered a clear case of de jure segregation in the school board's
" 'undeviating purpose to isolate Negro students' in segregated
schools 'while preserving the Anglo character of [other] schools.' " 104
The Court held that these "intentionally segregative school board actions in a meaningful portion of [the] school system" created a presumption that other segregated schools within the district were also
the product of intentional state action. 195 By thus placing the burden of proving nonsegregative motive upon the school board, the
Keyes Court substantially facilitated the proof of state action in largescale desegregation cases.
Although the Keyes Court in this way extended the reach of de
jure segregation theory, it did not consider how presumptions of segregative intent might be applied to cases in which there is no proof
of intentionally segregative state action in any part of the school system. Thus, the Keyes majority perpetuated the distinction between
de facto and de jure segregation for most purposes. In his separate
opinion, however, Justice Powell contended that because "public
schools are creatures of the state"196 and because the focus of concern in desegregation litigation should be "for those who attend such
schools, rather than for perpetuating a legalism rooted in history
rather than present reality," 197 it should not be constitutionally relevant "whether the segregation is state-created or state-assisted or
merely state-perpetuated . . . .mos Thus, he advocated a sharp departure from previous constitutional analysis:
Rather than continue to prop up a distinction no longer grounded
in principle, and contributing to ["uneven and unpredictable results,
380 F.2d 385, 397 (5th Cir. 1967). See also A. BICKEL, THE SUPREME CoURT AND
119-20 (1970).
192. 413 U.S. 189 (1973).
193. 413 U.S. at 191.
194. 413 U.S. at 199, quoting Keyes v. School Dist No. 1, 303 F. Supp. 289,
294 (D. Colo. 1969).
195. 413 U.S. at 208.
196. 413 U.S. at 227 (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
197. 413 U.S. at 219.
198. 413 U.S. at 227.
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to protracted and inconclusive litigation, to added burdens on the federal courts, and to serious disruption of individual school systems"],
we should acknowledge that wherever public school segregation exists
to a substantial degree there is prima facie evidence of a constitutional violation by the responsible school board. It is true, of course,
that segregated schools-wherever located-are not solely the product of the action- or inaction of public school authorities. . . . But
it is also true that public school boards have continuing, detailed responsibility for the public school system within their district . . . •
[A]s foreshadowed in Swann and as implicitly held today, school
boards have a duty to minimize and ameliorate segregated conditions
by pursuing an affirmative policy of desegregation. It is this policy
which must be applied consistently on a national basis without regard
to a doctrinal distinction which has outlived its time. 100

In numerous desegregation cases since Keyes, lower courts have
been required to assess whether segregated schools were the result
of intentional state action, and a number of courts have adopted Justice Powell's position on the use of presumptions of segregative intent even in the absence of a showing of deliberate acts of segregation. Thus, the Second, Third, and Eighth Circuits applied such a
presumption when it was established that school authorities had engaged in acts or omissions, the natural and foreseeable consequence
of which was to bring about or maintain segregation. 200 School
boards, therefore, are increasingly being required to prove that "segregative intent was not among the factors that motivated their actions. 11201
The growing judicial application of a presumption of intent
against school boards that maintain segregated schools substantially
emasculates the concept of de facto segregation and thus should enable more plaintiffs to succeed in desegregation cases. 202 This trend
is grounded on the belief that all children are fully entitled to the
199. 413 U.S. at 235-36.
200. United States v. School Dist. of Omaha, 521 F.2d 530 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 946 (1975); Hart v. Community School Bd. of Educ., 512 F.2d 37
(2d Cir. 1975); Oliver v. Michigan State Bd. of Educ., 508 F.2d 178 (6th Cir. 1974),
cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975). The court in Omaha found support for this test
in Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974). 521 F.2d at 536-37 n.10. See Dimond, School Segregation in the North: There ls but One Constitution, 1 HARV.
CIV. Rimrrs-CIV. LIB. L. REV. 1, 4-6 (1972). But see Johnson v. San Francisco
Unified School Dist., 500 F.2d 349 (9th Cir. 1974). See also Morgan v. Kerrigan,
509 F.2d 580, 588-89 (1st Cir. 1974).
201. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 210 (1973); see United States
v. School Dist. of Omaha, 521 F.2d 530 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 946
(1975).
202. Recognition as de jure discrimination of school segregation that results from
action of a type other than discriminatory conduct of school officials, such as zoning
or housing laws or practices, would further undercut the concept of de facto segregation. This still appears to be an open question. See Milliken v. Bradley, 418
U.S. 717, 728 n.7 (1974); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S.
1, 23 (1971). But see Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.), affd., 423
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socialization opportunities of nonsegregated public schools. Moreover, it is consistent with the reciprocity rationale articulated in connection with academic opportunities. 203 Because the state can constitutionally compel children to attend educational institutions to socialize them for meaningful participation in society, it should have
an affirmative duty to ensure that all children who demand an adequate socializing experience204 receive such an experience "on an
equal basis to all. "20 rs
Once the fact of de jure segregation is established, either by direct proof or by unrebutted presumption, school authorities have a
duty not only to dismantle the dual school system, but also to establish a "unitary school system" in which the effects of past de jure
segregation have been eliminated "root and branch." 206 In fashioning desegregation orders, courts have usually relied on a combination
of remedies-student transportation, redrawing attendance zones,
and other administrative practices-to establish a unitary system of
education. 207 Generally, the goal of such remedies has been to
achieve a student population :in each school that approximates the
Black-White ratio in the community as a whole. 208 This remedy has
been increasingly criticized, however, as an attempt to use the public
schools to further broad and controversial social objectives r.ather
U.S. 963 (1975) (relying in part on state involvement in housing to find de jure
discrimination in interdistrict context).
203. See note 140 supra and accompanying text.
204. Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 225-26 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I would now define it as the right, derived
from the Equal Protection Clause, to expect that once the State has assumed responsibility for education, local school boards will operate integrated school systems within their respective districts") (emphasis original).
205. Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
206. Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 437-38 (1968).
207. See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1971).
208. See generally Boykins v. Fairfield Bd. of Educ., 457 F.2d 1091 (5th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 962 (1975); Brewer v. School Bd., 434 F.2d 408 (4th
Cir. 1970); Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich. 1972), revd. in part,
418 U.S. 717 (1974); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 306 F. Supp.
1299 (W.D.N.C. 1969), affd., 402 U.S. 1 (1971 ). The Supreme Court has ordered
consideration of Black-White student ratios. See, e.g., Wright v. Council, 407 U.S.
451, 464-65 (1972); Davis v. School Commrs., 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971). This may be
inevitable if its mandate that all vestiges of de jure segregation be immediately eliminated, see Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430, 438-39 (1968), is to be fulfilled. See Yudof, supra note 42, at 449-50. However, racial ratios are not constitutionally required:
If we were to read the holding of the District Court to r~uire, as a matter
of substantive constitutional right, any particular degree of racial balance or mixing . . . we would . . . reverse. The constitutional command to desegregate
schools does not mean that every school in every community must always reflect the racial composition of the school system as a whole.
. • . [However,] [a]wareness of the racial composition of the whole school
system is likely to be a useful starting point in shaping a remedy to correct
past constitutional violations.
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than a means of safeguarding ithe individual's interest in adequate
socializiation. 209
Until recently, most school desegregation remedies sought only
to achieve collectivist interests by imposing student ratios, without
taking into account the countervailing pluralistic interests of parents
and students. 210 Thus, once a constitutional violation was established, the courts devoted their attention almost exclusively to
achieving socialization. The interest of parents in participating in
the educational decision-making that affects their children and the
interest of students in attending neighborhood schools were accorded
little weight. 211 It appears, however, that courts are now seeking
to protect these interests at the remedial stage in a manner that is
consistent with the resolution of other access disputes. By limiting
their remedial orders, courts are demonstrating increased respect for
parental involvement in the education process.
In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 212 the
Supreme Court approved for the first time a remedial order requiring substantial busing in a large metropolitan school district. Swann
asserted that "the scope of a court's equitable powers to remedy past
wrongs is broad, for breadth and flexibility are inherent in equitable
remedies." 213 The decision thereby established a precedent for
large-scale remedial orders that has been followed by lower
courts. 214 Chief Justice Burger, writing for the Court, stressed, how209. See Goodman, supra note 179, at 388 ("[e]quality of treatment . , . is better served by individual option than by forced desegregation • • . . [S]ince a racially representative classroom is not equally suited to every child • • • the state may
best treat black children equally by giving them equal opportunity to choose, rather
than by imposing upon them an objectively uniform school environment •••"); Yudof, supra note 42, at 457, quoting Novak, White Ethnic, HARPER'S, Sept. 1971, at
46 ("Blacks, frustrated by the historical experience with integration, have begun to
challenge the universal ideal and to question the legitimacy of institutions, even integrated institutions, exclusively controlled by whites. White ethnic groups too have
been critical of '[l]iberal education [that] tends to separate children from their parents,
from their roots, from their history, in the cause of a universal and superior religion'"). See also Fein, Community Schools and Social Theory: The Limits of
Universalism, in CoMMUNllY CONTROL OF ScHOOLS 76, 88-91 (H. Levin ed. 1970).
210. See, e.g., Moss v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 356 F. Supp. 675 (1973) (denying
equal protection claim of Black and Spanish surnamed parents that desegregation
remedy placed too great a burden upon their children); Hart v. County School Bd.,
329 F. Supp. 953 (E.D. Va. 1971).
211. While courts often paid lip service to pluralistic interests of the parent and
child, substantive limitations on the collectivist goal of uniform racial ratios were rare,
See, e.g., Bradley v. Milliken, 345 F. Supp. 914 (E.D. Mich. 1972) (requiring transportation of students out of their home districts to achieve racial ratios in the schools
consistent with those throughout an entire metropolitan area), revd. in part, 418 U.S.
717 (1974).
212. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
213. 402 U.S. at 15.
214. See, e.g., Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mass. 1975), alfd., 530
F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1976).
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ever, that the concept of a unitary school system does not require
"as a matter of substantive constitutional right, any particular degree
of racial balance or mixing." 215 He emphasized that desegregation
remedies should be the product of a "reconciliation of competing values. "216 Four years later, in Milliken v. Bradley, 217 a majority of
the Court did in fact limit a lower court's remedial desegregation
order in part because it failed to accord sufficient weight to pluralistic
interests in education.
In Milliken, the plaintiffs sought to desegregate the Detroit
school system, which had an extremely high percentage of Black students. Although the plaintiffs proved the existence of de jure segregation in tlle Detroit schools, 218 no showing was made that significant constitutional violations had occurred in the surrounding suburban school districts or that racially discriminatory acts of any district or the state had resulted in interdistrict segregation. 219 Nevertheless, having as its aim the establishment of a unitary school system, the district court ordered cross-district busing of students in the
Detroit school district and fifty-three of the eighty-six outlying school
districts to achieve a Black-White student ratio in each "school, grade
[and] classroom" equal to that throughout metropolitan Detroit. 220
The Supreme Court reversed, emphasizing that the autonomy of the
local districts included in the plan should have been accorded substantially more weight in the formulation of the remedy:
Boundary lines may be bridged where there has been a constitutional
violation calling for interdistrict relief, but the notion that school district lines may be casually ignored or treated as a mere administrative
convenience is contrary to the history of public education in our country. No single tradition in public education is more deeply rooted
than local control over the operation of schools; local autonomy has
long been thought essential both to the maintenance of community
concern and support for public schools and to quality of the educational process. 221

Significantly, the Court reaffirmed its position, previously articulated
in Rodriguez, that local control over the educational process is necessary <to afford "citizens an opportunity to participate in decisionmaking, [to permit] the structuring of school programs to fit local
215. 402 U.S. at 24. See note 208 supra.
216. 402 U.S. at 31.
217. 418 U.S. 717 (1974). See also Pasadena City Bd. of Educ. v. Spangler,
44 U.S.L.W. 5114 (U.S. June 28, 1976) (once racial discrimination through official
action is eliminated from a school system, a district court abuses its discretion in
requiring year-by-year adjustments of the racial composition of student bodies).
218. See 418 U.S. at 724-28.
219. See 418 U.S. at 745.
220. 418 U.S. at 733-34, quoting 345 F. Supp. 914,918 (E.D. Mich. 1972).
221. 418 U.S. at 741-42.
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needs, and [to encourage] 'experimentation, innovation, and a
healthy competition for educational excellence.' " 222
Thus, the Court's holding in Milliken that a district court can use
its equitable power to remedy de jure segregation only in districts
affected by the constitutional violation223 is in effect a new accommodation of pluralistic interests with the goals of desegregation. The
Court's concern that an interdistrict remedy could adversely affect
the ability of parents to participate in -t1he educational decision-making process was manifested in a series of questions raised by the majority: ''What would be the status and authority of the present popularly elected school boards? Would the children of Detroit be
within the jurisdiction and operating control of a school board elected
by the parents and residents of other districts? What board or
boards would levy taxes for school operations in these fifty-four districts constituting •the consolidated metropolitan area. . . ?" 224 The
Court's deference to existing school district boundaries was most
likely based on a reluctance to fashion remedies that restructure state
and local governmental operations rather than on a determination
that limiting judicial remedies to the districts where constitutional
violations occurred is an appropriate accommodation of interests. 22 G
222. 418 U.S. at 742.
223. 418 U.S. at 744-45.
224. 418 U.S. at 743.
225. See Hills v. Gautreaux, 44 U.S.L W. 4480, 4483 (U.S. April 20, 1976)
("fT]he Milliken decision was based on basic limitations on the exercise of the
equity power of the federal courts and not on a balancing of particular considerations
presented by school desegregation cases ..."). Thus, the Gautreaur Court concluded that Milliken was primarily based on separation of power considerations
that limit judicial equity power rather than on pluralistic interests such as local
control of schools. The District Court's remedy in Milliken was impermissible
"not because it envisioned relief against a wrongdoer extending beyond the city
in which the violation occurred but because it contemplated a judicial decree restructuring the operation of local governmental entities that were not implicated in any
constitutional violation." 44 U.S.L.W. at 4484.
In Gautreaux, Black tenants in, and applicants for, public housing in Chicago
brought separate class actions against the Chicago Housing Authority and the Department of Housing and Urban Development. The plaintiffs urged that public housing sites had been selected within Chicago to avoid placing Blacks in predominantly
White neighborhoods in violation of federal statutes and the fourteenth amendment.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals ordered the district court to require the CHA
and HUD to provide a comprehensive plan not necessarily confined to the geographical limits of Chicago to remedy this past discrimination. In upholding the order
that mandated a comprehensive metropolitan area plan, the Court concluded that
Milliken did not bar a public housing plan that extended beyond the Chicago city
limits even though all constitutional violations involved Chicago alone. In Milliken,
the Detroit school district had no power in suburban school districts and so could
not have been ordered to act within them. The state of Michigan, also "guilty"
of de jure discrimination within Detroit, had such power but could not have been
ordered by the court to exercise it in fashioning a remedy because such exercise
would have necessarily entailed restructuring the operation of local governmental entities. In Gautreaur, however, HUD had certain limited powers in the Chicago
suburbs that the court could require to be exercised in fashioning a remedy without
interfering with local political subdivisions. See 44 U.S.LW. at 4485-86.
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However, Milliken specifically acknowledges the importance of
pluralistic interests in the desegregation context and clearly establishes that parents, both in Detroit and in the surrounding suburbs,
are entitled to the degree of control over education that present
school districts provide.
In school districts with a high percentage of minority students,
the remedial limitations imposed by Milliken may effectively bar
such students from schools that have substantial nonminority attendance. 226 Although this phenomenon ,arguably reduces the opportunities for socialization that come with attending racially mixed schools,
the Court apparently concluded that :the core collectivist interest in education is limited to providing all children with a nonstigmatizing educational experience .that prepares them for participation in their community. 227 The decision :reflects 11:he view that this core interest can
be satisfied by ensuring that no discriminatory assignment of students
occurs within the school district where the student resides. It would
therefore follow that any possible benefits of further socialization
should be subordinated to the strong parental interest in participating
in education decision-making at the local level. 228 This result is
Notwithstanding the Gautreaux Court's denial that the pluralistic interests underlying local political subdivisions were determinative in Milliken, the Milliken Court
had indeed invoked these interests to support its decision. 418 U.S. at 741-42. See
text at notes 221-24 supra. That these pluralistic interests were mentioned in the
educational context, yet were explicitly rejected as relevant in the public housing
context, suggests that the Court, despite its purported exclusive reliance on institutional concerns, was actually accommodating pluralistic and collectivist interests in
both cases, and that the unique nature of pluralistic interests in education was the
real difference between the cases. By this analysis, the Court, in directing HUD
to provide housing units in the greater metropolitan area outside the city of Chicago,
effectuated collectivist interests in adequate housing and social integration, and did
not significantly impair pluralistic interests, which would probably be the interests
in maintaining the social and ethnic composition of neighborhoods.
In Milliken, the Court similarly accommodated interests, but, unlike Gautreaux,
found that the pluralistic interests were much stronger. The pluralistic interests in
Milliken, in essence, involved the integrity of the family unit because granting an inter-district remedy would have impaired .the parental interest in how their children
would be educated. This interest is arguably more strongly identified with how the
family unit functions than the interest in what type of neighborhood surrounds the
family unit. However, where an interdistrict remedy does not seriously threaten
pluralistic interests in education, courts may search hard for an interdistrict violation,
which allows a remedy to be granted regardless of the effect on local governments
and, thus, allows an accommodation of interests similar to that in Gautreaux. See
Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.), affd., 423 U.S. 963 (1975); text at
notes 230-34 infra.
226. See generally Calhoun v. Cook, 332 F. Supp. 804 (N.D. Ga.), modified, 451 F.2d 583 (1971 ), application for stay denied, 409 U.S. 974 (1972).
227. See text at note 179 supra.
228. There is increasing awareness of Black pluralistic interests and of the necessary conflict of these interests with the collectivist goal of integration, even among
those who have worked for and value integration. See Ravitch, supra note 55, at
217:
Those blacks who are critical of the current thrust of the integration movement are not separatists; they are professionals who move in a racially mixed
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analogous :to that· reach in Yoder, in which the Court recognized
a core collectivist interest in educating individuals to the point at
which they no longer threaten to be a liability to society. The Yoder
Court recognized that there is a further interest in preparing individuals to be assets to society, but it concluded that the autonomy
of the Amish had greater weight. Similarly, the Milliken Court recognized the importance of a limited amount of socialization that
could arguably prevent individuals from becoming community liabilities, but it held ,that socialization with a broader geographic referent
-could outweigh the benefits of local control.2 20
Milliken Tepresents ithe initial judicial effort to accommodate
meaningfully the conflicting interests in desegregration cases. Subsequent interdistrict and intradistrict desegregation decrees show a
continuing evolution in this accommodation process. Thus, a number of courts have narrowly construed Milliken's limitation on interdistrict remedies by reading broadly its statement that such remedies
may be appropriate where there has been "a constitutional violation
within one district that produces a significant segregative effect in
another district." 23° For example, one three-judge court actually
held that certain governmental acts-encouraging discrimination in
the private housing market and providing public housing almost exclusively in the inner city-were "responsible to a significant degree" for the racial imbalance between city and suburbs and constituted "segregative action with inter-district effects under Milliken."231 These courts have distinguished Milliken on the ground
that, because their order of an interdistrict remedy would have a narrower geographical scope, it would not create the administrative
problems, the extensive disruption of education, and the infringement on parental control that the Supreme Court feared would result
world and who value integration. They share a common fear that black institutions will be stigmatized by the implicit insult that whatever is black is inferior. They have been groping for language to express their views without giving
aid and comfort to the George Wallaces and Louise Day Hickses of America.
The idea that blacks should reject black institutions has been so deeply ingrained
that most of the critics feel they must apologize for appearing to be disloyal
to the spirit of Brown. Each in his own way has been trying to evolve a pluralist position for blacks that grants black institutions and organizations the same
legitimacy as is accorded those of other ethnic groups, without in any way diminishing the opportunity for full interracial contact. "We will not be free," says
Charles Hamilton, ''until we have freed ourselves of the mentality of dependency. We must no longer be white America's permanent ward and favorite
cause."
229. The accommodation of pluralist and collectivist interests is reflected in the
Milliken Court's adoption of the existent school district boundaries as the limit on
the desegregation order. See note 225 supra.
230. 418 U.S. at 744. See Newburg Area Council, Inc. v. Board of Educ., 510
F.2d 1358 (6th Cir. 1974); Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428 (D. Del.), af/d.,
423 U.S. 963 (1975); United States v. Missouri, 388 F. Supp. 1058 (E.D. Mo. 1975).
231. Evans v. Buchanan, 393 F. Supp. 428, 438 (D. Del. 1975), affd., 423 U.S.
963 (1975).
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from a metropolitan remedy in Detroit. 232 As the Sixth Circuit recently stated: An "interdistrict [consolidation] in this case would
not be likely extensively to disrupt and alter the structure of public
education . . . nor require the creation of a vast new super school
district, as may have resulted from the broad metropolitan remedy
considered in Milliken." 2 :13 Thus, it appears that the lower courts
are, in effect, interpreting Milliken not as a constitutional ban on
interdistrict remedies, but as a mandate to consider the pluralistic
interests of home-school proximity and effective community participation in public education. 234 Upon a determination that these interests can be accommodated within the framework of an interdistrict
remedy, the courts appear willing to formulate such a decree.
The courts in single-district desegregation cases also appear to
be giving greater consideration to pluralistic interests while deemphasizing the achievement of specific racial ratios. Two recent district court orders exemplify this trend. In Morgan v. Kerrigan, 235
the highly publicized Boston desegregation case, the court expressly
recognized that the collectivist interest in racially mixed schools inevitably conflicts with "legitimate concerns of the community." 236 According to the coum, an appropriate remedy must both "reflect the
primacy of the need to achieve equal opportunity in education," 2 :17
and "recognize the central importance of minimizing the distance between the student's home and [his] assigned school"238 and of allowing the student to "maintain ties developed in school while in [his]
home [neighborhood]."239 To this end, the court devised an elaborate desegregation plan that would encourage voluntary desegregation by offering special programs of study in "magnet schools," 240
ensure a continuity of school-neighborhood contacts by assigning students to schools on a neighborhood rather than an individual basis, 241
and minimize home-school distances by establishing desegregated
community school districts. 242
Similarly, the district court in Bradley v. Milliken,:!.4:i upon remand from the Supreme Court, put considerable emphasis on the
importance of accommodating "the legitimate concerns of the school
232.
233.
234.
235.
236.
237.
238.
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.

510 F.2d at 1359-60; 393 F. Supp. at 446-47; 388 F. Supp. at 1060.
510 F.2d at 1360.
See note 225 supra.
401 F. Supp. 216 (D. Mass. 1975), aftd., 530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir. 1976).
401 F. Supp. at 233.
401 F. Supp. at 233.
401 F. Supp. at 240.
401 F. Supp. at 241.
401 F. Supp. at 246-48.
401 F. Supp. at 240-42.
401 F. Supp. at 236, 250-56.
402 F. Supp. 1096 (E.D. Mich. 1975).
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system and the community at large, [which include] the undesirability of forced reassignment of students achieving only negligible desegregative results" and "the overriding community concern for the
quality of educational services available in the school district. " 244
Thus, it refused to adopt any plan that required all schools to achieve
rigid racial ratios 245 because the majority of schools would necessarily
have been between seventy-five and ninety per cent Black even after
massive intradistrict transportation, due to Detroit's large Black population. 246 The Court did stress that all "racially identifiable" White
schools had to be eliminated;247 but instead of focusing on the racial
compositions of each school in the system, it sought to "balance the
practicalities that affect the system as a whole." 248 As a result, the
court's remedial guidelines emphasized the importance of secondary
desegregation procedures, such as community relations programs designed to encourage "a cooperative flow of information from the
school to the community and from the community to the school."240
Thus, those recent cases that have granted both intradistrict desegregation orders and interdistrict remedial orders indicate that
since Milliken the lower courts have paid increasing attention to
pluralistic interests in education. At the same time, as was previously noted, the lower courts have been increasingly willing to declare the deprivation of core-community socialization opportunities
unconstitutional if segregation in the schools can be demonstrated,
even when traditional state action is difficult to prove. 2 G0 These two
trends suggest that courts are beginning to reach an accommodation
between collectivist and pluralistic interests analogous to that
achieved in other conflicts concerning the universality of and access
to education.

III.

INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS WITHIN THE PUBLIC
ScHOOL SYSTEM

Courts do not only determine when the state can require education or can be required to provide education; they must also frequently find an appropriate accommodation among the various parties who have an interest in determining the specific content of the
educational experience provided by the public school system. Par244. 402 F. Supp. at 1102.
245. "In our analysis, we have been mindful that rigid and inflexible desegregation plans too often neglect to treat school children as individuals, instead treating
them as pigmented pawns to be shuffled about and counted solely to achieve an abstraction called 'racial mix.'" 402 F. Supp. at 1101.
246. 402 F. Supp. at 1102.
247. 402 F. Supp. at 1126, 1127, 1132.
248. 402 F. Supp. at 1133.
249. 402 F. Supp. at 1143.
250. See text at notes 187-205 supra.
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ent-state conflicts are particularly common. On the one hand, the
state seeks to instill through the educational system certain values
and traits in its citizens. To achieve collectivist goals of academic
achievement and socialization251 school boards are empowered to
prescribe curricula252 and to regulate conduct within the schools.
But parents may differ with the educational decision-makers on the
values that should be inculcated in their children and on the best
means of utilizing the schools to guide their children's development.
When confronted with school procedures and policies with which
they do not agree, parents must often seek judicial vindication of
their interests in shaping the character and attitudes of their children.
Numerous factors may affect the courts' readiness to protect the
interests of parents who are opposed to decisions of school authorities and who desire to be free of the system's regulatory power in
a given area. First, the state has an important interest in ensuring
that the schools are operated efficiently so that the essential function
of educating students is not disturbed. 253 Accordingly, the parental
desire for diversity of educational experience may be ignored if any
deviation from standardized procedures or policies would significantly impair the administration of the school system. Second, the
process of accommodating rights and interests and of choosing remedies often entangles courts in educational judgments that they do not
feel competent to make. Rather than overrule the school board on
a particular controversy involving the literary merit of a book or the
appropriateness of an innovative teaching method, ,the cou.r,t will
probably defer to ithe board's judgment because of its "professional
expertise" or its "democratic" mandate. 254
Finally, because a school system consists of numerous parties
other than the school board and parents, such as students, teachers,
and administrators, obeisance to parental demands may infringe not
only on the interests of the state but on those of other groups as
well. For example, a parent's attempt to insulate his child from exposure to a certain book may conflict with a teacher's interest in discussing it or with another student's interest in reading it. When confronted with such a dispute, courts frequently conclude that the best
way to protect the rights of unrepresented groups is to defer to the
school board, whose judgment ostensibly represents the best interests of the entire community. Such deference is manifested not only
when judgments requiring expertise are involved, but also when the
interests of conflicting parties must be reconciled. Yet board judgments should not be considered sacrosanct, for they may infringe on
251.
252.
253.
i$4.

See note 48 supra & text at notes 48-50 supra.
See, e.g., MICH. CoMP. LAws ANN.§ 340.583 (1976).
See text at note 467 infra.
See, e.g., text at notes 31-41 supra, 272 i11fra.

Michigan Law Review

1422

fVol. 74:1373

interests that merit safeguarding even from a genuinely democratic
institution that reflects the majority of its constituents.
Despite the tendency of courts toward deference to school board
decisions, increasing numbers of parents, students, and teachers are
challenging the power of schools to influence the minds of students
and the lives of both students and teachers. The following section
of the Project will examine such claims and see how they are resolved. It will first analyze challenges to substantive curriculum25 r,
and then will discuss conduct regulation and disciplinary procedures. 256
A.

Challenges to the Substantive Curriculum

In September 1974, parents of elementary, junior high, and high
school students in Kanawha County, West Virginia, protested the decision of the county school board to use new English textbooks in
the schools. Few observers foresaw that this conflict would develop
into a protracted and turbulent struggle over control of the curriculum. The degree of parental concern was reflected in the intensity
of the dispute; before the year ended, the superintendent ·had resigned, the school had been boycotted, and one school had been
bombed. 257 The parents who objected to the new texts argued that
the books encouraged permissiveness and .thus posed a threat to traditional Amerioan morals and values. They further contended that their
children would not receive a good education because of purported
deficiencies in the contents of the books. 258 Those who supported
255. See section III-A infra.
256. See section III-B infra.
257. See TIME, Nov. 4, 1974, at 88; U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Nov. 4, 1974,
at 61.
258. Mike Wallace, Sixty Minutes (CBS Television Network), August 31, 1975.
A similar textbook controversy is raging in Florida. See Miami Herald, Jan. 18,
1976, § G, at 12, col. 1; id., Oct. 19, 1975, § A, at 1, col. 1. The increasing willingness of parents to challenge curriculum decisions in court rather than at school board
meetings can be partially attributed to fundamental changes in national attitudes.
Americans no longer place unfettered faith in the ability of administrative agencies
to solve the nation's problems. See Goldstein, Reflections on Developing Trends
in the Law of Student Rights, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 612, 612-14 (1970). See generally United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures (SCRAP),
412 U.S. 669, 692 (1973); Citizens To Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402 (1971); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136 (1967). The debate
over who should be responsible for making educational policies, see generally Goldstein, The Asserted Constitutional Right of Public School Teachers To Determine
What They Teach, 124 U. PA. L. REv. 1293 (1976); The Great Anti-School Campaign, in THE GREAT IDEAS TODAY 167 (R. Hutchins & M. Adler eds. 1972); Miller,
Teachers Freedom of Expression Within the Classroom, 8 GA. L. REV. 837, 84748 (1974), is part of an upheaval in social, political, and cultural values that has,
in fact, brought into question the efficacy of education. Cf. Rabin, Lawyers for
Social Change: Perspective on Public Interest Law, 28 STAN. L. REV. 207, 224
(1976). See generally T. RoSZAK, WHERE TIIE WASTELAND ENDS: POLITICS AND
TRANSCENDANCE IN POSTINDUSTRIAL SOCIETY (1972); P. SLATER, THB PURSUIT OF
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using the texts asserted that the books prepared students to handle
problems of adulthood and hence contributed to a meaningful education.
Parents sought an injunction against the use of the challenged
texts, claiming that the school board's decision had violated their own
rights of free exercise of religion and family privacy and the personal privacy rights of their children. 259 In denying relief, the
United States District Court for West Virginia stated that because
the plaintiffs' claim was essentially only a disagreement with the
values being taught in the schools, the complaint did not allege a
violation of constitutional rights. The parents were thus left with
a remedy whose inadequacy had brought them to court in the first
place: the opportunity to exert political pressure on the school board
for redress of grievances. 260
The dispute in Kanawha County highlights the central issues that
are raised in controversies over curriculum: the right of teachers,
parents, and students to affect school board decisions; the right of
parents to insulate their children from policies with which they disagree; and the appropriateness of judicial intervention in such disputes. This section of the Project will first examine the sources and
uses of school board power over curriculum and the historical background of curriculum litigation. It will then analyze the constitutional challenges of parents and teachers to board decisions--challenges based on the first amendment's establishment and free exercise clauses, a parental nurture right, the equal protection clause, a
"free thought" right of children derived from the free speech clause,
and a free speech right of teachers.
1.

The Nature of School Board Authority over Curriculum

Except where restrained by the federal Constitution, the states
possess plenary power over the public school curriculum. 261 Accordingly, all states have enacted statutes that either require, proAMERICAN CULTURE AT nm BREAKING POINT (1970). Critics have
alleged that the school system fails either to educate children adequately or to prepare
them to cope with modern-day pressures. See Goldstein, 118 U. PA. L REV. 612,
supra, at 613. See generally Hutchins, supra, at 154. In particular, the ability of
the school system to provide a meaningful education for Blacks has been severely
questioned. See Goldstein, 118 U. PA. L REV. 612, supra, at 613; Note, Education
Vouchers and Curriculum Control: The Parent Versus the State, 52 B.U. L. REV.
262, 264 (1972).
259. Williams v. Board of Educ., 388 F. Supp. 93, 94 (S.D.W. Va.), affd., 530
F.2d 972 (4th Cir. 1975). In its one-paragraph affirmance of the trial court decision, the court called the plaintiffs' complaints "bald assertions." (Civil No. 75-1455,
Dec. 3, 1975).
260. 388 F. Supp. at 96.
261. E. RBUITER, JR. & R. HAMILTON, supra note 25, at 109. See generally section I-A supra.
LoNELINESS:
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hibit, or permit certain subjects to be taught in the public schools. 202
Although the legislatures have generally established basic requirements, the bulk of authority with respect to curriculum matters has
been either expressly delegated to the local school ,boards203 or sustained on an implied delegation of powers theory. 204
States and school boards have exercised this plenary power to
make the curriculum an effective instrument of socialization to the
norms of the community, at least as these are perceived by the educational decision-makers. 205 Pursuant to .their authority to require
courses "plainly essential to good citizenship" and to prohibit
courses "manifestly inimical to the public welfare," 200 states generally have mandated a "highly prescriptive and noncontroversial"
curriculum. 267 The subject matter required in civics, government,
and literature courses is selected ito perpetuate and reaffirm "basic
Am:erican ideals."268 Moreover, religiousity is considered an integral part of American life and thus frequently is emphasized in
the curriculum. American history courses often dramatize the religious spirit that has purportedly influenced the nation's development. 260 The hard-working, prudent, God-fearing individual is portrayed as the dominant force in the nation's growth. 270 Thus, the
262. Reutter, The Law and the Curriculum, 20 LAW & C0NTEMP, PROB. 91, 9295 (1955). See Seitz, Supervision of Public Elementary and Secondary School Pupils
Through State Control over Curriculum and Textbook Selection, 20 LAW & CON·
TEMP. PROB. 104, 105-08 (1955).
263. G. JoHNSON, supra note 34, at 81-83.
264. E. REUTTER, JR. & R. HAMILTON, supra note 25, at 110.
265. See R. DAWSON & K. PREWITT, POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION 147 (1969); Introduction, THE "!NEQUALl1Y CoNTROVERSY" (D. Devine & M. Bane eds. 1975), The
transmission of selective knowledge has been accomplished through both the "hidden"
and substantive curriculum. The "hidden" curriculum, the rules and regulations that
are necessary for the efficient and safe operation of schools, has implicitly conveyed
to students the values of order, discipline, and authority. D. KIRP & M. YUDOF,
supra note 46, at 126-34. See R. DAWSON & K. PREWITT, supra, at 163; Berkman,
Students in Court: Free Speech and the Functions of Schooling in America, in EDU•
CATION AND TIJE LEGAL STRUCTURE 35, 37 (Harv. Educ. Rev. Reprint Series No. 6,
1971). Critics of the school system assert that schools foster such traits as competitiveness and conformity, as well as passivity. See C. JENCKS, INEQUALITY 131
(1972).
266. E. REUTTER, JR. & R. HAMILTON, supra note 25, at 112. See Seitz, supra
note 262, at 123.
267. F. WIRT & M. KIRST, THE PoLmCAL WEB OF AMERICAN ScHOOLS 29
(1972). See C. JENCKS, supra note 265, at 54.
268. R. DAWSON & K. PREWITT, supra note 265, at 147, citing V. KEY, JR,, Punuc OPINION AND AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 317 (1961). See P. GOODMAN, supra note
126, at 87, in which the author describes the school system "with its increasingly
set curriculum, stricter grading, incredible amounts of testing" as a "vast machine
to shape acceptable responses."
269. See generally R. DAWSON & K. PREWITT, supra note 265, at 147-67; D. KIRP
& M. YuooF, supra note 45, at 88-134.
270. See generally P. SLATER, supra note 258; w. TAYLOR, CAVALIER AND YANKEE
21 (1961).
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public school curriculum can be used to transmit and foster particular values deemed by some as essential to achieving the collectivist
goal of developing good and productive citizens. 271
When the social, political, and religious values expressed through
the curriculum are not shared by some parents, judicial conflict-resolution may be necessary. In curriculum controversies, courts have
traditionally deferred to the vast discretionary authority of the school
board. 272 However, during two distinct periods of judicial activism,
courts have questioned whether legislatures and school boards are
willing -to establish curriculum content that does not infringe upon
fundamental individuaJ. liberties.273
During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the prevailing judicial philosophy emphasized the protection of individual
rights against governmental encroachment. 274 In this period, courts
eagerly scrutinized the use of legislative powers and, accordingly, circumscribed legislative authority. Because statutory grants of power
were generally construed narrowly, courts held that a number of
local school rules and regulations exceeded the delegated authority
of school boards. 275 Constitutional doctrine reflected this suspicion
of the exercise of legislative power. Recognition of personal substantive due process rights imposed the first significant limits on compulsory education276 and on the power of states to prescribe curriculum. 277
The demise of substantive due process made curriculum litigation a rarity between the 1930s and the late 1960s. 278 The judicial
retreat from performing what were perceived to be exclusively legislative functions 279 resulted in judicial deference to school board au271. R. DAWSON & K. PREWIIT, supra note 265, at 178. Education has been
a powerful agent of political and social control because ideas and values can be disseminated through a centralized and uniform system. Id. at 179. See E. FRIEDENBERG, COMING OF AGE IN AMERICA 49, 168 (1965); Berkman, supra note 265, at
37; Hutchins, supra note 258, at 200; cf. M. KATZ, supra note 43, at 117.
272. Nahmod, First Amendment Protection for Learning and Teaching: The
Scope of Judicial Review, 18 WAYNE L. REV. 1479 (1972). See text at notes 3141 supra.
273. See Goldstein, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 612, supra note 258, at 612-14.
274. See, e.g., Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
275. See, e.g., Holman v. School Trustees, 77 Mich. 605, 43 N.W. 996 (1889)
(penalties for accidentally damaging school property). But compare Wright v. Board
of Educ., 295 Mo. 466, 246 S.W. 43 (1922), with Wilson v. Board of Educ., 233
Ill. 464, 84 N.E. 697 (1908) (membership in secret societies).
276. See Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
277. See Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Goldstein, 118 U. PA. L. REV.
612, supra note 258, at 615.
278. The religion cases are the only exception. See, e.g., Abington School Dist.
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Zorach
v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
279. See B. ScHWARTZ, THE LAW IN AMERICA 159-63 (1974).
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thority. This deference was consistent with a general faith in administrative agencies, professionals, specialists, and most importantly,
the over-all quality of American education. 28° Courts professed a
lack of competence to formulate educational policy and thus acceded
to the "expertise" of educators and administrators, particularly where
judgments of educational value were ["equired. 281 Furthermore, courts
were conscious of their own undemocratic nature and consequently
were reluctant to overturn local school board decisions that supposedly reflected community values. 282
The second period of judicial activism began with the 1954 Supreme Court decision in Brown v. Board of Education, 283 which
marked the emergence of judicial concern for the problems of public
education and of judicial willingness to scrutinize the decisions of
local school boards. Brown illustrated the loss of faith in American
schools that would soon produce a new wave of curriculum litigation. 284 Since the late 1960s, the frequency of litigation has intensified. Parents and teachers, seeking judicial protection of their right
to control the classroom curriculum, have brought an unprecedented
number of suits. Parents have most frequently been motivated by
fear and dislike of the values taught in the schools. 28 r. Teachers,
on the other hand, have resorted to litigation to clarify their proper
role in the educational system, 286 for the instability in institutional
rules and values has created uncertainty about their freedom to deviate from traditional pedagogical techniques. Although parents and
teachers are linked together by a common, though amorphous, feeling of personal oppression, the courts have not yet clearly articulated
a unified constitutional doctrine that embraces their claims.
2.

Constitutional Challenges to the Curriculum

a. Pure establishment and free exercise clause challenges. During
the 1940s and early 1950s when ,public school cumculum was
not challenged directly in the cour.ts, a number of first amendment ,religion cases defined the public school's power to inculcate, or sometimes accommodate, religious values. 287 Since these
280. Goldstein, 118 U. PA. L. REV. 612, supra note 258, at 613.
281. See Developments in the Law: Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REV. 1048,
1050,(1968) [hereinafter Developments].
282. See Miller, supra note 258, at 847.
283. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
284. See text at note 273 supra.
285. See, e.g., Williams v. Board of Educ., 388 F. Supp. 93 (S.D.W. Va.), afld.,
530 F.2d 972 (4th Cir. 1975); Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395 (D.N.H. 1974).
286. See, e.g., Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969); Parducci v.
Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
287. See, e.g., Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); McCollum v. Board of
Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
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suits helped frame a relatively clear body of law limiting school
board discretion, the establishment and free exercise clauses have
subsequently provided the basis for most curriculum challenges, including bona fide religious claims and claims in which the underlying
disagreement concerns a nonreligious value conflict between parents
and the school board. These decisions provide particular insight into
the scope of school boards' power to determine what ideas, values, and
traditions can be transmitted to American children through the public school curriculum.
The majority of successful suits against the school boards have
been based on the establishment clause, 288 which has sometimes
been viewed as erecting a "wall of separation between church and
state"289 that prohibits any introduction of religion in the schools. 200
Thus, as articulated in Everson v. Board of Education, "[n]either
a state nor the Federal Government . . . can pass laws which aid
one religion, aid all religions or prefer one religion over another.
291
"
The Court in Zorach v. Clauson, 292 however, implicitly
recognizing that schools necessarily shape values and attitudes and
believing that a requirement of indifference or hostility to religion
would actually result in a preference of nonreligion over religion,
held that some accommodation of religion in the public schools was
needed. 211 =1 In upholding the practice of releasing children from
public schools during the school day so that they could attend religious instruction, the Court observed that
.
[w]e are a religious people whose institutions presuppose a Supreme
Being. We guarantee the freedom to worship as one chooses. We
make room for as wide a variety of beliefs and creeds as the spiritual
needs of man deem necessary. We sponsor an attitude on the part
of government that shows no partiality to any one group and that lets
each flourish according to the zeal of its adherents and the appeal
of its dogma. When the state encourages religious instruction or cooperates with religious authorities by adjusting the schedule of public
events to sectarian needs, it follows the best of our traditions. For
it then respects the religious nature of our people and accommodates
the public service to their spiritual needs. 294
288. See Nahmod, supra note 272, at 1479.
289. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947), citing Reynolds v. United
States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
290. See generally Kauper, Prayer, Public Schools, and the Supreme Court, 61
MICH. L. REV. 1031, 1049 (1963); Le Clercq, The Monkey Laws and the Public
Schools: A Second Consumption?, 27 VAND. L. REV. 209, 214 (1974).
291. 330 U.S. 1, 15 ( 1947).
292. 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
293. 343 U.S. at 314.
294. 343 U.S. at 313-14. The Court, in Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374
U.S. 203 (1963), reaffirmed this view: "It is true that religion has been closely
identified with our history and government . . . . It can be truly said, therefore,
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In recognizing that religiosity is a part of the "national" tradition and
should be tolerated in the schools,295 the Zorach Court did not apply
the absolute neutrality standard but instead sought to determine the
extent to which government may accommodate certain religious theories.296
In the religion cases courts have had difficulty defining the relationship between the duties and limitations of the state under the
establishment clause and the rights of individuals under the free exercise clause. The need to maintain a proper balance is apparent,
since untrammeled protection of free exercise could conceivably result in the establishment of religion. As the Court noted in Abington School District v. Schempp: "While the Free Exercise Clause
clearly prohibits the use of state action to deny rights of free exercise
to anyone, it has never meant that a majority could use the machinery of the State to practice its beliefs."297 Although interpretations
of the interplay between the establishment clause and free exercise
clause have shifted periodically, the parameters of permissible religious activity in the schools now seem relatively clear.
Courts will not permit religious activity that might engender sectarian divisiveness, exacerbate consciousness of religious differences, 298 or exert psychological pressure on the nonparticipants to
attend the religious activities. 299 In his concurring opinion in McCollum v. Board of Education, Justice Frankfurter stressed that
"[i]n no activity of the State is it more vital to keep out divisive
forces than in its schools. "300 Thus, free exercise of religion must
be limited if it has the effect of either coercing minorities or giving
official governmental support to a particular denomination or belief. 301 The establishment clause is breached even if participation
that today, as in the beginning, our national life reflects a religious people ••••"
374 U.S. at 212-13. Zorach thus undermined the absolutist notion of separation established in Everson. See Kauper, supra note 290, at 1049. The free exercise clause
was interpreted to be a limitation upon the establishment clause. Id. at 1049.
295. 343 U.S. at 312-13. See Kauper, supra note 290, at 1049; text ai notes
269, 270 supra.
296. Cf. Kauper, supra note 290, at 1053-54.
297. 374 U.S. 203,226 (1963) (emphasis original).
298. See, e.g., McCollum v. Board of );!due., 333 U.S. 203, 227 ( 1948) (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
299. See, e.g., McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203, 227 (1948) (Frank•
furter, J., concurring).
300. 333 U.S. at 231 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
301. See, e.g., Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 222 ( 1963);
DeSpain v. DeKalb County Community School Dist., 384 F.2d 836 (7th Cir. 1967),
cert. denied, 390 U.S. 906 (1968); Reed v. Van Hoven, 237 F. Supp. 48 (W.D.
Mich. 1965); State Bd. of Educ. v. Board of Educ., 108 N.J. Super. 564, 262 A.2d
21 (Ch. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971).
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in the religious exercise is voluntary302 and the activity causes only
a minor encroachment on the nonparticipants' rights. 303 However,
free exercise rights are accommodated to the extent of allowing children to leave school early to attend religious classes;304 apparently
the Court did not believe that this practice is unduly divisive or puts
psychological pressure on the children who remain in school.
The cases further reveal that activity presented in a purely "religious" as opposed to a "secular" context is forbidden. 305 Although
the boundary between religious and secular activity is often nebulous, courts attempt through this demarcation to encourage the student's exposure to a diversity of ideas but to prevent his indoctrination to a single set of religious beliefs.
The released time306 and prayer3° 7 cases demonstrate how the
courts distinguish between objectionable "pure" religious activity and
permissable secular activity. The ban on religious observances extends to officially composed prayers, 308 the Lord's Prayer, 309 and even
to pr-ayers that do not refer explicitly to God. 310 However, recitation
of "patriotic" passages containing references to God is clearly permitted. 311 Moreover, while school facilities cannot be used by
private teachers for religious instruction312 and the Bible cannot be
302. See, e.g., State Bd. of Educ. v. Board of Educ., 108 NJ. Super. 564, 58082, 262 A.2d 21, 29-31 (Ch. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 1013 (1971).
303. See DeSpain v. DeKalb County Community School Dist., 384 F.2d 836 (7th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 906 (1968). However, one district court has found
the following program to be permissible: the prayer is to be voluntary, conducted
at least five minutes before or after the regularly scheduled class day, in a classroom
other than the regular homeroom, and not signified by a bell. Reed v. Van Hoven,
237 F. Supp. 48 (W.D. Mich. 1965).
304. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952).
305. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963); Engel
v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,435 n.21 (1962).
306. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952); McCollum v. Board of Educ.,
333 U.S. 203 (1948).
307. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
308. See Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962).
309. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). The Court
summarily affirmed its position a year later in Chamberlin v. Dade County Bd. of
Pub. Instruction, 377 U.S. 401 (1964). Several district courts have reconsidered this
issue as a result of the recent impetus to reinstitute prayers in the public schools.
See, e.g., Goodwin v. Cross County School Dist., 394 F. Supp. 417 (E.D. Ark. 1973).
United States District Judge Arnow recently issued a temporary injunction prohibiting the practice of requiring teachers in Okaloosa County, Florida to begin each
school day with Bible readings. The injunction, which upset a long-established
school board policy, has created great controversy. See Miami Herald, Dec. 18,
1975, § A, at 1, col. 1.
310. See DeSpain v. DeKalb County Community School Dist., 384 F.2d 836 (7th
Cir. 1967), cert. denied, 390 U.S. 906 (1968).
311. See Engel v. Vitale, 310 U.S. 421, 435 n.21 (1962).
312. McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948). The Court held that
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used as part of religious ceremony in the schools, 313 an objective
study of the Bible in a secular educational program does not offend
the establishment clause. 314
The nature of the distinction has also been explored in a series
of cases involving the teaching of evolution in the public schools.
These cases reveal that courts will not permit the introduction of
religious ideas in the schools that show a preference for one religious
group over another. In Epperson v. Arkansas, 315 for example, a
teacher requested a declaratory judgment on the constitutionality of
an Arkansas statute making it unlawful in any state-supported school
or university to teach or use a textbook that included evolutionary
theory. The challenged law was similar to the Tennessee statute upheld in ithe celebrated Scopes "monkey" trial. 316 It was unclear
whether the Arkansas statute prohibited any explanation of the theory
of evolution or merely proscribed teaching that the theory was true.
The Court concluded that under either interpretation the statute was
intolerable because it was based solely on the religious convictions
of a particular sect: 317 "The State's undoubted right to proscribe
the curriculum in its public schools does not carry with it the
right to prohibit . . . the teaching of a scientific theory or doctrine
where that prohibition is based on reasons that violate the First
Amendment."318 Although the Court noted the importance of prothe released time program, which allowed religious teachers employed by private religious groups to give religious instruction in the public school classroom on a weekly
basis, violated the establishment clause. Commentators have disagreed over which
aspect of the program the Court found determinative of unconstitutionality. Nole,
The "Released Time" Cases Revisited: A Study of Group Dccisio11maki11g, 83 YALE
L.J. 1202, 1225 (1974). At least five factors appear to have contributed to the
Court's decision: the use of the state's tax-supported public school buildings for the
dissemination of religious doctrines; the use of the state's compulsozy machinezy to
induce students to participate in religion classes; the close cooperation between
church and state government officials; sectarian divisiveness and consciousness of
religious difference engendered by the program; and the psychological pressure on
the nonparticipants to attend the religious classes. Id. at 1225 n.132.
In Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), the Court upheld a New York school
program that allowed the release of students, with the permission of parents, during
the school day, so that they could attend religious centers for training or devotional
exercises. Zorach is distinguishable from McCollum since neither the expenditure
of public funds nor the use of public school buildings was involved in Zorach. See
Note, supra, at 1226. Zorach is indicative of the doctrinal shift in the interpretation
of the establishment clause: Justice Douglas, writing for the majority in Zorach,
interpreted the separation mandated by the establishment clause less stringently than
did Justice Black in Mccollum. See text at notes 290-96 supra.
313. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 224 (1963).
314. See Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203,225 (1963).
315. 393 U.S. 97 (1968).
316. Scopes v. State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927).
317. 393 U.S. at 107-08.
318. 393 U.S. at 107.
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tecting teachers and students from arbitrary restrictions on their academic freedom, 310 it avoided this rationale and rested its decision
upon the narrower grounds of the establishment clause. 320
The resurgence of the creationist movement has given new vitality to the controversy over the teaching of evolution. 321 In Daniel
v. Waters, 322 public school teachers, some of whom were also parents, successfully challenged a Tennessee statute that explicitly favored the creationist view of evolution. 323 A consistent result was
reached in Moore v. Gaston County Board of Education, 324 a dispute
over the discharge of a teacher, who, in response to student questions, had approved Darwinian theory and agnosticism and had challenged the literal interpretation of the Bible. In granting the teacher
relief, the court also preferred to base its decision upon the establishment clause rather than upon principles of academic freedom. 325
The court warned that if the teacher were discharged because his
ideas did not conform to local community beliefs, the students would
be indoctrinated to a particular religious orthodoxy, which would
amount to impermissible official approval of local religious values. 326
The evolution cases demonstrate the clear preference of courts
for the certainty and simplicity of the establishment clause as a basis
for limiting school board discretion. By relying on the historical
principle of separation- of church and state, courts can intervene in
curriculum decisions without having to make the difficult assessments of educational value required by a free speech analysis or the
equally difficult determinations concerning the importance and sincerity of -individuals' religious beliefs required by a free exercise ·anal:
ysis. The establishment clause protects society against the imposition of a state religion. The remedy for its breach is a complete
prohibition of the offending practice. In contrast, the free exercise
clause protects individuals from infringement of the right to practice
their religious beliefs. The remedy here is the creation of a curriculum exemption specifically tailored to curtail the particular kind of
encroachment on the individual's religious right. Yet the courts are
aware that a single exemption causes disruption in the school and
319. 393 U.S. at 106. The court cited Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390
( 1923), as establishing the academic freedoms of teacher and student.
320. 393 U.S. at 106. See T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION 605, 606 (1970); LeClercq, supra note 290, at 217.
321. See LeClercq, supra note 290, at 209-10.
322. 515 F.2d 485 (6th Cir. 1975).
323. 515 F.2d at 487.
324. 357 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D.N.C. 1973).
325. See 357 F. Supp. at 1043; Moskowitz & Casagrande, Teachers and the First
Amendment: Academic Freedom and Exhaustion of Administrative Remedies Under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, 39 ALBANY L. REV. 661, 670-71 (1975).
326. 357 F. Supp. at 1043.
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that numerous exemptions may seriously impair the efficiency of the
public school system. Thus, it is not surprising that very few successful challenges to the state's control over curriculum have been
based on the free exercise clause. 327
One notable exception to this pattern is Wisconsin v. Yoder. 328
Although primarily a compulsory education exemption case, Yoder
can also be read as the most significant successful attempt by parents
to shield their children from the public school curriculum. 329 The
decision, which upheld the right of Amish parents to remove from
school ·their children who had completed eight grades, rested heavily
on the special religious interests of ,the Amish community. 330 The
unique facts of Yoder made it unnecessary for the Court to rely on
the establishment clause; it could grant a free exercise exemption
because the extreme remedy of complete exemption from school disrupted -the daily operations of ithe school system less ithan did other
more limited remedies. The effect of the remedy for the plaintiffs
in this case was analogous to the relief granted for establishment
clause violations-absolute prohibition from an offending practice.
Yoder suggests the very difficult and somewhat capricious distinctions that courts must draw in granting religious free exercise exemptions from subjection to the school system. A judge must initially determine whether the group seeking relief has a bona fide
religious belief. Although the Court recognized that what constitutes a "religious practice" entitled to constitutional protection is a
"most delicate question," 331 Yoder does articulate certain standards.
Objections cannot be based on either purely personal values332 or
on a mere disagreement with the method of education in the schools.
It seems certain, however, that predispositions of judges will influence their determination of the sincerity and importance of an individual religious belief. 333 In Yoder, their approval of the law-abiding history of the Amish people, whose nonconformity imposed no
burdens on society, must have influenced the majority to find the
327. Two of the cases in which a free exercise violation has been found are Mitchell v. McCall, 143 S.2d 629 (Ala. 1962) (student was granted a limited exemption
on the ground of a free exercise claim; she was compelled to attend physical education classes but was not forced to wear the required uniform or perform exercises
which would be immodest in regular attire); Hardwick v. Board of School Trustees,
54 Cal. App. 696, 205 P. 49 (1921) (forced participation in school dancing program
violated both the free exercise and establishment clauses).
328. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
329. See text at notes 95-109 supra.
330. See 406 U.S. at 210, 211, 216, 219.
331. 406 U.S. at 215.
332. 406 U.S. at 216.
333. See Giannella, Religious Liberty, Nonestablishment, and Doctrinal Development, 80 HARV. L. R.Ev. 1381, 1419 (1967). Cf. G. GuNTIIER, supra note 112, at
1480.
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Amish beliefs sincere and important. 334 Thus, the success of a free
exercise challenge may d~pend on whether a religious group espouses philosophies or fashions a lifestyle with which the majority
of the court empathizes.
Once a bona fide religious belief is established, there must next
be a balancing of state and individual interests, a process in which
judges are also apt to interject their own values. The (1) sincerity
and importance of the religious belief and (2) the degree of infringement on the practice required by the belief must be balanced
against (1) the state's interest in requiring certain educational activity, (2) the reasonableness of the educational requirements with respect to the underlying interest, and (3) the impact that a particular
exemption would have on the requirement. 335 In measuring state
interests, courts must reach conclusions on the merits of different
aspects of the state's educational program. Yet most judges clearly
lack the expertise necessary to make these evaluations. Consequently, the Court in Yoder urged that the judiciary exercise caution
in weighing the necessity for a free exercise exemption against the
state's legitimate interest in providing a basic education: "[T]he obvious fact [is] that courts are not school boards or legislatures, and
are ill-equipped to determine the 'necessity' of discrete aspects of
a State's program of compulsory education."338 This warning, in effect, operates to constrain the use of the free exercise exemption.
As analyzed above, the parental challenges to curriculum that
have defined '1:he scope of first ,amendment rights have typically
involved bona fide religious disputes. Yet a number of challenges
are not based on pure religious objections but rather reflect disagreement of parents with nonreligious values implicit in the curriculum approved by the school -board. In some of the complaints, the underlying value dispute is disguised through the use of first amendment
establishment or free exercise clause language, while in others, different constitutional grounds are articulated.
b. Value-oriented challenges claiming religious and other constitutional violations. The notion of a parental right ,to control the upbringing of children emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth
centuries337 during the first period of judicial activ.ism in education.
In the majority of cases, courts upheld the school boards' selection of
courses. 338 However, several decisions affirmed the right of parents
334. See 406 U.S. at 222; Recent Development, Wisconsin v. Yoder, 18 VILL.
955,960 (1973).
335. See Giannella, supra note 333, at 1390.
336. 406 U.S. at 235.
337. See text at notes 53, 274-77 supra.
338. See, e.g., Samuel Benedict Memorial School v. Bradford, 111 Ga. 801, 36
S.E. 920 (1900) (students refusing to write compositions and enter debates may be
disciplined by school authorities); State ex rel. Andrews v. Webber, 108 Ind. 31,
L.

REV.
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to select courses on the ground that parents were better able to know
what was best for their children. 33 n
The Supreme Court first recognized the right of parents to control the education of their children in Meyer v. Nebraska. 340 The
Court invalidated a statute that prohibited teaching German to children who had not completed the eighth grade. Its opinion recognized both the parental right and the teacher's right to teach, 341 and
apparently viewed the fourteenth amendment as the source of both
rights:
Without doubt, [the four-teenth amendment] denotes not merely freedom from bodily restraint but also the right of the individual to contract, to engage in any of the common occupations of life, to acquire
useful knowledge, to marry, establish a home and bring up children,
to worship God according to the dictates of his own conscience, and
generally to enjoy those privileges long recognized at common law as
essential to the orderly pursuit of happiness of free men. 342

The collectivist purposes of the statute, fostering American ideals
and preparing a citizenry for intelligent participation in civic matters,
were considered permissible; however, the means adopted were
deemed to exceed the powers of government. 343 The view of the
parental right advanced in Meyer was affirmed in Pierce v. Society
of Sisters. 344 A statutory requirement that all children from eight
to sixteen years of age attend public schools, which was intended
8 N.E. 708 (1886) (school authorities not required to readmit student who had been
dismissed for failure to participate in a music class); Sewell v. Board of Educ., 29
Ohio St. 89, 1 W.LB. 338 (1876) (failure to participate in prescribed rhetoric instruction could be ground for suspension); E. REUTTER, JR. & R. HAMILTON, supra
note 25, at 110; Note, Sex Education: The Constitutional Limits of State Compulsion, 43 s. CAL. L. REV. 548, 556-57.
339. See, e.g., Kelly v. Ferguson, 95 Neb. 63, 144 N.W. 3039 (1914) (father
has right to make a reasonable selection of courses for his child; upon father's request, the child was permitted to substitute music lessons for the required home economics course); State ex rel. Sheibley v. School Dist. No. 1, 31 Neb. 552, 48 N.W.
393 (1891). The father in Sheibley refused to permit his child to study grammar
because grammar was not taught when he went to school. The court, upholding
the parent's right, stated: "The right of the parent . . . to determine what studies
his child shall pursue ·is paramount to that of the trustees or teacher • • ••
[N]o pupil attending the school can be compelled to study any prescribed branch
against the protest of the parent that the child shall not study such branch ••• ,"
31 Neb. at 556-57, 48 N.W. at 395.
340. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). Accord, Farrington v. Tokushige, 273 U.S. 284
(1927). In Farrington, Hawaii's laws prohibiting instruction in a foreign language
were held to infringe the fifth amendment rights of the owners of the Japanese
schools and parents whose children attended the schools. The Court, citing Meyer
and Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925), concluded that enforcement
of the law would deprive the parent of his right to direct the education of his own
child without unreasonable interference.
341. 262 U.S. at 400.
342. 262 U.S. at 399.
343. 262 U.S. at 402.
344. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
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to "standardize" children, was deemed to interfere "with the liberty
of the parents and guardians to direct the upbringing and education
of children under their control." 345 The Court emphasized both the
parental right and duty to educate their children: "The Child is not
the mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and direct
his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize
and prepare him for additional obligations."346
The decline of substantive due process347 in the 1930s weakened
the doctrinal foundation of the parental right. Although the continuing vitality of personal substantive due process theory is apparent
in recent cases developing the constitutional right of privacy,348 the
precise scope and strength of the right is still unclear. Consequently,
current litigants generally buttress their objections to prescribed curricula by raising a combination of establishment, free exercise,
parental nurture and privacy claims. It is difficult, therefore, to calculate what potency the parental nurture right would possess if asserted by itself. However, even when the parental nurture right is
advanced in combination with other constitutional claims, plaintiffs
have had little success either in obtaining individual exemptions from
curriculum requirements or in changing school board policy as a
whole.
A recent example of an unsuccessful challenge to the public
school curriculum that combined a parental nurture right claim with
a free exercise claim is Davis v. Page. 349 According to the tenets
of the Apostolic Lutherans, the plaintiffs' sect, it is a sin to watch
or hear movies, television, radio broadcasts, or images produced by
audio-visual equipment. 350 Hence, the parents charged that the
children's exposure to audio-visual equipment interfered with the
free exercise of religion and the parental right to control the children's education. The court held that when the audio-visual equipment was used for educational purposes, the children could not leave
the classroom, although the children could be excused when the
equipment was used for entertainment purposes. The parents also
claimed that the health and music courses impinged on their free
exercise right, but the court concluded that this was not a significant
burden.
Because the parents' free exercise and nurture rights mandated
345. 268 U.S. at 534-35.
346. 268 U.S. at 534.
341. See B. ScHWARTZ, supra note 279, at 163.
348. See, e.g., Roe v. Wade,- 410 U.S. 113 (1973); Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S.
645 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381
U.S. 479 (1965).
349. 385 F. Supp. 395 (D.N.H. 1974).
350. 385 F. Supp. at 397-98.
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the same standard of review, the court considered the rights conjunctively. The court was persuaded that allowing the children to leave
the classroom every time audio-visual equipment was used would seriously impair the quality of the educational experience, although
limited excuses were deemed permissible. Thus, an important factor in the decision was the court's concern that attempts to restrict
the scope of education would frustrate the state's objective of exposing children to a "broad educational spectrum, . . . where . . . general knowledge is the right of all and not the privilege of a few." 3 G1
Davis and Yoder are similar in that the parents in both cases
based their claims for relief on the parental nurture and free exercise
rights. Yet in Yoder, but not in Davis, the Court concluded that
this combination presented a sufficiently strong claim to justify an
exemption from the public school curriculum for the children. 3112
This result is not surprising, for despite the similarity of the asserted claims, the judicial approaches in these cases differ significantly. 3113 In Davis, .the coutt interpreted the interests of the state
and the child to be coterminous and in opposition to the parental
interest. The assumption underlying this alignment is that the state
has a duty to protect the child from the idiosyncratic religious views
of his parents. This approach directly conflicts with Yoder, which
upheld the parents' right to mold children's religious beliefs. 311 i
Yoder held that once the state's interest in exposing the child to basic
skills and social norms is fulfilled, the parents should have at least
some control over whether the child must receive advanced or specialized education. 355 Davis attempted to distinguish Yoder on the
ground that the involvement of elementary school children necessitated greater state control, 3156 but the distinction is inapt. The aspects of the curriculum to which the plaintiffs in Davis objected, the
use of audio-visual equipment and the health and music classes, were
clearly less essential to a basic education than post-eighth grade
351. 385 F. Supp. at 400. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 245 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting in part).
352. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 233 (1972). See Knudsen, supra note
47, at 1510.
353. The court distinguished Yoder, in which the interests of the child were considered to be synonymous with those of his parents. It refused to believe that the
child understood the "ramifications of his religious beliefs":
It would be naive for this court not to recognize that the children's asserted
freedom of exercise of religion is, in essence, that of their parents. In fact,
the freedom asserted is the right of the parents to inculcate and mold their children's religious beliefs to conform to their own without the children being subjected to school programs and materials which the parents deem offensive and
subversive of their beliefs.
385 F. Supp. at 398.
354. 406 U.S. at 233.
355. 406 U.S. at 221-22.
356: 385 F. Supp. at 398.

June 1976]

Project

1437

study, an interest that Yoder held did not outweigh that of the Amish
parents. 357 Certtainly if Yoder did not -align ithe state interest with
that of the child, then Davis should not have done so.
However, even if the Davis court had remained consistent with
Yoder, it might not have granted a remedy for any" one of several
independent reasons. 368 First, considerable concern was expressed
regarding the potential impact of an exemption on the school. The
court was primarily concerned with maintaining an integrated educational program and the "operational efficiency" of the school: "To
allow students and parents to pick and choose which courses they
want to attend would create a stratified school structure, where division and derision would flourish." 359 The remedy sought by the
plaintiffs, a limited exemption from particular aspects of the curriculum, would impinge on the interests of other students and the
school system in general. In contrast, the complete exemption remedy in Yoder did not burden the internal workings of the school system.
Second, even though the plaintiffs asserted a bona fide free exercise claim, the court was unsympathetic. Refusal to give relief
may have stemmed from doubts concerning the sincerity and importance of the religious belief or from a judgment that infringement
had not been severe. Since -the sincerity of .1Jhe plaintiffs religious
belief seems clear, the court's skepticism might be attributable to a
simple inability -to empha:thize with this particular sect.
Third, the court's belief that the plaintiffs' objection was based
on a disagreement with values taught in the schools360 is most significant, since it appeared to temper the court's general attitude toward
the plaintiffs. The court thought that a limited free exercise exemption was an inappropriate remedy in such a situation. It was "reluctant to become involved with school curriculums and educational philosophy"361 and stated that the proper forum for presentation of
351. See 406 U.S. at 224.
358. The court asserted, for example, that attendance of separate classes in which
the objectionable teaching methods would not be used was a violation of the establishment clause. 385 F. Supp. at 401. Given the fact that courts do accommodate
interests in establishment clause cases, see text at notes 292-94 supra, this conclusion
is not self-evident. Separate classes would be no more divisive and would impose no
greater psychological pressure than the released-time practice approved in Zorach v.
Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), discussed in note 312 supra. Furthermore, the plaintiffs did not request that their beliefs be taught in the school. If the Davis plaintiffs had sought to have their religious beliefs taught in school, the case would have
been similar to Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), or McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333 U.S. 203 (1948).
359. 385 F. Supp. at 405.
360. 385 F. Supp. at 402-04, 405-06.
361. 385 F. Supp. at 406.
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these parental objections to curriculum was the public school board
meeting. 362
Even though the approaches adopted by the courts differ, the
result reached in Davis is not inconsistent with Yoder. In Yoder,
the rejection of values taught in the schools did not preclude granting
a remedy, since rejection of mainstream values and complete separation from worldly influence are essential to salvation in the Amish
faith. 363 Apparently, only objections to contemporary values wholly
founded upon and inextricably connected with religious doctrine are
entitled to religious protection.
Davis illustrates the predicament of a parent whose challenges
to the general curriculum on constitutional grounds disguise an underlying disagreement with the values taught in school. Numerous
constitutional theories have similarly been used by parents to attack
specific courses. For example, the school board's authority to prescribe sex education courses has been challenged. Many such
claims have alleged violations of the free exercise clause, but courts
have rejected them using three different rationales: (1) the first
amendment does not protect a religious sect from any or all objectionable views;364 (2) the first amendment neither requires nor permits the state to tailor its courses or programs of instruction to the
religious principles of one sect; courts must protect freedom of
speech as zealously as freedom of religion; 365 (3) the possibility of (
conflict with religious beliefs in one area of the curriculum does not
outweigh the governmental interest in establishing a course with a
- wholly secular purpose. 366
Even when the parental right to control the child's education is
asserted in combination with the religious claim, courts have held
that the parental interest does not outweigh the broad authority of
school boards to require sex education. 367 Contentions that parents
have an exclusive constitutional right to teach their children about
sexual matters368 and that sex education classes unnecessarily in362. 385 F. Supp. at 405.
363. 406 U.S. at 209-12.
364. See Cornwell v. State Bd. of Educ., 314 F. Supp. 340, 344 (D. Md. 1969),
affd., 428 F.2d 471 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970).
365. See Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo School Bd., 51 Cal. App.
3d 1, 14, 124 Cal. Rptr. 68, 79 (1975); Medeiros v. Kiyosaki, 52 Hawaii 436, 444,
478 P.2d 314, 319 (1970).
366. See Hopkins v. Hamden Bd. of Educ., 29 Conn. Supp. 397, 411, 289 A.2d
914, 922 (1971). In general, courts have accorded less weight to the free exercise
claim if the challenged sex education program allowed parents to choose whether
their children would receive sex education instruction. See Medeiros v. Kiyosaki,
52 Hawaii 436, 442-43, 478 P.2d 314, 316-17 (1970).
367. Cornwell v. State Bd. of Educ., 314 F. Supp. 340, 344 (D. Md. 1969), affd.,
428 F.2d 471 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 942 (1970).
368. Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo School Bd., 51 Cal. App. 3d 1,
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fringe upon the constitutional zone of privacy369 have also been rejected. Equal protection objections have been dismissed on the
ground that the sex education program applied equally to all students
of varied religious beliefs.37° Finally, one court rejected the argument that a statutory excusal feature in a sex education program created an arbitrary and unreasonable classification. 371
Parents have not only objected to courses but also challenged the
use of particular novels in literature classes on purported religious
grounds. In Todd v. Rochester Community Schools, 372 the parents
claimed that religious references m Kum: Vonnegut's novel, Slaughterhouse Five, violated free exercise rights. The court responded
that "[b]y couching a personal grievance in First Amendment language, one may not stifle freedom of expression";373 a book's mere
reference to religious matters was not a violation of any right. 374 The
court warned that if the parents' claim were upheld, children would
be deprived of the opportunity to study great masterpieces: "Our
Constitution does not command ignorance; on the contrary, it assures
the people that the state may not relegate them to such a status and
guarantees to all the precious and unfettered freedom of pursuing
one's own intellectual pleasure in one's own personal way." 375
Similarly, in Rosenberg v. Board of Education, 376 a court rejected
the request to prohibit the use of Oliver Twist and The Merchant
of Venice in the secondary schools. The plaintiffs asserted that the
literature tended to engender anti-Semitic feelings, 377 but the court
concluded that suppression would not necessarily remedy bigotry and
would have the undesirable effect of interfering with learning and
free inquiry in the school. Suppression, the court stated, would be
32-33, 124 Cal. Rptr. 68, 91-92 (1975); Hopkins v. Hamden Bd. of Educ., 29 Conn.
Supp. 397,411, 289 A.2d 914, 922 (1971 ).
369. Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo School Bd., 51 Cal. App. 3d 1,
30-32, 124 Cal. Rptr. 68, 89-91 (1975); Medeiros v. Kiyosaki, 52 Hawaii 436, 43841, 478 P.2d 314, 315-16 (1970).
370. Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo School Bd., 51 Cal. App. 3d 1,
28, 124 Cal. Rptr. 68, 88 (1975); Hopkins v. Hamden Bd. of Educ., 29 Conn. Supp.
397, 411, 289 A.2d 914, 922 (1971 ).
371. Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo School Bd., 51 Cal. App. 3d 1,
28-29, 124 Cal. Rptr. 68, 88-89 (1975).
372. 41 Mich. App. 320,200 N.W.2d 90 (1972).
373. 41 Mich. App. at 329, 200 N.W.2d at 93.
374. 41 Mich. App. at 328, 200 N.W.2d at 93.
375. 41 Mich. App. at 329, 200 N.W.2d at 93-94. The court criticized the
trial judge for substituting his own ideas of morals and rightness for those of the
school community. 41 Mich. App. at 339, 200 N.W.2d at 99. "It is for the lawfully
elected school board . . . and its teachers to determine the local school's curriculum.
The judicial censor is persona non grata in [the] formation of public education."
41 Mich. App. at 340,200 N.W.2d at 99.
· 376. 196 Misc. 542, 92 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
377. 196 Misc. at 543, 92 N.Y.S.2d at 345.
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justified only if a book were written with the explicit purpose of fostering hatred toward a particular group. 378
In the cases that challenge the general curriculum, courses, or
books, parents have sought protection, under the guise of free exercise, parental nurture, privacy, or other theories, of their right to socialize their children according to their own values. In response,
courts have expressed an overriding concern that the personal attitudes and values of individual parents must not be allowed to stifle
the free interchange of ideas in public school classrooms needed to
achieve the educational system's goals.
Until recently, the notion that education serves to develop the
critical inquiry and open-mindedness necessary for democracy has
been considered applicable only to universities. 879 The secondary
school environment has been distinguished from the university setting in several ways: the secondary school acts more "in loco parentis with respect to minors";380 secondary school teachers frequently lack the "independent traditions," broad discretion over
teaching methods, intellectual qualifications, and experience of the
university faculty; and secondary students and sometimes teachers
are less intellectually and emotionally mature than their university
counterparts. 381
While still emphasizing the indoctrination function of secondary
schools,382 educators and courts in the last several decades have recognized that maximum exposure to ideas is also an important concern not only at the university level but also at lower levels of public
education. 383 As a result, judicial reluctance to allow parents to
378. 196 Misc. at 543, 92 N.Y.S.2d at 345-46. But see Presidents Council,
Dist. 25 v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 998 (1972), in which the court affirmed the school board's decision to
remove a novel claimed by parents to be obscene from the junior high school libraries. The court stated that academic freedom was "scarcely fostered by the intrusion of three or even nine federal jurists making curriculum or library choices for
the community of scholars." 457 F.2d at 292.
379. See Keyishan v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) ("[11he [university] classroom is peculiarly the 'marketplace of ideas' in which the exposure of
students to a robust exchange of ideas is essential"); Developments, supra note 281,
at 1050.
380. Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (D. Mass.), affd., 448 F.2d
1242 (1st Cir. 1971).
381. 323 F. Supp. at 1392.
382. See James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 573 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1042 (1972); Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (D. Mass.), alfd,,
448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971).
383. See, e.g., Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1968); Wieman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 196 (1952) (Frankfurter, J., concurring); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352, 355 (M.D. Ala. 1970); Albaum v. Carey, 283 F. Supp. 3,
11 (E.D.N.Y. 1968). Cf. Note, School Boards, Schoolbooks and the Freedom To
Learn, 59 YALB LJ. 928, 943 (1950); Note, Academic Freedom in the Public
Schools: The Right to Teach, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1176, 1181 (1973).
This broad view of education has been justified by its tendency to strengthen
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censor classroom discussion is understandable. Citizens for Parental
Rights v. San Mateo School Board, 384 a recent California appeals
court case, epitomizes the nature of the parental challenge and judicial response. The court rejected a parental privacy claim that was
based on Meyer 385 and Pierce: 386
Meyer and Pierce are supportive of the explicit freedoms of speech
and press rather than the penumbral right of privacy. Citing these
two cases, the Supreme Court drew the following conclusion in Griswold v. Connecticut [citation omitted]: "In other words, the State
may not, consistently with the spirit of the First Amendment, contract
the spectrum of available knowledge." Yet, this is the very thing that
the plaintiffs would have this court do. They seek to "contract the
spectrum of available knowledge" by enjoining the county from continuing with its family life and sex education program.381

The court's primary emphasis on free speech is appropriate in the
curriculum setting. Although recognizing a privacy right to withdraw entirely from public school would merely limit the knowledge
of the individual claimant, allowing parents to alter the public school
curriculum would encroach on the rights of other members of the
school community to teach, learn, and speak. Thus, courts have subordinated the interest of individual parents in fashioning a curriculum to reflect their own values not only because satisfaction of all
diverse desires would oe administratively impossible, but also because satisfaction of the individualistic interest would be paradoxically counterproductive to preserving free expression.
Free expression is therefore necessary for the creation of an atmosphere in which the.school boards can effectively carry out their
collectivist functions of academic achievement and socialization. The
exchange of ideas and exposure to diversity within the school curriculum prepare the student for life in a democratic society that
values a certain degree of heterogeneity. They are a prerequisite
to good citizenship, and it is in the state's interest to expose all children to the experience.
and reaffirm the pluralistic nature of American society in which "knowledge is the
right of all and not the privilege of a few." Davis v. Page, 385 F. Supp. 395, 400
(D.N.H. 1974). See Bright v. Isenbarger, 314 F. Supp. 1382, 1391 (N.D. Ind.
1970), affd., 445 F.2d 412 (7th Cir. 1971). Courts also have increasingly stressed
the importance of education to the success and welfare of the child: "In these days,
it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he
is denied the opportunity of an education." Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,
493 (1954). See, e.g, San Antonio Indp. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1,
30 (1973); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 245 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting);
Davis v. Ann Arbor Public Schools, 313 F. Supp. 1217, 1225 (E.D. Mich. 1970).
384. 51 Cal. App. 3d 1, 124 Cal. Rptr. 68 (1975).
385. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
386. Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
387. Citizens for Parental Rights v. San Mateo School Bd., 51 Cal. App. 3d 1,
32, 124 Cal. Rptr. 68, 90 (1975) (all emphasis of California court).

1442

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 74:1373

Recognition that the free exchange of ideas is a fundamental
value in the public schools does not, however, mean that individuals
have no right to challenge the established curriculum. Clearly,
school board policy may be as parochial and destructive of individual
inquiry as parental censorship. When the public school curriculum
serves as an instrument for the oppression of minority groups or for
the suppression of ideas, it may violate the fourteenth amendment
equal protection clause, the first amendment free speech clause, or
both.
c. Direct challenges: equal protection and free speech claims.
An order to cease violating -the equal protection clause could
arise from two different types of claims. First, a group might assert
that it did not receive an education equivalent to that of other groups
because the public school curriculum was used to portray it unfairly
and prejudicially. As the court indicated in Rosenberg v. Board of
Education, 388 elimination from the curriculum of a book or a course
that fosters hatred or preaches the inferiority of a particular group
would be justified.380
A variant of this type of equal protection claim is that the group
has been stereotyped in the textbooks. The stereotyping of women
in texts as wives and mothers arguably denies female students equal
protection of the law by providing them with a substantially different
and inferior education to that provided male students. aoo Ethnic or
religious groups might make similar claims. For example, due to
the failure of the school system to give proper credit to Blacks in texts
and classes, 391 Blacks may have been unable to develop the self-esteem necessary to function effectively in society and to take advan388. 196 Misc. 542, 92 N.Y.S.2d 344 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
389. 196 Misc. at 543, 92 N.Y.S.2d at 346. See text at notes 376-78 supra.
390. It has been demonstrated that people rise to what is expected of them. See
R. RosENrnAL & L. JACOBSON, PYGMALION IN THE CLASSROOM (1968); Milgram, Behavioral Study of Obedience, 61 J. .ABNORM. & Soc. PSYCH. 371-78 (1963), Expectations are often communicated to the child through school textbooks. Several studies
have revealed that women and girls are given very limited roles in school texts and
that boys are the main characters in most of the stories. While girls are depicted as
passive and dependent, boys are portrayed as being adventurous, skillful, and creative.
Women seldom have exciting jobs, while men are employed in a variety of interesting
jobs. See generally U'Ren, The Image of Women in Textbooks, in WOMEN IN SEXIST
SOCIETY (V. Gornick & B. Moran eds. 1971); Note, Teaching Woman Her Place:
The Role of Public Education in the Development .of Sex Roles, 24 HASTINGS L.J.
1191, 1199-202 (1973). The contributions of famous women are rarely acknowledged in textbooks. In one text, Madame Curie is portrayed as a lab assistant to
her husband, U'Ren, supra, at 222. Due to the inadequate representation of girls
and women in texts, girls' aspirations and their potential for achievement are limited.
See Note, supra, at 1202. See also Comment, Sex Discrimination: The Textbook
Case, 62 CALIF. L. REV. 1313, 1338 (1974).
391. Cf. Rosenfelt, Indian Schools and Community Control, 25 STAN, L. Rt;v,
489,525 (1973).
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tage of the "amazing world of diversity." 392 Claims alleging such
injuries from stereotyping have not yet been litigated; moreover,
courts might be reluctant to engage in the psychological, sociological,
and educational analyses necessary to decide these issues. It appears, however, that organized minority groups have successfully
brought this problem to the attention of local boards and textbook
manufacturers and have effected significant changes without judicial
assistance.
The second type of equal protection claim involves a challenge
to "sex tracking," the designation of different curricula for girls and
boys in an attempt to train girls for certain occupations and boys for
others. 393 In Robinson v. Washington, 394 the court held that the
plaintiff's challenge to a regulation making home economics a degree
requirement only for female high school students did not present a
substantial federal question under the equal protection clause. However, in Sanchez v. Baron, 395 the court reached a contrary conclusion
on similar facts. The plaintiffs contended that a policy that excluded
women from industri:al arts classes resulted in •a denial of fourteenth
amendment rights by "arbitrarily channelling women, controlling their
education and ,therefore, limiting their options in careers and life
roles." 396 In a preliminary hearing to determine whether the case
should be certified as a class action, the court agreed that ."girls in
junior and senior high schools . . . are being discriminated against
because of their sex."397
The equal protection claim, like the free exercise and parental
nurture claims, is in a sense an oblique attack upon the school
board's power to socialize students. A more direct approach, which
has not yet been attempted, would challenge on free speech grounds
the board's power to shape and influence children's minds through
the academic curriculum. Parents might assert, based on the principles articulated in West Virginia Board of Education v. Barnette, 398
a right on behalf of their children to be free from interference with
thought.
The disputed school board regulation in Barnette required student participation in a flag salute ceremony and imposed penalties
for refusal to participate. The Court held the regulation invalid as
applied to a child of the Jehovah's Witness sect. Although the flag
392. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 245 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in
part).
393. See Note, supra note 390, at 1212.
394. Civil No. 9576 (W.D. Wash., April 6, 1971), cited in 2 WOMEN'S RIGHTS
LAW RPTR. 42 (1972).
395. Civil No. 69-C-1615 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
396. Note, supra note 390, at 1212.
397. Civil No. 69-C-1615 (E.D.N.Y. 1970).
398. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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salute conflicted with a religious principle forbidding all forms of
idolatry, Justice Jackson's majority opinion emphasized that the deci•
sion was based upon a general right of freedom of thought rather
than upon freedom of religion: 399 "Nor does the issue as we see
it tum on one's possession of particular religious views or the sincer•
ity with which they are held. While religion supplies appellees' mo•
tive for enduring the discomforts of making the issue in this case,
many citizens who do not share these religious views hold such a
compulsory rite to infringe constitutional liberty of the individual." 400
The Court found that the statute compelled either an affirmation of
belief or a simulation of assent; 401 such coercion was held to invade
the sacred sphere of intellect that the first amendment was designed
to insulate from official and political control. "One's right to life,
liberty, and property, to free speech, to free press, freedom of wor•
ship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not be submit•
ted !<;> vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections."402
lj'he court noted that in the educational setting, individual rights
may be particularly vulnerable to infringement because local school
boards "may feel less sense of responsibility to the Constitution" than
do other units of government. 403 Despite its admitted lack of exper•
tise in public education, the Court concluded that it must intervene
when such constitutional invasions occur rather than defer to the
school board: 404 "[E]ducating the young for citizenship is reason
for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms of the individ•
ual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at its source and teach
youth to discount important principles of our government as mere
platitudes."405 While the Court noted, as it had in Meyer and
Pierce, that the collectivist goal of national unity was permissible,
it held that coercion of thought was an impermissible means. 400 Such
coercion was particularly objectionable in the public schools because
"[p]robably no deeper division of our people could proceed from
any provocation than from finding it necessary to choose what doc•
trine and whose program shall compel youth to unite in embrac•
ing."407

The student who is indoctrinated to the beliefs and values es•
poused by the school board and transmitted through the curriculum
is arguably coerced no less than the student in Barnette. As dis•
399.
400.
401.
402.
403.
404.
405.
406.
407.

See Kauper, supra note 290, at 1062.
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319
319
319
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319
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U.S.
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U.S.
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cussed earlier,408 the educational system's socialization function is
well established and control by the board over the curriculum is a
permissible means of discharging it. However, when the core collectivist interests of the state are not at stake, limits on the educational
authorities' power to manipulate the curriculum's content may be
reached, and the countervailing right of individual freedom of expression should be invocable. The student, compelled to attend
school, is forced to learn the ideas approved ·by the school board;
the child's mind could be shackled if no provision is made for exposure to different and opposing ideas. In both Barnette and the
curriculum cases, diversity is sacrificed to the state's demands for ideological conformity.
A complicating factor in determining how school board power
should be limited is that, unlike the parental nurture and free exercise rights, the right of freedom of thought belongs to the child. 400
Of course, when the child is very young, the parent must bring the
action to moderate board control over socialization on the child's
behalf. However, it is at least arguable that since the process of socialization acts directly upon the student, and since education is primarily intended to benefit the child instead of the parent, a child of appropriate age should be allowed to assert independently his own
rights and opinions. As Justice Douglas noted in his dissent in
Yoder, "It is the student's judgment, not his parents', that is essential if we are to give full meaning to what we have said about the
Bill of Rights and of the right of students to be masters of their own
destiny." 410 Douglas relied on Tinker v. Des Moines Independent
Community School District,411 which held that students were "persons" possessing fundamental rights under the Constitution. In the
language of Tinker, students are not "closed-circuit recipients of only
that which the state chooses to communicate." 412 It is difficult to
determine, however, when children would be capable of asserting
the right on their own behalf. The children in Tinker were sixteenyear-old junior high school students, but Justice Douglas believed
that even a fourteen-year-old child generally possesses the necessary
408. See text at notes 251-52 supra.
409. Although this issue has not been decided by the courts, there seems to be
no procedural problem if a child who does not have parental approval wishes to
litigate. Federal practice provides that the "[c]ourt shall appoint a guardian ad
litem for an infant or incompetent person not otherwise represented in an action
or shall make such other order as it deems proper for the protection of the infant
or incompetent person." FED. R. Crv. P. 17(c). This provision has been broadly
construed. Thus, when an infant's interests conflict with those of ·his parents, the
court has power to appoint a special representative. See C. WRIGIIT & A. MILLER,
6 FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE§ 1570, at-774 (1971).
410. 406 U.S. 205, 245 (1972).
411. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
412. 393 U.S. at 511.
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emotional and intellectual maturity to exercise judgment with respect
to his education. 413
A court that recognizes the child's right to be free from interference with thought should fashion a remedy that minimizes the socialization impact of the curriculum. Because a degree of socialization
is inherent in the compulsory education system, 414 an absolutely neutral curriculum is not possible and therefore could not be mandated.
Indeed, a totally neutral curriculum would not be desirable; there
are strong state interests to be furthered through socialization that
must necessarily outweigh the individual right. 415 However, specific curriculum changes could be made that would help safeguard
the interest of the child. For example, schools could be required
to give parents and students greater choice in the exposure of students to socially and politically charged subjects, such as sex education and the potentially role-defining studies of industrial arts and
home economics. In courses such as history and political science
that traditionally have emphasized consensus values, the state could
be compelled to expose the student to a balanced presentation of
ideas. A judicial requirement that students be exposed to a diversity of ideas would, in effect, represent a declaration that free expression is a consensus value and that the schools, by setting an example
of openness to diverse ideas, must communicate it to the students.
The recognition of a right of free thought, however, would present problems similar to those that restrained courts in the religion
and privacy cases, but which did not exist in Barnette.41° In the
curriculum indoctrination situation, for example, courts must assess
educational policies and values to determine a violation and fashion
a remedy. It would be difficult, however, to determine when exposure has become indoctrination or when a balanced presentation
of ideas has occurred. Such determinations require an understanding of subtle interactions and relationships in the educational system,
including the manner in which various subjects, ideas, and techniques influence students. Clearly, courts do not possess the level
of expertise necessary to make such judgments. In Barnette, on the
other hand, the parents attacked the required observance of a ritual,
which was merely an adjunct to the content of the curriculum. In
that case, the determination of unconstitutionality was based primarily upon a judgment of good citizenship, which the Court felt
413. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 245 n.3 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part); Russo v. Central School Dist. No. 1, 469 F.2d 623, 633 (2d Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 (1973) (tenth-grade children considered to be capable
of forming independent judgments).
414. See text at notes 265-72 supra. See generally K. DAWSON & K. PREWITI,
supra note 265, at 45, 164; D. KmP & M. YUDOF, supra note 46, at 85-134.
415. See note 48 supra and text at notes 48-50 supra.
416. West Virginia Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
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uniquely competent to make. Thus, the court's lack of competence
in educational matters was less important.
There are, moreover, several problems with the proposed remedy for curriculum indoctrination. Separate programs for dissenting
children could create detrimental divisiveness, which has been a continuing concern of the courts in religion cases417 and was further reiterated in Barnette. 418 Further, the efficiency of school operations
and the quality of education might be seriously impaired by a complex system of exemptions and special classes. 419
Thus, while the right to be free from interference with thought
appears to have been given a sound theoretical foundation in Barnette, the courts' relative inexpertise in the field of education and
the practical difficulties of formulating a remedy are likely to prevent
them from recognizing such a claim, thereby leaving intact the school
boards' pervasive control of curriculum.
3.

Free Speech Protections of Teachers' Rights

In contrast to the courts' refusal to protect students in curriculum
disputes is their recent willingness to make the protection of the
rights of teachers the only area in which school board authority has
been successfully challenged on free speech grounds. This new deference towards teachers' rights and the departure from traditional solicitude toward school board authority are consistent with the increasingly recognized role of the school as a "marketplace of ideas."420
Although <the right to teach was recognized in Meyer v. Nebraska,421 the free speech right of teachers has long been limited
because of their unique position in the classroom. 422 On the one
hand, the teacher serves as the "mouthpiece" of the educational authorities and must thereby implement prescribed policies and curric417. See text at notes 298-304 supra.
418. See text at note 407 supra.
419. But see Miami Herald, Oct 19, 1975, § A, at 1, 26, col. 2. Some members
of the Florida legislature favor mandating alternative programs, thus preferring classroom disruption to the encroachment upon the right of parents to control their child's
upbringing.
420. See text at notes 379-83 supra.
421. 262 U.S. 390 (1923). See Moskowitz & Casagrande, supra note 109, at
678, 681-82; Case Note, 86 HARV. L. REV. 1341, 1347 (1973).
422. See, e.g., Adler v. Board of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952) (while teachers
have "the right under our law to assemble, speak, think and believe as they will
. . . [i]t is equally clear that they have no right to work for the school system
on their own terms");~Beilan v. Board of Educ., 357 U.S. 399 (1958); Scopes v.
State, 154 Tenn. 105, 289 S.W. 363 (1927). However, the notion that employees
could be compelled to relinquish constitutionally protected rights as a condition of
public employment has since been rejected. See, e.g., Keyishan v. Board of Regents,
385 U.S. 589, 605-06 (1967). See Nahmod, supra note 272, at 1494-95. See also
Comment, The Dwindling Rights and the Closing Courthouse Door, 44 FORDHAM
L. REV. 511 (1975); Note, 48 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1176, supra note 383.
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ulum. On the other hand, in his tutorial role, the teacher often identifies with the interests of the child and may thus be brought into
conflict with administrators. Moreover, the teacher deals directly
with parents and may consequently become entangled in disputes between parents and administrators concerning educational policy and
values. Whatever his relationship to competing forces outside the
classroom, within it the teacher wields extraordinary power. As a
"role-model"423 and primary disciplinarian, 424 the teacher has a powerful socializing influence on his pupils. 425 Because the state compels his students to attend school, he addresses a "captive audience,"426 and the force of his ideas are not counterbalanced by the
views of any comparable authority. 427 While generally the teacher
utilizes his power as the transmitter of the board's prescribed values
and ideas, his special status allows him to modify the official curriculum, thus making the teacher a potential counterweight to the parochialism of an unchallenged school board program.
Obviously, the teacher stands at the crossroads of the educational
. system. 428 Through him, the rights and interests of all members of
the educational community can be thwarted or vindicated. The failure of courts to develop a unified theory of academic rights and obligations that accommodates all of the "unique institutional demands,
social policies, and personal interests involved in the educational situation"429 is most evident in the case of teachers, who have been
423. Wishart v. McDonald, 500 F.2d 1110, 111S (1st Cir. 1974); Comment, supra note 422, at S11.
424. See R. DAWSON & K. PREWIIT, supra note 26S, at 1S8.
42S. See Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 48S (1960); Parducci v. Rutland, 316
F. Supp. 3S2, 35S (M.D. Ala. 1970).
426. See Moore v. School Bd., 364 F. Supp. 35S, 360 (N.D. Fla. 1973); Van
Alstyne, The Constitutional Rights of Teachers and Professors, 1970 DUKE L.J. 841,
8S6.
427. Van Alstyne, supra note 426, at 8S6. Moreover, students are not free to
respond to the teacher for fear of his sanctions. Id. at 856.
428. See generally Miller, supra note 258, at 839-40. The unique position of
the teacher illustrates the potential countervailing interests of the state, parents, and
students in the teacher's classroom expression. Since the state's ultimate interest is in
the development of its children, it is therefore concerned with both how the teacher
conducts class and the subject matter to which the child is exposed in the classroom.
The parents' interest is in the intellectual and emotional development of their children. See Nahmod, supra note 272, at 1493; Note, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1176, supra
note 383, at 118S. Finally, the student has a right to be exposed to a broad use
of knowledge as well as to a classroom environment that will foster his intellectual
and emotional development. See Nahmod, supra note 272, at 1494. In Minarcini
v. Strongsville City School Dist., 384 F. Supp. 698 (N.D. Ohio 1974), students
claimed that the school board's text selection contrary to faculty recommendations
violated their first amendment learning freedoms. The court noted the fairness of
the selection process and found for the school board. The court, emphasizing "the
professional teacher's obligation to utilize individual teaching methodology," implicitly recognized students' academic learning rights as encompassing exposure to
a variety of ideas. 384 F. Supp. at 707 (emphasis added).
429. Case Note, supra note 421, at 1348 n.40.
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accorded rights only in piecemeal fashion. Still, as indicated earlier,
the free speech right has at least been recognized, and the cases have
evinced certain standards that identify its scope.
While some courts have recognized only the teacher's procedural
right not .to ·be dismissed without prior notice that his methods are
unacceptable, 430 several have overcome their fear of inexperitise in
questions involving educational judgment and have recognized a substantive right of academic freedom. 431 In these cases, courts balance
the state's interests in the students' welfare and in operating an efficient school system against the teacher's freedom to conduct his
classes in the manner he believes will most effectively implement
the curriculum and stimulate critical thinking. 432 Thus, the teacher's
right is not absolute. For example, courts have generally rejected
attempts by teachers to discuss matters completely unrelated to the
subjects that the teachers were hired to present. 433 In certain cases,
430. See, e.g., Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1392 (D. Mass.), affd.,
448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971).
431. See, e.g., Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352, 354 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
Similarly, in Sterzing v. Fort Bend lndp. School Dist., 376 F. Supp. 657 (S.D. Tex.),
vacated for reconsideration of relief granted, 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1972), the court
recognized
the substantive rights of a teacher to choose a teaching method, which, in the
court's view, on ti}e basis of expert opinion, served a demonstrated educational
purpose, and the procedural right of a teacher not to be discharged for the use
of a teaching method which was not proscribed by a regulation or definite administrative action, and as to which it was not proven that he had notice that
its ~se was prohibited.
376 F. Supp. at 662. But see Oakland Unified School Dist. v. Olicker, 25 Cal. App.
3d 1098, 1109, 102 Cal. Rptr. 421, 429 (1972), in which the court stated that its
sole function was to determine whether the teaching technique disrupted or impaired
discipline in the classroom; it was not to assess the academic merit of the pedagogical technique.
432. See generally Note, 48 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1176, supra note 383, at 1176.
433. Where the topic in controversy was considered relevant to the teacher's assigned curriculum, teachers' rights have been upheld. See Keefe v. Geanakos, 418
F.2d 359 (1st Cir. 1969) (teacher's right to introduce the word "motherfucker" in
context of discussion of article from Harpers magazine, in senior English
class upheld); Webb v. Lake Mills Community School Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791
(N.D. Iowa 1972) (drama teacher's use of words "damn" and "son of a bitch" were
deemed reasonably relevant to the subject matter she was employed to teach); Sterzing v. Fort Bend Indp. School Dist., 376 F. Supp. 657 (S.D. Tex.), vacated for
reconsideration of relief granted, 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1972) (damages for value
of reinstatement granted to high school civics teacher who was dismissed because
he raised and discussed controversial · issues, used contemporary anti-war literature,
and implemented a six-day section on race relations); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F.
Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970). But see Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387 (D.
Mass.), affd., 448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971) (teacher who had written "fuck" on
the blackboard and asked students to define it during a discussion on societal taboos
was reinstated; however, the court held that if a teacher uses a method that is relevant to the subject matter and approved by some experts but not by a preponderance
of the teaching profession as having a serious educational purpose, he may be discharged if he was put on notice that the method was not permitted).
When the teacher's deviation from the established curriculum was deemed to be
more substantial, dismissals have been upheld. See Brubaker v. Board of Educ., 502
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courts have also circumscribed the right by insisting that the teacher
give a balanced presentation of ideas to avoid indoctrination or proselytization of the students. 434
In assessing the educational value of pedagogical methods, courts
have relied heavily upon whether the disputed language or concept
is available to the student either in books in the school library435 or
in other accessible literature,436 and whether the student already
might be familiar with the controversial language or subject. 437
While courts have sought the expert opinions of administrators, professors, and teachers on these matters, 438 reliance upon parental objections has been conspicuously absent. 439
. Parducci v. Rutland440 illustrates the general judicial approach
in teachers' rights cases. In Parducci, a high school teacher assigned
Kurt Vonnegut's story "Welcome to the Monkey House" to her junior English class. Three students asked to be excused from the assignment, and several parents complained. The superintendent, describing the story as "literary garbage," ordered her not to teach it.
She was subsequently dismissed on the ground that her assigned materials had a "disruptive effect" on the class. The court held that
the dismissal violated the teacher's first amendment right of academic freedom. The court noted that although the right to teach
was not one of the enumerated rights of the first amendment, 441 it
had been acknowledged by many courts as fundamental to the preservation of democracy. The court emphasized that first amendment
protection of the right of academic freedom was necessary because
unwarnanted invasions would otherwise have a "chilling'' effect on
F.2d 973 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975) (dismissal of three
teachers for distributing a poem that referred to the pleasures derived from smoking
marijuana and urging students not to accept the discipline and moral tenets imposed
on them was held not to violate the first amendment); Ahern v. Board of Educ.,
456 F.2d 399 (8th Cir. 1972) (teacher drafted corporal punishment regulation during
economics class); Moore v. School Bd., 364 F. Supp. 355 (N.D. Fla. 1973) (teacher's
class statements concerning prostitutes and other illegitimate topics were not protected by the first amendment); Robbins v. Board of Educ., 313 F. Supp. 642 (N.D.
III. 1970) (dismissal of English teacher because of her chronic tardiness, leaving
class unattended oil several occasions, discussion of disciplinary action taken against
another teacher, use of offensive sexual references during class, and inadequate teaching methods held not to violate first and fourteenth amendments).
434. See generally Nahmod, Controversy in the Classroom: The High Sc/zoo/
Teacher and Freedom of Expression, 39 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1032, 1048 (1971).
Cf. Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352, 353 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
435. See Note, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1176, supra note 383, at 1187 & n.78.
436. See, e.g., Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352, 356 (M.D. Ala. 1970),
437. See Note, 48 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1176, supra note 383, at 1187 & n.78.
438. See, e.g., Mailloux v. Kiley, 323 F. Supp. 1387, 1390 (D. Mass.), alfd.,
448 F.2d 1242 (1st Cir. 1971).
439. See Nahmod, supra note 434, at 1052.
440. 316 F. Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970).
441. 316 F. Supp. at 355.
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other teachers. 442 However, cognizant of the disproportionate influence of the teacher and the "state's vital interest in protecting the
impressionable minds of its young people from any form of extreme
propagandism in the classroom,"443 the court acknowledged the need
to temper the teacher's right in certain circumstances. 444 In Parducci, the decision .to protect ithe teacher's right to assign the story
was based on two factors: no substantial disruption resulted from
the teacher's action and the story was, in the judgment of the court,
appropriate for high school students. 445
Parducci was the first case to apply the standard articulated in
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District446 of
"material and substantial interference with school work or discipline"
in the context of teacher free speech. 447 The student's response in
the classroom, which the court characterized as apathetic, was the
sole basis for finding that there was no substantial disruption; parental objections were not considered. 448 Rather than assess community and parental sensibilities to determine whether the story
chosen for classroom study was obscene, the court focused on student
maturity, sophistication, and experience. 449
The court's assessment of the educational value of the classroom
materials markedly contrasts with the typical approach used in parental challenges. In agreeing with the teacher that the story had
literary and social merit, the court in effect substituted its judgment
of educational value for ,that of the school board. 450 Apparently the
442. 316 F. Supp. at 355. See Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 362 (1st Cir.
1969).
443. 316 F. Supp. at 355.
444. 316 F. Supp. at 355. See Moore v. School Bd., 364 F. Supp. 355, 360
(N.D. Fla. 1973); Sterzing v. Fort Bend lndp. School Dist., 376 F. Supp. 657, 661
(S.D. Tex.), vacated for reconsideration of relief granted, 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir.
1972).
445. See Markowitz & Casagrande, supra note 325, at 680.
446. 393 U.S. 503 (1969).
447. 316 F. Supp. at 355. See Sterzing v. Fort Bend Indp. School Dist., 376 F.
Supp. 657, 662 (S.D. Tex.), vacated for reconsideration of relief granted, 496
F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1972).
Tinker involved behavior outside the classroom. Thus, its use in Parducci is significant, since a distinction has generally been drawn between classroom and out-ofclassroom contexts. See Nahmod, supra note 272, at 1492.
448. 316 F. Supp. at 356. See Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 361-62 (1st
Cir. 1969).
449. 316 F. Supp. at 356. See Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 361 (1st Cir.
1969).
450. See Nahmod, supra note 272, at 1502. The fact that the story was clearly
within the assigned curriculum, however, appears to have been important to the
court's determination. See Nahmod, supra note 434, at 1044.
One commentator bas suggested that the court in Parducci may have disregarded the school principal's literary judgment because it was "based not on educational considerations but rather on parental complaints alone." Id. at 1038. The
implication that parental opinion should not influence the board's "educational" judg-
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court found it easy to judge independently the story's educational
value in this case because the school board's position was entirely
arbitrary. The board had failed to articulate any standards to guide
teachers in selecting literature for classroom study. In fact, inconsistency pervaded the entire system. 451 The court noted that both
the school library and the English department's recommended reading list contained books with philosophies and language far more
controversial than any to be found in the Vonnegut story. 4112 Because of the absence of standards, the teacher received no prior notice that her action violated Board policy, and, therefore, the dismissal violated her right of due process. 453 Although the court was
generally reluctant to interfere with the decision-making of the
school board, it could not on the facts of the case "find any substantial interest of the schools to be served by giving defendants unfettered discretion to decide how the First Amendment rights of teachers are to be exercised. " 454
Although the teacher's right of academic freedom is receiving
increasing support in the courts, it appears that the judiciary is not
intervening solely to protect teachers. For example, their references
to student needs when determining the scope of a teacher's academic
freedom455 indicate that courts are also concerned that prohibition
of controversial subject matter might diminish the intellectual opportunities of students. 456 When the curriculum content issue is framed
in terms of teacher rights, the teacher, in effect, becomes the guardian of academic freedom for the entire school community.
Parducci also highlights the conflict between the academic freedom of teachers and the right of parents to influence their children's
education. Ostensibly, a teacher's right of free speech, like all constitutional rights, should be immune from popular pressure. For ex,

'

ment contraverts the basic political premise upon which the system is founded: par•
ents would be denied access to the school board, the intended forum for parental
communication of grievances.
451. 316 F. Supp. at 357, 358.
452. The English Department provided a reading list for teachers and students
for each grade. The court concluded that J.D. Salinger's Catcher in the Rye, a recommended novel on the junior English reading list, contained far more controversial
language than the assigned story. 316 F. Supp. at 357.
453. 316 F. Supp. at 357. This reasoning seems consistent with Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). The statute in Meyer forbidding foreign language
instruction for students who had not passed the eighth grade was held to be "arbitrary and without reasonable relation to any end within the competency of the State."
262 U.S. at 403. Emphasizing the sanctity of the right to teach, the Court stated
that the legislature had "attempted materially to interfere with the calling of modern
language teachers." 262 U.S. at 401. See LeClercq, supra note 290, at 237.
454. 316 F. Supp. at 357.
455. See text at notes 435-39 supra.
456. See Nahmod, supra note 434, at 1049. Cf. Minarcini v. Strongsville City
School Dist., 384 F. Supp. 698, 707 (N.D. Ohio 1974), discussed in note 428 supra,
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ample, parental objections should not be sufficient to justify a dismissal for teaching evolution; such action would violate the teacher's
rights under the establishment clause.457 Even so, parents do have
a legitimate interest in the curriculum. They are understandably
frustrated when the values they teach at home are undermined by
a teacher who commands significant attention and respect from their
children. This dissatisfaction is frequently manifested in parental
objection to school board policy. Ignoring parental desires and
granting teachers absolute freedom to control the content of classroom discussion would risk omitting from the children's educational
experience important political and social values about which parents
are properly concerned. Accordingly, the court in Parducci recognized that the teacher's right of free speech was not unlimited, 458
although it considered itself better able to define the scope of the
right than either the Board or the parents. 469
Clearly, when assessing the merit of challenges to the curriculum, courts must not limit themselves to the judgments of professionals who, in designing educational policies, may overlook constitutional values. Rather, courts must scrutinize and reject arbitrary educational policies if constitutional rights are to be adequately protected. However, courts should also retain a degree of sensitivity
to the reasonable concerns of parents. In Adams v. Campbell
County School District, 460 for example, the court indicated that parental concerns could be considered in setting school policy. The
court stated that although the teacher's pedagogical method may
have had educational value, the teacher did not necessarily have a
constitutional right to adopt the method. Particularly in small communities, it concluded, the board possesses the right to require the
teacher to use a more orthodox approach. 461 Apparently, a school
board action that amounts to an obvious surrender to parental pressures will be condemned by the courts without even an evaluation
451. See text at notes 315-26 supra.
458. 316 F. Supp. at 355.
459. The court concluded: "We do not question the good faith of the defendants
in believing that some parents have been offended. With the greatest of respect
to such parents, their sensibilities are not the full measure of what is proper education." 316 F. Supp. at 356, quoting Keefe v. Geanakos, 418 F.2d 359, 361-62 (1st
Cir. 1969).
460. 511 F.2d 1242 (10th Cir. 1975).
461. 511 F.2d at 1247. See generally Brubaker v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 973
(7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965 (1975); Presidents Council, Dist. 25
v. Community School Bd. No. 25, 457 F.2d 289 (2d Cir. 1972); Drown v. Portsmouth School Dist., 451 F.2d 1106, 1109 (1st Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
972 (1972) (nonrenewal of a teacher for being "'too innovative and unconventional'
would be proper under the wide discretion afforded the school board"); Parker v.
Board of Educ., 237 F. Supp. 222 (D. Md.), affd., 348 F.2d 464 (4th Cir. 1965),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 1030 (1966).

1454

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 74:1373

of the action on its merits. 462 However, a change in school board
policy that is responsive to reasonable parental involvement is usually
presumed valid.

4.

Conclusion

Because of their reluctance to review school board policy, courts
have assumed a limited role in most curriculum matters. As a result,
school board policies have been affirmed in the majority of cases.
Courts have intervened only to protect certain fundamental rights:
freedom from an established religion, free exercise of religion, equal
protection of the law, and especially freedom of expression. Both
by rejecting parental efforts to censor classroom discussion and by
upholding teacher's rights of academic freedom, courts have consistently recognized the value of a "wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers 'truth' out of a multitude of tongues
[rather] than through any kind of authoritative selection." 463
Even though the value of a free exchange of ideas has been
stressed, courts have not addressed directly the problem of school
board indoctrination. Many courts assume that the classroom is and
should be an open intellectual community. Unfortunately, the ideal
of academic freedom for teachers and students is still limited by the
general presumption of validity accorded school board policies and
curricula. Certainly the protection of free speech rights of teachers
ensures some diversity, thereby mitigating the effects of school board
indoctrination. However, even though it is apparent that a curriculum itself may embody a particular set of values, courts have not objected to the transmission of these values to students. The concern
in the academic freedom cases is for protecting impressionable young
minds only from the indoctrination of values not fostered by the
state. 464 In the final analysis, students, teachers, and parents who
share the school board's value orientation are generally protected by
the board's preferred position in curriculum litigation. However,
those students, teachers, and parents whose values differ significantly
from those of the majority in a community and who accordingly can462. The question of what impact parental preference should have on a teacher's
rights also arises when a school board tries to dismiss a tenured teacher on the
grounds of incompetency or inefficiency. In Beebee v. Haslett Pub. Schools, 66
Mich. App. 718, 239 N.W.2d 724 (1976), the court held that a disagreement over
teaching philosophy was not "just and reasonable cause" for dismissal under the tenure law. The court noted that a teacher who was criticized by all parents "would
surely have an effect on the school detrimental enough to jeopardize his or her tenure." However, the suggestion that a teacher had to be liked by evezyone was "ridiculous on its face. Some parents will always criticize a teacher, especially one
who utilizes methods different from those used when they went to school." 66 Mich.
App. at 727, 239 N.W.2d at 729.
463. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967).
464. See generally Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 485 (1960); Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F. Supp. 352, 355 (1970).
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not influence school board policy are, for the most part, left unprotected by the courts.

B.

Control over Conduct, Behavior, and Discipline
in the Public Schools

Conflicts arise not only over what values and attitudes .should be
communicated through the academic curriculum, but also over communication through noncurricular activities. Thus, this subsection
will examine the rules that govern the daily operations of the school
and control the conduct of teachers and students. The educational
authorities use this system of regulation of grooming, sexual behavior, noncurricular speech and other behavior no less than they
use the academic curriculum to transmit particular values and attitudes. Moreover, because certain rules, such as limits on hair
length, necessarily affect the individual outside of the school environment, conduct regulation involves even greater intrusion into the
personal affairs of students and teachers.
Local school boards derive their power to establish such rules
and to discipline teachers and students from state legislation that either proscribes specific conduct465 or delegates broad disciplinary authority to the boards. 466 Such statutes often place the disciplinary
power in the context of ·the school board's general operational powers, thereby emphasizing the relationship between conduct regulation and the concern for safety and operational efficiency. 467
In addition, courts have implied disciplinary power over students
under the theory that schools act in loco parentis. 468 By establishing
a connection between school board authority and the responsibility
of parents for the social development of their children, this doctrine
in particular reflected the socialization purpose of many rules of conduct, especially those governing sexual and social behavior. The artificiality of this rationale for school disciplinary authority was appar465. Specific statutes proscribing conduct are rare. An example, however, is specific legislation prohibiting student membership in fraternities, often with provisions
commanding or allowing expulsion. See, e.g., Hughes v. Caddo Parish School Bd.,
57 F. Supp. 508 (W.D. La. 1944), affd., 323 U.S. 685 (1945); Burkitt v. School
Dist No. 1, 195 Ore. 471, 246 P.2d 566 (1952).
466. See, e.g., IowA CODE § 279.8 (1975); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 160.290
(1971); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, §§ 353, 356 (1976-77 Supp.); NEB. REv. STAT.
§ 79-443 (1971). The Iowa statute, for example, provides that "[t]he board shall
make rules for its own government and that of the directors, officers, teachers, and
pupils, and for the care of the schoolhouse, grounds, and property of the school corporation, and aid in the enforcement of the same, and require the performance of
duties by said persons imposed by law and the rules." IOWA CODE § 279.8 (1972).
461. See text at note 253 supra.
468. For a review of the in loco parentis doctrine as it applies te the school's
plenary disciplinary power over pupils while in school, see Goldstein, The Scope and
Sources of School Board Authority To Regulate Student Conduct and Status: A Nonconstitutional Analysis, 117 U. PA. L REv. 373, 377-84 (1969).
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ent to many observers, since it is the parents who challenge the
school's disciplinary action in court. 469 With the demise of in loco
parentis theory, the school's power to regulate student conduct has
been weakened considerably. 470 Accordingly, students and teachers
have been increasingly successful in recent years in challenging
school rules and disciplinary procedures. In rare instances courts
have struck down a local rule because it exceeded the statutory
power of the school board471 or because it was unconstitutionally
vague. 472 The majority of successful claims, however, have alleged
violations of substantive constitutional rights, such as freedom of expression, substantive due process, and privacy.
This section of the Project first explores the scope of substantive
rights of teachers and students in the areas of noncurricular free
speech, grooming, and sexual behavior. It concludes with an examination of the scope of students' procedural rights, giving particular
emphasis to the implications of expanded procedural safeguards for
the school community itself.
1.

Noncurricular Speech and Communicative Conduct

Students and teachers spend a considerable number of hours
each day in school. Obviously, during this time a substantial amount
of communication between teacher and student transpires that is not
related to the substantive academic curriculum. While the distinction between curricular speech473 and noncurricular communication
is often tenuous, it is apparent that very different considerations do
in fact influence the regulation of noncurricular or "casual" speech,
469. For a criticism of the doctrine as an inadequate explanation of the legal
relationship between the student and the school, see Developments, supra note 281,
at 1144-45. This study points out that the doctrine has met with disfavor because
it confers powers but not responsibilities on the schools, because it artificially usurps
power when parents expressly refuse their consent, and because it condones excessive
regulation of conduct.
470. When the in loco parentis theory was at its height, courts upheld a variety
of school board regulations, subjecting them to only minimal scrutiny. See, e.g.,
Board of Directors v. Green, 259 Iowa 1260, 147 N.W.2d 854 (1967) (excluding
married persons from extracurricular activities held reasonable); State ex rel. Idle
v. Chamberlain, 12 Ohio Misc. 44, 175 N.E.2d 539 (C.P. 1961) (excluding a pregnant girl held reasonable); State ex rel. Thompson v. Marion County Bd. of Educ,,
202 Tenn. 29, 302 S.W.2d 57 (1957) (temporary suspension of married pupils is
reasonable); Sherman v. Inhabitants of Charlestown, 62 Mass, (8 Cush.) 160 (1851)
(excluding a female student because of her immoral monetary connections with men
held reasonable).
471. See, e.g., Alvin Indp. School Dist. v. Cooper, 404 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1966) (exclusion of a mother held ultra vires). One commentator argues that
this approach should be'used more often. See Goldstein, supra note 263, at 376-77.
472. See, e.g., Burton v. Cascade School Dist. Union High School No. 5, 353
F. Supp. 254 (D. Ore. 1973), affd., 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
839 (1975) (dismissal of a nontenured teacher for being a practicing homosexual).
473. See section III-A supra.

June 1976]

Project

1457

once it is so identified, in the classroom. For example, although the
school board clearly has a strong interest in ensuring that noncurricular activity does not obstruct the communication to students of the
subject matter embodied in the curriculum, courts are less inclined
to defer to the school board on issues that do not necessitate appraising the educational value of the prescribed curriculum and hence
require no "professional expertise."474
Just as the content of the academic curriculum can be adjusted
to socialize students to particular values, 475 so, too, can noncurricular
communication. To further the collectivist interest in training patriotic citizens, schools typically attempt to instill respect for flag and
country. School programs generally include the recitation of the
Pledge of Allegiance, the singing of the National Anthem and other
patriotic hymns, and the performance of nationalistic rituals. Yet
individuals have an interest in freely expressing their attitudes and
ideas and in resisting standardization of beliefs. Students and teachers may, for example, seek to state their views on a broad range
of issues and subjects concerning both the school and events outside
the school's premises. They will be thwarted unless the school is
viewed as a community whose functions and influences reach far beyond the mere imparting of knowledge to students.
The interest in resisting standardization of belief was supported
by the Court in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, 4711 in whioh •the notion of a right of "freedom of thought" 477
for students was first articulated. The Court held that a student
could not be expelled from public school for refusing to participate
in a compulsory flag salute ritual, resting its opinion on the ground
that the state could not constitutionally compel either belief or the
appearance of belief through ritualistic conduct designed to inculcate
certain values in its captive student audience. 478 In distinguishing
the flag salute ritual from academic instruction in American history
and civics that would " 'tend to inspire patriotism and love of country,' " 4711 the Court said that "[t]he issue here is whether this slow
474. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 631
n.12, 637-38 (1943).
475. See text at notes 265-71 supra.
476. 319 U.S. 624 (1943).
477. 319 U.S. at 645 (Murphy, J., concurring).
478. The distinction between teaching and secular study on the one hand, and
compulsion or proselytizing on the other, had also arisen in the context of establishment and free exercise of religion in the schools. See, e.g., Abington
School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963). The courts are unanimous that the
latter is an unconstitutional infringement of individual rights, but in practice the line
is not an easy one to draw. The problem is particularly acute when a teacher, who
clearly exerts great influence over students, see text at notes 422-27 supra, exercises
his right of free expression in the classroom.
479. 319 U.S. at 631, quoting Minersville School Dist. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586,
604 (Stone, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted).
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and easily neglected route [academic instruction in civics and history] to aroused loyalties constitutionally may be short-cut by substituting a compulsory salute and slogan."480
Russo v. Central School District No. 1481 presented a similar fact
situation to that in Barnette except that the plaintiff was a teacher
instead of a student. School officials discharged the teacher because
she stood silently at attention in front of her class during flag ceremonies instead of saluting ,the flag 1and reciting :the Pledge of Allegiance as required by school regulations. The court framed the
issue as whether the teacher's constitutional rights relative to those
of students were lessened due to her voluntary presence in school
and her function as a socializing agent of the state. 482 It then maintained,
There is little room in what Mr. Justice Jackson once called the "majestic generalities of the Bill of Rights," West Virginia State Board
of Education v. Barnette . . ., for an interpretation of the First
Amendment that would be more restrictive with respect to teachers
than it is with respect to their students, where there has been no interference with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school, Tinker v. Des Moines Independent School District.
• • .483

The court recognized that the state has a legitimate interest in instilling a healthy respect for symbols of the national government in
young minds, 484 but concluded that in this case the teacher's free
expression of her personal beliefs had not undermined the state's
interests: No class was disrupted and the students were not prevented from reciting the pledge, 480 since the ceremony proceeded
under the supervision of a second homeroom teacher. 486 Furthermore, the court noted that because the tenth-grade students were
approaching the age when they "form their own judgments," 487 they
were not susceptible to undue influence by their teacher's nonparticipation.
Both Barnette and Russo demonstrate that courts will not allow
the state, in its attempts to inculcate certain basic values in students,
to force individuals either to share the beliefs of the majority or to
give the appearance of shared belief. The accommodation of the
collectivist function of education with individual interests in diversity
in these two cases parallels the accommodation achieved in Pierce
480.
481.
482.
483.
484.
485.
486.
487.

319
469
469
469
469
469
469
469

U.S. at 631 (footnotes omitted).
F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 932 ( 1973 ).
F.2d at 631.
F.2d at 631-32 (citations omitted).
F.2d at 632.
F.2d at 633.
F.2d at 625, 626, 633.
F.2d at 633.
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v. Society of Sisters.-iss The state may seek a moderate amount of
general socialization but may not use its power to regulate the
schools to achieve standardization of belief. As Barnette and Russo
indicate, the state's ability to control behavior and conduct within the
school is limited by the individual's interest in freedom of belief and
thought.
The strength of ,the individual's mterest in active expression489 of
beliefs is, however, another matter. Active expression of an individual's ideas raises the possibility, as recognized in Barnette, that the
rights of other groups in the school community might be infringed
and that disruptive influences might be created. Several cases have
dealt specifically with the active free expression rights of both students and teachers.
The Court in Tinker v. Des Moines Community School District, 4110 for ex,ample, declared that "students in school as well as out
of school . . . are possessed of fundamental rights which the State
must respect," 491 but indicated that limits on the right of free expression are imposed "in light of the special characteristics of the school
environment." 492 In that case, the Court held that a student could
not be suspended for wearing an armband to protest the Vietnam
war. In so holding, the Court affirmed the meaning of Barnettethat the state may not use its power to regulate conduct in the schools
to standardize belief-as applied to a student's active expression of
belief. However, the Court noted that the student's right of free
speech493 could be overridden upon a showing that the state's core
interest-preserving order in the schools to permit educating and socializing students-has been seriously jeopardized:
[The student] may express his opinions, even on controversial subjects like the conflict in Vietnam, if he does so without "materially
and substantially interfer[ing] with the requirements of appropriate
discipline on the operation of the school" and without colliding with
the rights of others. . . . [C]onduct by the student . . . that mate488. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
489. "Active" expression refers to expression that requires an affirmative act on
the part of the communicator. This distinguishes the "passive" expression in Barnette, in which the student took no affirmative steps to communicate an idea.
490. 393 U.S. 503 (1969). There is considerable literature on Tinker. See, e.g.,
Denno, Mary Beth Tinker Takes the Constitution to School, 38 FORDHAM L. REV.
35 (1969); Haskell, Student Expression in the Public Schools: "Tinker'' Distinguished,
59 GEO. L.J. 37 (1970); Comment, Constitutional Law: Freedom of Expression in
Student Demonstrations, 22 U. FLA. L. REV. 168 (1969); Comment, Constitutional
Law: Regulation Prohibiting War Protest in High School ls Unconstitutional, 54
MINN. L. REV. 721 (1970).
491. 393 U.S. at 51 I.
492. 393 U.S. at 506.
493. The Court characterized the armband as tantamount to "pure" speech, distinguishing cases on skirt length, clothing, hair style, or deportment in that none
of these constituted pure speech. 393 U.S. at 507-08.
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rially disrupts class work or involves substantial disorder or invasion
of the rights of others is, of course, not immunized by the constitutional guarantee of freedom of speech. . . .494

Infringement upon noncore state interests will not suffice: "[U]ndifferentiated fear or apprehension of disturbance is not enough to
overcome the right to freedom of expression."4911 A reasonable
forecast of a substantial disruption is necessary.
In thus affirming individual interests in active expression, the
Court emphasized that public schools cannot be viewed solely as a
conduit for teaching academic skills. Instead, the school serves a
variety of other functions, including the facilitation of personal intercommunication among students, all of which are integral parts of the
educational process. 490 By imposing no conditions of age or maturity on the students' rights of free expression,497 the majority accorded
significant strength to the value of a free exchange of ideas in the
school community. Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion, had
urged that protection be limited to students "possessed of that full
capacity for individual choice which is the presupposition of First
Amendment guarantees, 498 thereby recognizing the right only when
students themselves are undeniably old enough to appreciate it. Although this approach has been rejected, the students' age might be
a factor in forecasting disruption when appraising the extent to which
the state's interest in avoiding disturbances in the school is threatened. Even so, the majority opinion presumes that all students,
through communication with their peers, are able to contribute to
the educational process; Tinker, therefore, stands for the proposition
that all students regardless of age have a strong individual interest
in expressing their views within the school community.
This same accommodation of the rights of students with the interests of the educational authorities also appears in lower court
opinions that uphold the students' right to publish "underground" literature and distribute it in the schools. Although a conflict exists
among the circuits over whether schools may constitutionally require
students to submit the publication for review prior to distribution, 499
494. 393 U.S. at 513 (citation omitted). Justice Fortas earlier alluded to what
these rights might be: "the rights of other students to be secure and to be let alone."
393 U.S. at 508.
495. 393 U.S. at 508.
496. 393 U.S. at 512.
497. The children involved in the case were of different age and grade levels:
15- and 16-year-old high school boys and a 13-year-old junior high school girl.
498. 393 U.S. at 515 (Stewart, J., concurring), quoting Ginsberg v. New York,
390 U.S. 629, 649-50 (1968) (Stewart, J., concurring).
499. The Seventh Circuit has prohibited all forms of substantive prior approval.
See Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972). Other circuits
have been less sweeping in their treatment of the issue. The First Circuit, for exam-
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courts have uniformly placed a strict procedural burden on school
officials to insure that arbitrary censorship does not occur. 50 ° Courts
also agree that the school may impose reasonable regulations on the
time, place, and manner of distribution, and punish students who
publish and distribute obscene or libelous literature. 501 While the
courts have occasionally approved regulations that effectively eliminate the underground student press from the schools, 502 a showing
of substantial harm or disruption to the school community is required. School officials thus are not allowed automatically to stifle
student publications merely because they claim possible disruptive
influences: "Perhaps it would be well if those entrusted to administer the teaching of American history and government to our students
began their efforts by practicing the document on which that history
and government are based. " 503
The teacher's active right of free expression in the schools has
also been recognized, 504 for example in Tinker, in which •the Supreme Court indicated that the teacher as well as his students retains
pie, has called for efforts to minimize the adverse effects of prior restraints. See
Riseman v. School Comm., 439 F.2d 148 ( 1st Cir. 1971). The Fourth and Fifth
Circuits have invalidated a prior restraint that lacked procedural safeguards but have
indicated that appropriately fashioned rules for students could be upheld. See Quarterman v. Byrd, 453 F.2d 54 (4th Cir. 1971); Shanley v. Northeast Indp. School
Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972). The Second Circuit has upheld a prior restraint rule that was accompanied by elaborate procedural safeguards, but found that
its provisions were not met on the facts. See Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440
F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971). The Supreme Court had an opportunity to resolve the
issue of prior restraints in an appeal from a Seventh Circuit case involving alleged
obscenity in student publications, but declined to do so on the ground of mootness.
Board of School Commrs. v. Jacobs, 420 U.S. 128 (1974). Justice Douglas dissented
saying, "In allowing the Board to reimpose its, system of prior restraints on student
publications, we raise a very serious prospect of the precise sort of chilling effect
which has long been a central concern in our First Amendment decisions." 420
U.S. at 134.
500. See, e.g., Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of Educ., 440 F.2d 803 (2d Cir. 1971).
501. See, e.g., Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355, 1359 (7th Cir. 1972).
502. See, e.g., Katz v. McAulay, 438 F.2d 1058 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 402 U.S.
996 (1971). In Katz, a complete ban on solicitation of money in primary and secondary schools was upheld despite its impact as an effective ban on certain student
publications. The rule was not aimed at expression but at the probability of harm
to the students (especially those too poor to afford a donation) from multiple solicitations.
503. Shanley v. Northeast Indp. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960, 978 (5th Cir. 1972).
504. The distinction between "active" and "passive" expression, see note 489 supra, is more attenuated with regard to teachers. It may be that a teacher who stands
silently at attention during a flag salute ceremony, for instance, transmits values as
directly as a teacher who wears an armband to class, as in James v. Board of Educ.,
461 F.2d 556 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972), discussed in note 507
infra. A distinction may be that in the former case the teacher makes no effort
to transmit the value to the student. Instead, the school system requires the teacher
to perform a certain communicative (although nonacademic) act and the teacher
passively resists. In the armband situation the teacher affirmatively seeks to communicate an idea.
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constitutional rights in the classroom. 505 However, the teacher cases
are distinguishable from the student cases in the important respect
that different interests must be accommodated. Thus, the state has
no core collectivist interest in inculcating basic societal values or in
promoting the academic achievement of a teacher, and, of course,
parents have no countervailing interest in nurturing attitude and personality development. Instead, courts must consider the state's interest, articulated in Tinker, in avoiding disruption in the school's
institutional functions as well as the special "interest of the State as
an employer in promoting the efficiency of the public services it performs through its employees. " 500
The scope of the teacher's right of active free expression was
dealt with in James v. Board of Education, 507 in which the Second
Circuit held that the dismissal of a teacher who wore a symbolic armband in class violated his right of free speech. The facts of James
paralleled those of Tinker, and the court accommodated the countervailing interests in the same manner. The court expressly noted
that the interest of the school in maintaining order and discipline
was the same with respect to both students and teachers. 008 Because
there was no showing that the teacher's action actually disrupted or
threatened to disrupt classroom activities, the school had failed to
justify its restriction on the teacher's freedom of speech.
The James court confirmed that all public education, curricular
and noncurricular, serves fundamental collectivist interests: "[A]
principal function of all elementary and secondary education is indoctrinative-whether it be to teach the ABC's or multiplication tables or to transmit basic values of the community."000 Thus, one
of the teacher's affirmative duties is to inculcate certain values010 that
educational authorities have deemed desirable. 511 Because his special
status in 1:he classroom and unique relationship with students enables
the teacher to exert powerful influence upon students, 512 the teacher
may obstruct rather than assist ·the state in transmitting designated
basic values to students. The court thus ,recognized that a teacher
must not abuse his special relationship with students, but, in this
instance, the court held that James had not done so. Wearing the
505. 393 U.S. at 506.
506. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). There is ample
literature on Pickering. See, e.g., Note, Teachers' Freedom of Expression Outside
the Classroom: An Analysis of the Application of "Pickering" and "Tinker'', 8 GA.
L. REV. 900 (1974); Note, Judicial Protection of Teachers' Speech: The Aftermath
of Pickering, 59 IOWA L. REV. 1256 (1974).
507. 461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972).
508. 461 F.2d at 572.
509. 461 F.2d at 573.
510. See text at notes 48-52 supra.
511. 461 F.2d at 573.
512. See text at notes 423-27 supra.
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anti-war armband did not i:Q:terfere with Jrunes' teaching function,
and there was no suggestion that his teaching was deficient in any
respect. He had made no effort to proselytize hls students, who regarded the •armband as no more -than a benign symbolic expression.513
Moreover, the court observed that the students were eleventh graders
on the "eve of their first venture into the voting booth," 514 and indicated that a policy of shielding students from political controversy would
•be foolhardy: "Schools must ,play a central role in preparing their
students to think and analyze and recognize the demagogue. Under the circumstances present here, there was a greater danger that
-the school, by power of example, would appear ito the students to be
sanctioning the very 'pall of orthodoxy' ... which ·chokes freedom of
dissent." 516 The fact rthat ,1Jhe school authorities had tolerated o1Jher
types of in-class teacher e~pression, including display of a pro-war
bumper sticker, 616 was not decisive. Rather, the col.ll.1t's primary concern was that the teacher have -the right to express his ideas freely
though not-to 1Jhe point of propagandizing his students. 517
The accommodation of interests achieved in James parallels that
reached in the cases dealing with academic curriculum. 518 Just as
the teacher cannot present a course or book that advocates a particular political value to the exclusion of all others, a teacher cannot in
noncurricular speech advocate a particular political view and suppress dissent. Thus, although schools do indoctrinate through the
academic curriculum and through regulation of noncurricular behavior, and, although they have broad discretion to set classroom
standards, they cannot infringe upon society's interest in freedom of
speech.
The Supreme Court decisions in Barnette and Tinker when read
in conjunction with the Second Circuit decisions in Russo and James
create a very broad right of freedom of expression for students and
teachers in the classroom, although the right may be limited to prevent interference with the functions of teaching academic skills and
socializing students. A student may, for example, freely express his
beliefs by wearing an armband or button or by printing and distributing political literature if these actions are not likely to cause violence or other disruptions, although the student may be required to
submit his material to a school official for prior approval. The
teacher may also wear an armband or button to class and can even
explain its meaning so long as he does not attempt to use his position
513.
514.
515.
516.
517.
518.

F.2d at 574.
F.2d at 574.
F.2d at 574.
F.2d at 575.
See text at notes 433-43 supra.
See text at notes 423-27, 433-43 supra.
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to propagandize values inimical to the core collectivist interests of the
state and does not cause disruptions in the school's operations.
Thus, these courts have viewed the public school classroom as a relatively open environment in which intellectual exchange and diversity
are to be protected under the first amendment.
Not all courts, however, have arrived at an accommodation of
the countervailing interests of the educational community that similarly safeguards free expression. One example is Guzick v. Drebus, 519 in which the court held constitutional the suspension of a seventeen-year-old, eleventh-grade student for refusing to remove a
button soliciting participation in an anti-war demonstration. Unlike
the impermissible ad hoc response of the school official in Tinker
to the student's armband demonstration, the court stated, the prohibition against buttons in Guzick was a long-standing, uniformly enforced rule that applied to all cause-supporting buttons not related
to school activity. Most importantly, the school in Guzick, whose
population was seventy per cent Black, had a history of racial disturbances catalyzed by racially inflammatory buttons. 520 Although
the message on Guzick?s button was not considered to be racially
offensive, the court maintained that "abrogation of the rule would
inevitably result in collisions and disruptions which would seriously
subvert Shaw High School as a place of education for its students."li 21
The court also noted the administrative difficulties in attempting to
distinguish between permissible and impermissible buttons, 522 and
therefore reasoned that "school authorities should not be faulted for
adhering to a relatively non-oppressive rule that will indeed serve
our ultimate goals of meaningful integr.ation of our public schools." 623
The question that faced the court in Guzick-how to accommodate the state's interest in avoiding disruptive influences with the individual's interests in free expression-is identical with that raised
in Tinker. The court in Guzick appeared to believe that the state's
interests would be so extensively infringed by allowing the student
to wear an anti-war button that his right of free expression had to
be curtailed. The court, however, stated this conclusion in the following language: "Unless [the buttons] have some relevance to
what is being considered or taught, a school classroom is no place
for the untrammeled exercise of such a right. " 624 Such language
is needlessly overbroad. Its apparently neutral ban on all political
519. 431 F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 948 (1971).
520. 431 F.2d at 596. One such racially antagonistic button read "Happy
Easter, Dr. King" (the late Dr. Martin Luther King having been assassinated during
the Easter season).
521. 431 F.2d at 598.
522. 431 F.2d at 598-99.
523. 431 F.2d at 597.
524. 431 F.2d at 600-01.
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expression ignores the standard articulated in Tinker that only expression that substantially disrupts or risks substantial disruption in
the classroom should be restricted. The court rejected as administratively impossible a less restrictive alternative of requiring prior approval of all buttons, although such an alternative has been approved
and used successfully in some cases involving student newspapers. 525
The court's language essentially appears to condone total prohibitions of noncurricular free expression in the classroom. 526 Yet, if
the state's interests in maintaining order are not impaired by the expression, such prohibitions are unnecessary and a different accommodation of interests is appropriate.
Another reading of Guzick is plausible. By upholding the ban
on all buttons, a rule originally designed to avoid racial disruption
and thereby to promote integration, the court might be viewed as
·attempting ·to promote racial :balance. 527 However, while such an
objective might justify suppression of racially inflammatory buttons,
it provides no rationale for prohibiting buttons with no racial overtones.1528 Thus even under this interpretation of Guzick, the total
limitation on noncurricular free expression in the classroom appears
extreme and unnecessary.
Although courts have strongly supported the right of students
and teachers to express their beliefs freely in the schools, 529 they
have curtailed this right when certain state interests, such as the communication of fundamental social values and the preservation of
order in the schools, are infringed. Not surprisingly, the process of
accommodating the countervailing interests in these cases concerning
noncurricular communication parallels that employed in the compulsory education and substantive curriculum cases. Even so, it is apparent that courts are not always consistent in what strength they accord the competing interests.

2. Student and Teacher Behavior
Schools also further conformity to social norms as defined by the
525. See note 499 supra.
526. This may simply be the result of ill-chosen language. Earlier in the opinion
the court did recognize the state's interest in avoiding disruption and appeared to
be applying the Tinker disruption test. If so, a more appropriate conclusion would
have been to hold that on the facts of Guzick the particular noncurricular expression
would have caused substantial disruption, rather than that all noncurricular expression in the classroom is impermissible.
527. One newspaper analysis of school desegregation in Detroit, headlined
"Tough Discipline Helps Make Busing Work," Detroit Free Press, April 19, 1976,
§ A, at 4, col. 2 (metro ed.), reported that a school characterized by "freeness"
in discipline had been "tom by tensions, fear and declining faculty morale." The
principal was replaced by someone who would exercise stricter control.
528. See 431 F.2d at 601 (McAllister, J., dissenting).
529. See Tinker v. Des Moines Indp. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969).
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educational authorities through rules that attempt to regulate student
and teacher behavior. Most litigation involves challenges to either
hair 530 and grooming codes531 or to rules governing social and sexual
behavior. In each of these areas, courts have disagreed about
whether there is a constitutional right of privacy or liberty that protects the proscribed conduct. 1132 Moreover, even when courts have
recognized that a constitutional interest is at stake, they have disagreed about the extent to which such interests are protected within
the school environment.
The question of the constitutionality of haircut and grooming regulations came before the Supreme Court for the first time in Kelley
v. Johnson, r;sa a recent case involving policemen rather than teach530. Compare the decisions of four circuits: Massie v. Henry, 455 F.2d 779 (4th
Cir. 1972); Bishop v. Colaw, 450 F.2d 1069 (8th Cir. 1971); Richards v. Thurston,
424 F.2d 1281 (1st Cir. 1970); Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1035 (7th Cir. 1969), cert.
denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970), with those of five other circuits: Zeller v. Donegal
School Dist Bd. of Educ., 517 F.2d 600 (3d Cir. 1975); Kan v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d
609 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 989 (1972); Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258
(10th Cir. 1971); King v. Saddleback Junior College Dist., 445 F.2d 932 (9th Cir.),
cert. denied sub nom. Olff v. East Side Union High School Dist., 404 U.S. 1042
(1972); Jackson v. Donier, 424 F.2d 213 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
850 (1971). With steadily increasing intensity, Justice Douglas dissented from the
denials of certiorari in Jackson, Olff and Kan.
531. Compare Conard v. Goolsby, 350 F. Supp. 713 (N.D. Miss. 1972), wit/1
Miller v. School Dist. No. 167, 495 F.2d 658 (7th Cir. 1974). See, e.g., Braxton
v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 303 F. Supp. 958 (M.D. Fla. 1969); Lucia v. Duggan,
303 F. Supp. 112 (D. Mass. 1969); Finot v. Pasadena City Bd. of Educ., 250 Cat.
App. 2d 189, 58 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1967).
532. The point of transition from conduct that will trigger a free speech analysis
to conduct concerning which such an analysis is inappropriate is by no means clearcut. For instance, some courts have characterized the individual's interest in the
choice of personal appearance as a free speech interest. See, e.g., Finot v. Pasadena
City Bd. of Educ., 250 Cal. App. 2d 189, 58 Cal. Rptr. 520 (1967) (teacher's right
to wear a beard), a case predating Tinker. While Tinker specifically distinguished
cases on skirt length, clothing, hair style, and deportment on the basis that none
involved "pure speech," 393 U.S. at 507-08, Tinker itself has been characterized by
Justice Marshall as a case in which personal appearance merely took on a first
amendment dimension. See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 251 n.2 (1976)
(Marshall, J., dissenting). In isolated haircut/grooming cases a free speech
analysis might be tenable. Consider, for example, an American Indian stu•
dent who wishes to wear his hair in braids as a demonstrable symbol of his heritage.
Hatch v. Goerke, 502 F.2d 1189 (10th Cir. 1974), a case presenting this fact
situation, was argued not on behalf of the student seeking vindication of his free
speech rights, but on behalf of the parents claiming that their rights to rear their
children according to their own rf;ligious, cultural, and moral values had been violated. The Court held that there was no basis in the Constitution for such a claim.
But see Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972), discussed in text at notes 95.
109 supra. See generally text at notes 340-87 supra. The student himself probably
did not challenge the haircut regulation on the ground of free speech because the
Tenth Circuit had barred that possibility in Freeman v. Flake, 448 F.2d 258, 26061 (1971). See note 530 supra. The constitutional right of privacy rather than
of free speech better accommodates the teachers' and students' interests in lifestyle
and personal appearance.
533. 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
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ers. In upholding the regulations of New York's Suffolk County Police Department, the Court did not decide, but assumed arguendo,
that "the citizenry at large has some sort of liberty interest within
the Fourteenth Amendment in matters of personal appearance
634
• • • •"
However, applying the principle that the rights of a state
employee are necessarily qualified by the demands of his employment, 636 the Court held that the general liberty interest did not outweigh the police department's need for "discipline, esprit de corps,
and uniformity." 536 The Court noted that the regulations were entitled to a presumption of validity because they were "unquestionably
at the core of the State's police power . . . ." 1137
The Kelley opinion is ambiguous in its implications for the regulation by schools of teachers' and students' personal appearance. 538
Most of the justifications asserted by Justice Rehnquist for regulating
the appearance of police do not apply to teachers, even though both
534. 425 U.S. at 244.
535. 425 U.S. at 245.
536. 425 U.S. at 246.
537. 425 U.S. at 247.
538. Kelley could be based on any of three independent rationales: (1) a special
presumption of validity and special restrictions appropriate in the context of uniformed police employees, 425 U.S. at 247; (2) the general power of the state
to restrict even fundamental rights of public employees, 425 U.S. at 245; or
(3) a holding that the interest in personal appearance has a constitutional basis only
in the broad principles of substantive due process as distinguished from the fundamental right of privacy involved in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See 425 U.S. at 244. See also
425 U.S. at 248 (Marshall, J., dissenting). The first basis for decision would
produce a very narrow holding. The second would have ramifications for teachers
but not for students. The third, by requiring only minimal scrutiny of the infringing
regulation, would ·signal a retreat from the expansion of constitutional personal autonomy that could affect all privacy interests.
Justice Rehnquist argued in dissent in Roe v. Wade:
If the Court means by the term "privacy" no more than that the claim of a
person to be free from unwanted state regulation of consensual transactions may
be a form of "liberty" protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, there is no
doubt that similar claims have been upheld in our earlier decisions on the basis
of that liberty. . . . But that liberty is not guaranteed absolutely against deprivation, only against deprivation without due process of law. The test traditionally applied in the area of social and economic legislation is whether or not
a law such as that challenged has a rational relation to a valid state objective.
410 U.S. at 172-73 (emphasis added). If Kelley means that Justice Rehnquist has
persuaded a majority of the Court to accept his view that privacy is really only substantive due process in modem dress, the Court will have come full circle in its
analysis of personal liberty, returning to the approach of cases like Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right to study German in private school), and Pierce
v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right to educate one's child in private
school). This view would stop the expansion of the fundamental right of privacy
that began in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (right of access of married couples to information on contraceptives), evolved slowly through Stanley v.
Georgia, 394 U.S. 551 (1969) (right to possession of obscene materials in the privacy of the home), and Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (right of unmarried adults to use contraceptives), and culminated in the potentially expansive abortion decision in Roe.
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are public employees. Teachers are generally not expected to experience and are not trained to deal with situations that require "discipline, esprit de corps, and uniformity." The teaching profession
is not a "uniformed civilian service" 539 in which uniformity in personal appearance assists public recognition. 540 It is revealing that
other aspects of police regimentation that the Court apparently approved, such as the requirement that a uniformed police officer
salute the flag, and that he not actively participate in local political
affairs,541 have already been held unconstitutional when applied to
teachers. 542
Nevertheless, the opinions in Kelley are relevant as models of
the accommodation of countervailing interests that would have been
employed had the Court faced the issue of teacher grooming regulations. Justice Marshall, in a dissent joined by Justice Brennan, vigorously argued that the individual's interest in personal appearance
is of fundamental significance543 and possibly is derived from first
amendment free expression guarantees. 544 Justice Marshall is probably correct that none of his colleagues would uphold a law regulating the appearance or hair length of the general population. 646 However, a teacher is not merely a member of the general population;
he is also a public employee expected to assist in the transmission
of the community's values to students. The majority would thus presumably ask if the grooming regulation for teachers bears a rational
connection to any core interest of the state. 546
This was the question raised in Miller v. School District No.
J 67, 547 in which the Seventh Circuit held that "the impact of teacher
appearance on the educational process, and on the associational in539. 425 U.S. at 248.
540. 425 U.S. at 248.
541. 425 U.S. at 245-46.
542. See Russo v. Central School Dist. No. 1, 469 F.2d 623 (2d Cir. 1972) (failure to salute the flag); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968) (activity
in political affairs).
5_43. Justice Marshall advances an interesting argument, supported by records of
the debate on the Bill of Rights, that the interest in personal appearance was omitted
from the express guarantees only because it was unthinkable that any democratic
government would try to infringe so fundamental a right of personal liberty. 425
U.S. at 251-52.
544. 425 U.S. at 251 n.2.
545. Although Justice Rehnquist, by assuming arguendo an individual interest in
personal appearance, did not reach this issue, Justice Powell, in a concurring opinion,
found "no negative implication in the opinion with respect to a liberty interest within
the Fourteenth Amendment as to matters of personal appearance." 425 U.S. at
249.
546. Justice Powell's separate opinion in Kelley bypasses the difficulties of choosing strict, minimal or "intermediate" scrutiny and asserts that when a state interest
exists it must simply be balanced against that of the individual. 42.5 U.S. at 249,
547. 495 F.2d 658 (7th Cir. 1974).
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terests of the children for whose educa,tiion they are responsible" 1148
made promulgation of a grooming regulation by local school boards
legitimate. Judge, now Justice, Stevens, writing for the court, accorded
the school boards' policy a strong presumption of validity and maintained that, even if a particular appraisal of the need to regulate a
teacher's appearance was incorrect, "the importance of allowing
school boards sufficient latitude to discharge their responsibilities effectively" outweighed the individual's interest in determining his
own appearance. u49 The court recognized that the school board,
elected by the community, is the institution responsible for protecting the interests of parties who are not represented in the litigation.
Judge Stevens explained that students "have a valid interest in not
being compelled to associate with persons they or their parents consider objectionable," 5 r.o and thus it is appropriate for the school board
to choose the teachers with whom the students will associate.
It is evident that the result in Miller turned more on the weakness of the teacher's interest in personal appearance than on the
strength of the state's interests: "[W]e merely hold that as long as
no greater interest than that involved in this controversy is at stake,
the decision is one that the school board is entitled to make." 551 Accordingly, if the teacher's interests had been stronger, for instance,
if the teacher's free speech or other constitutional right had been
infringed, 552 the court would not have deferred to the school board
but would instead have intervened to protect the teacher's interest.
When not joined with other rights, however, the teacher's interest
in setting his own appearance can be regulated in accordance with
his socializing and role-model functions. 553
Unlike teachers, students do not voluntarily assume their positions in school and, of course, are not public employees. Since students are compelled to attend school, rules of conduct and behavior
should be more closely scrutinized for possible infringement of personal rights. 554 Moreover, a regulation governing the appearance
548. 495 F.2d at 667.
549. 495 F.2d at 667.
550. 495 F.2d at 667.
551. 495 F.2d at 668.
552. See, e.g., text at notes 440-44 supra.
553. Some courts have seen the relationship between student and teacher regulation but have gone the other way to strike down student codes where teachers were
unregulated. See, e.g., Miller v. Gillis, 315 F. Supp. 94, 101 (N.D. Ill. 1969)
("[I]t is a clear stroke of arbitrariness to operate on the basis that the appearance
of a student with long hair would be substantially disruptive, when in the same school
teachers who stand before these 2,500 students wearing hair equally long or longer
are not disciplined or suspended or made to conform to the school code").
554. Some judges believe the fact that a student's long hair follows him home
is partially dispositive of the question of the regulation's validity. See, e.g., Richards
v. Thurston, 424 F.2d 1281, 1285 (1st Cir. 1970); Breen v. Kahl, 419 F.2d 1035,
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of all public school children should be examined closely since it approximates the regulation of the general populace that Justices Marshall and Brennan assumed would offend any constitutional conception of personal liberty. 555
Any legislation, even under minimal constitutional scrutiny, must
bear "a rational relation to a valid state objective." 556 It is well established that mere standardization is not a valid state objective. It
not only exceeds the state's permissible collectivist interest in moderate socialization657 but also contradicts the principle that schools
should facilitate diversity in expression and belief. 11118 Thus, it seems
clear that the school board cannot justify regulation of student hair
length solely on the rationale that, as the educational body expressing the community's majority will, it is empowered to inculcate particular values in children.
However, school authorities have advanced other justifications
for grooming codes that are ostensibly based on the school's interests
in avoiding disruption and in promoting safety and operational efficiency. Some cases note that students who disapprove of their classmates' long hair have caused disturbances in school, such as fights,
taunting, or even attempts to cut the hair by force. 5 e1o By imposing
restrictions on the student's personal appearance instead of directly
controlling the -audience-generated disturbance, however, these courts
,allow short-haired disrupters to deprive the student of the rights
he seeks to assert. Other cases refer to disruptions caused by the
student himself, such ,as persistent, distracting combing of long hair
in class560 and the creation of safety hazards in laboratory classes, Ml
while still ot:hers point to problems arising when the student represents
the school in competition. 562 Each of these concerns is legitimate,
but none necessitates requiring short hair on students. Disruption
could be dealt with directly, students could wear hair restraints for
1038 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 937 (1970); Westley v. Rossi, 305 F.
Supp. 706, 713 (D. Minn. 1969).
555. Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238, 249 (1976) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
556. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 173 (1973) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (emphasis added). See also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); Meyer
v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390,400 (1923).
551. See, e.g., Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925).
558. See, e.g., West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 632,
637 (1943).
559. See, e.g., Ferrell v. Dallas Indp. School Dist., 392 F.2d 697, 700-01 (5th
Cir. 1968).
560. See, e.g., Jackson v. Dorrier, 424 F.2d 213, 216 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 850 (1971).
561. But see Karr v. Schmidt, 460 F.2d 609, 613 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 989 (1972) (rejecting the safety hazard rationale).
562. See, e.g., Dostert v. Berthold Pub. School Dist. No. 54, 391 F. Supp. 876
(D.N.D. 1975).
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laboJ.'latory and sports activities, .and for such activities as band competition, in which aesthetics may be a factor in scoring, 663 students might
even wear wigs.
Each of the rationales in favor of regulating student hair length
might survive minimal scrutiny by a court. However, if school authorities are actually attempting to impose their personal views of
proper appearancer, 04 under the guise of safety and efficiency requirements, then their actions amount to a general regulation of the
citizenry, which courts should not condone. Of course, this does not
mean that schools can never regulate student hair length: "An epidemic of lice might conceivably authorize the shearing of locks."565
Yet, where the essential purpose of a student hair-length regulation
is standardization of the student body, the student's "liberty interest"
in his own personal appearance and not the state's collectivist interest should prevail. Indeed, if anyone should limit a student's freedom in this regard, it is his parents, who are ultimately responsible
for the student's nurture and socialization.
In contrast to regulations on personal appearance, school rules
governing the sexual and social behavior of students and teachers
rest solely on the collectivist interest in socializing students to community views of morality and decency. The scope of constitutional
protection for the countervailing privacy interest in matters of sex,
procreation and family life, like the scope of constitutional protection
for the individual's interest in his appearance, is uncertain.
Both students and teachers have challenged school regulations
that attempt to control sexual behavior. The student challenges
have typically involved rules or decisions that penalize pregnancy, 566
marriage, 11 n7 sexual promiscuity, 568 and motherhood, regardless of
563. Fear that the entire band or other group would lose points because of the
appearance of a few students was a motivation for the rule in Dostert.
564. See Miller v. School Dist. No. 167,495 F.2d 658, 668 (7th Cir. 1974).
565. Olff v. East Side Union High School Dist., 404 U.S. 1042, 1044 (1972)
(Douglas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari).
566. See Goldstein, supra note 9, at 374 n.4. See, e.g., State ex rel. Idle v. Chamberlain, 12 Ohio Misc. 44, 175 N.E.2d 539 (C.P. 1961); Perry v. Grenada Municipal
Separate School Dist., 300 F. Supp. 748 (N.D. Miss. 1969) (dictum).
567. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Bentley, 383 S.W.2d 677 (Ky. Ct. App. 1964);
McLeod v. State ex rel. Colmer, 154 Miss. 468, 122 S. 737 (1929); Carrolton-Farmers Branch Indp. School Dist. v. Knight, 418 S.W.2d 535 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967);
Anderson v. Canyon Indp. School Dist., 412 S.W.2d 387 (Tex. Civ. App. 1967).
All these courts found regulations excluding the married student from school for all
or part of the term to be arbitrary and unreasonable and therefore void. Contra,
State ex rel. Thompson v. Marion County Bd. of Educ., 202 Tenn. 29, 302 S.W.2d
57 (1957).
Regulations that exclude married students from extracurricular activities have often been upheld. See Board of Directors v. Green, 259 Iowa 1260, 147 N.W.2d
854 (1967); Cochrane v. Mesick Consol. School Dist. Bd. of Educ., 360 Mich. 390,
103 N.W.2d 569 (1960) (affirming by an equally divided court order denying petition for writ of mandamus); State ex rel. Baker v. Stevenson, 27 Ohio Op. 2d 223,
189 N.E.2d 181 (C.P. 1962); Starkey v. Board of Educ., 14 Utah 2d 227, 381 P.2d
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whether the student is wed569 or unwed. 570 The teacher cases have
typically involved pregnancy out of wedlock, 671 cohabitation, u72 homosexuality, 573 adultery, 574 and acts of sexual promiscuity, both public and semi-public. 575
Until recently, it appeared that the expansive notion of personal
autonomy ,articulated in Roe v. Wade 576 protected a broad range of
individual sexual choice. cm However, the Supreme Court's decision
718 (1"963). Recently, however, such rules have been held to violate equal protection in the absence of a strong showing by the school of likely moral pollution,
disruption, or disciplinary problems attributable to the student's marital status. See,
e.g., Moran v. School Dist. No. 7, 350 F. Supp. 1180, 1186 (D. Mont. 1972); Indiana
High School Athletic Assn. v. Raike,_ Ind. App.-, 329 N.E.2d 66, 76-77 (1975):
Bell v. Lone Oak Indp. School Dist., 507 S.W.2d 636 (Tex. Civ. App. 1974).
568. See, e.g., Sherman v. Inhabitants of Charlestown, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 160
(1851).
569. See, e.g., Nutt v. Board of Educ., 128 Kan. 507, 278 P. 1065 (1929); Alvin
Tndp. School Pist. v. Cooper, 404 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
570. See, e.g., Houston v. Prosser, 361 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Ga. 1973); Perry
v. Grenada Municipal Separate School Dist., 300 F. Supp. 748 (N.D. Miss. 1969).
571. See, e.g., Andrews v. Drew Municipal Separate School Dist., 371 F. Supp.
27 (N.D. Miss. 1973), affd., 501 F.2d 611 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 423 U.S. 820
(1975), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 44 U.S.LW. 4627 (U.S. May 3,
1976); Reinhardt v. Board of Educ., 19 Ill. App. 3d 481, 311 N.E.2d 710 (1974).
In the case of married teachers where pregnancy follows marriage, the problem is
not one of discipline for unattractive conduct or status. Attacks on school board
pregnancy policies in this area have taken the form of due process issues, with either
the entire policy or aspects of it being struck down where a conclusive presumption
of incapacity underlies the compulsory maternity leave. See Cleveland Bd. of Educ.
v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Paxman v. Wilkerson, 390 F. Supp. 442 (E.D.
Va. 1975).
572. See, e.g., Sullivan v. Meade County Indp. School Dist. No. 101, 387 F. Supp.
1237 (D.S.D. 1975); Fisher v. Snyder, 346 F. Supp. 396 (D. Neb. 1972), affd., 476
F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1973).
573. See, e.g., Acanfora v. Board of Educ., 491 F.2d 498 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
419 U.S. 836 (1974); Burton v. Cascade School Dist., 353 F. Supp. 254 (D. Ore.
1973), affd., 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1975); Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal.
3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1969); Sarac v. State Bd. of Educ,, 249
Cal. App. 2d 58, 57 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1967).
514. See, e.g., Freeman v. Inhabitants of Bourne, 170 Mass. 289, 49 N.E. 435
(1898).
575. See, e.g., Wishart v. McDonald, 500 F.2d 1110 (1st Cir. 1974) (alleged
carrying in public view on his property in a lewd and suggestive manner, a dress
mannequin that he had dressed, undressed, and caressed); Pettit v. State Bd. of Educ.,
10 Cal. 3d 29, 513 P.2d 889, 109 Cal. Rptr. 665 ( 1973) ( oral copulation by female
teacher on three persons not her husband at a semi-private party); Governing Bd.
v. Metcalf, 36 Cal. App. 3d 546, 111 Cal. Rptr. 724 (1974) (oral copulation by
a sixth grade probationary teacher in a doorless toilet stall of a downtown department store's public restroom); Purifoy v. State Bd. of Educ., 30 Cal. App. 3d 187,
106 Cal. Rptr. 201 ( 1973) (sexual solicitation conviction resulting in revocation of
teaching certificate); Moser v. State Bd. of Educ., 22 Cal. App. 3d 988, 101 Cal.
Rptr. 86 (1972) (masturbating in public view in a public restroom, and touching
private parts of another male).
576. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
577. See Note, The Constitutionality of Laws Forbidding Private Homosexual
Conduct, 72 MICH. L REv. 1613 (1974).
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in Doe v. Commonwealth's Attorney 518 summarily affirmed a lower
court's judgment that Virginia's sodomy statute was constitutional
both on its face and as applied to consenting adults practicing homosexuality within their own home. The trial court concluded that the
state's interest in the "promotion of morality and decency" and in
the prohibition of conduct deemed "likely to end in a contribution
to moral delinquency" permitted the exercise of its legislative
power. 570 In fact, the state's interest was deemed sufficiently strong
to outweigh the individual's interest in fashioning his own private
sexual lifestyle. The right of privacy was held not even to protect
the homosexual act within the seclusion of one's own home. This
decision appears consistent with the Court's holding in Kelley, in
which the right of privacy as identified in previous cases involved
"certain basic matters of procreation, marriage and family life." 580
Thus the current scope of constitutional protection for nonmainstream sexual behavior is narrow. Obviously, this type of conduct
on the part of teachers or students would not be protected under
present constitutional doctrines. The remaining question is whether
conduct clearly within the constitutional right of privacy, such as marriage, pregnancy, or even parenthood out of wedlock, 581 may be regulated by schools in furtherance of their socialization function.
The privacy of unwed female teachers who are pregnant or
who have children is particu1arly vulnerable. Regulations concerning unwed pregnancy .typically punish only female teachers because the consequence of the premarital sexual conduct is apparent
only in the woman. Similarly, rules denying employment to unwed
parents weigh more heavily against the female, perhaps because
males less frequently rear their illegitimate children. Courts have
responded to the inequity 'by finding regulations that deny employment to parents of illegitimate children to be violative of due process
and equal protection rights. 582
Courts have also acknowledged, however, that the state does
have an interest in creating an environment in the schools that does
not so offend moral sensibilities as to disrupt the educational process. 583 As in the grooming cases, school authorities attempt to justify regulation of teacher conduct by pointing to student emulation
of teacher behavior and to the responsibility of teachers to inculcate
578. 425 U.S. 901 (1976) (mem.), affg. 403. F. Supp. 1199 (E.D. Va. 1975).
579. 403 F. Supp. at 1202.
580. 425 U.S. at 244.
581. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438,453 (1972).
582. Andrews v. Drew Municipal Separate School Dist., 371 F. Supp. 27 (N.D.
Miss. 1973), affd., 507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir.), cert. granted, 423 U.S. 820 (1975),
cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 44 U.S.L.W. 4627 (U.S. May 3, 1976).
583. 371 F. Supp. at 31.
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fundamental values in students. 584 In offering this justification,
school authorities presumably must demonstrate a "compelling" reason for regulating a teacher's constitutionally protected sexual behavior, such as a disruptive impact on the school or actual harmful
influence on student behavior. 585 At least two courts have searched
for such compelling reasons and have been unable to find them in
cases involving private homosexuality586 and cohabitation. 587 A like
result was reached on statutory grounds when one court reversed the
discharge of a tenured teacher who had married when seven-anda-half months pregnant. The tenure law's provision requiring dismissal for "immorality" was deemed to apply "only where the record
shows harm to pupils, faculty, or the school itself," none of which
was demonstrated. 588
Although courts generally agree that to justify dismissal a teacher's conduct must have adverse in-school effects, 589 it is not clear
exactly what type of harm will suffice. One court, in concluding that
the dismissal of a teacher for cohabitation did not violate what the
court identified as her "substantive due process" rights, 690 was persuaded that widespread community disapproval of the teacher's behavior "would make it difficult for [the teacher] to maintain the
584. The Fifth Circuit summarized the school's three rationales offered to justify
the regulation: (1) unwed parenthood is prima facie proof of immorality; (2) unwed
parents. are improper communal role models; and (3) employment of unwed parents
as teachers materially contributes to the proqlem of school-girl pregnancies. 507
F.2d at 614. None of the rationales was sufflcient to support the regulation. The
third rationale was dismissed as being "without' support, other than speculation and
assertions of opinion." 507 F.2d at 617.
585. Because the Fifth Circuit invalidated the rule in Andrews on traditional
equal protection grounds, it did not reach other substantive constitutional grounds
such as the right to privacy or the right to procreation. 507 F.2d at 617.
586. Morrison v. State Bd. of Educ., 1 Cal. 3d 214, 461 P.2d 375, 82 Cal. Rptr.
175 (1969) (holding that a teacher could not be discharged for homosexuality unless
a relationship was established between the conduct and fitness to teach).
587. Fisher v. Snyder, 346 F. Supp. 396 (D. Neb. 1972), holding that discharge
for conduct unbecoming a female teacher (on several occasions males not related
to the teacher had stayed in her apartment for periods ranging from one night to
one week) violated the teacher's rights of association and privacy in the absence
of proof that her conduct affected classroom performance, her relationship with her
students, or other state interests.
588. Reinhardt v. Board of Educ., 19 Ill. App. 3d 481, 485, 311 N.E.2d 710,
713 (1974).
589. The same argument has been successful even where the conduct violates a
criminal law. See, e.g., Board of Trustees of Santa Maria Union High School Dist.
v. Judge, 50 Cal. App. 3d 920, 123 Cal. Rptr. 839 (1975) (a teacher cannot be
dismissed from service on grounds of "evident unfitness for service" or "moral turpitude" unless his actions indicate his unfitness to teach, which was not demonstrated
by conduct that consisted of growing a single marijuana plant).
590. Sullivan v. Meade County lndp. School Dist. No. 101, 387 F. Supp. 1237
(D.S.D. 1975). The court implied that the plaintifrs interest in substantive due
process required at least a minimal scrutiny standard. 387 F. Supp. at 1245.
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proper educational setting in her classroom."591 Thus, at least for
this court, concern that majoritarian desires might infringe on important individual interests, a concern that has caused community sentiment to be largely overlooked when freedom of speech is at stake, 592
is less important in the area of sexual behavior. 593 Still unresolved
as well is whether harm to students can be inferred from mere
awareness of the teacher's behavior or whether it must be empirically
proved that students have been adversely influenced by the teacher's
example. 594
The underlying assumption in the cases involving teacher behavior is that the schools do have a legitimate interest in regulating
not only the conduct that might adversely affect the social and sexual development of students, but also the actual behavior of students.
The cases involving direct regulation of student conduct must answer
two related questions: whether students possess the same ability to
make decisions about social and sexual matters as adults, 595 and
whether schools should have significant responsibility in this area.
The argument that students lack the capacity to make important
decisions has not persuaded courts to sustain rules that deny married
students the right to participate in school activities to the same extent
as students who are not married. 596 Moreover, the Supreme Court
591. 387 F. Supp. at 1247. The court cited a petition signed by about 140 community members as evidence of the strong community reaction to the teacher's behavior.
592. See text at notes 492-503 supra.
593. See also Burton v. Cascade School Dist. Union High School No. 5, 353
F. Supp. 254 (D. Ore. 1973), aftd., 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1975), which held the
statute authorizing dismissal for "immorality" unconstitutionally vague, but which refused to reinstate the homosexual teacher fearing the disruption that may have been
engendered within the school district, staff, student body, and community. This holding was over a dissent that emphasized the dange_rs of majoritarian dictatorship:
It is clearly inappropriate to consider community resentment in deciding whether
to reinstate a person to a position from which she was unconstitutionally removed . . . • If community resentment was a legitimate factor to consider, few
Southern school districts would have been integrated. One of the major purposes
of the Constitution is to protect individuals from the tyranny of the majority.
That purpose would be completely subverted if we allowed the feelings of the
majority to determine the remedies available to a member of a minority group
who has been the victim of unconstitutional actions.
512 F.2d at 855-56.
594. The trend in other cases seems to call for just such empirical proof. See
Andrews v. Drew Municipal Separate School Dist., 507 F.2d 611 (5th Cir.), cert.
granted, 423 U.S. 820 (1975), cert. dismissed as improvidently granted, 44 U.S.L.W.
4627 (U.S. May 3, 1976).
595. Justice Powell, dissenting in Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 590-91 (1975),
points to the "long histocy of our law, recognizing that there are differences which
must be accommodated in determining the rights and duties of children as compared
with those of adults. • . . Until today, and except in the special context of the
First Amendment issue in Tinker, the educational rights of children and teenagers
in the elementacy and secondacy schools have not been analogized to the rights of
adults or to those accorded college students."
596. See, e.g., Moran v. School Dist. No. 7, 350 F. Supp. 1180 (D. Mont. 1972).
The regulation that barred married students from participating in extracurricular ac-
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has refused to limit the constitutional right of free speech according
to age. 597 Even so, the view that students who have not reached
their majority do not enjoy the same constitutional right of privacy
as adults merits further examination. Sexual activity can arguably
be distinguished from free speech in that it risks substantial harm
to the student. Rules that attempt to discourage youthful sex and
marriage by limiting the educational opportunities available to such
students reflect a conventional wisdom that young lives will be
ruined if students assume family responsibilities for which they are
ill-prepared. Ironically, many of the most destructive effects of
teen-age marriage-isolation from peers, uncompleted education,
unemployment-result directly from school policies that ostracize
married students.
Even if it is assumed that students are "still in a state to require
being taken care of by others" 598 and that they should be firmly
guided in their decisions concerning sexual conduct and marriage,
the question remains whether schools or parents are better suited
to perform this function. While it may not be realistic to recognize
a fourteen-year-old's privacy interest in making his or her own decisions in the constitutionally protected area of marriage, procreation,
and family, it is entirely reasonable to assert that such decisions,
being within the familial zone of privacy, should be regulated by the
parents and not by the state. Certainly those parents who do supervise the development of their children's social lives expect that
schools will not undermine their efforts by transmitting different values. 599 Many parents, however, are reluctant to offer sexual guidance to their adolescent youngsters. These parents would prefer
that the schools assume both the educational and socialization burden
in this area. The question of which parental view, if any, should prevail is made even more complex if a privacy right of married or pregnant students is recognized; this right may conflict with the parents'
interest in controlling their children's sexual and social behavior.
Many courts are inclined to allow schools to resolve these conflicts in most circumstances. Even though the decision to marry or
tivities was based, at least in part, on the contention that the ban was for the married
student's own good: "Married students assume new and serious responsibilities.
Participation in extracurricular activities tends to interfere with discharging these responsibilities . . . • Married students need to spend time with their families in order
that the marriage will have a better chance of being successful." 350 F. Supp. at
1182-83.
597. See text at notes 497-98 supra.
598. J. MILL, ON LIBERTY 11 (Meredith ed. 1947).
599. Cf. Judge Stevens' comment about rights of association in the schools, text
at note 550 supra. Ironically, because sexuality seems so much more significant than
haircuts, it may be entitled to greater constitutional protection, although it is also
more understandable that parents should have something to say about with whom
their children associate.
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have children is constitutionally protected, the school has a compelling interest in insulating other children from the influence of sexually advanced students. 00 ° For example, one court has held that the
equal protection clause forbids excluding unwed mothers from
school unless they are found to be "so lacking in moral character
that their presence in school would taint the education of the other
students." 601 The court indicated, however, that the school could
exclude the female student during her pregnancy, for purposes that
were both "practical and apparent." 002 Still another court, while acknowledging that the right of privacy protects a student's decision
to marry or have children, found reasonable the school board's policy
of excluding from day classes students who marry or become parents,
though accredited night school education remained open to them: 603
"[such] students . . . are normally- more precocious than other students. Because of their precociousness, it is conceivable that their
presence in a regular daytime school could result in the disruption
thereof." 604 Some courts, however, have required schools to show
a strong likelihood that the presence of married students actually
causes disruption or disciplinary problems. 005
Generally, parental claims to control exclusively the sexual and
social behavior of their children have not been successful. This result parallels the outcome in cases in which parents have challenged
the academic curriculum. Demands based on the privacy interest
600. A nineteenth-century case spoke of the duty "to preserve the pure-minded,
ingenuous and unsuspecting children of both sexes, from the contaminating influence
of those of depraved sentiments and vicious propensities and habits •.•." Sherman
v. Inhabitants of Charlestown, 62 Mass. (8 Cush.) 160, 167 (1851).
601. Perry v. Grenada Municipal Separate School Dist, 300 F. Supp. 748, 753
(N.D. Miss. 1969). See also Nutt v. Board of Educ., 128 Kan. 507, 278 P. 1065
(1929), which held that a school board could not exclude a married mother of a
child conceived out of wedlock from a public high school absent a showing of "a
licentious or immoral character." 128 Kan. at 508, 278 P.2d at 1066. In light of
the state's policy of -encouraging children to become educated and in light of the
student's desire to reenter school, the fact that the child was conceived out of wedlock
was insufficient to demonstrate such a character. 128 Kan. at 509, 278 P.2d at
1066. The holding was over a dissent that the majority, contrary to established practice, had substituted its judgment for that of the school board. 128 Kan. at 50910, 278 P.2d at 1067.
602. 300 F. Supp. at 753.
603. Houston v. Prosser, 361 F. Supp. 295 (N.D. Ga. 1973).
Other courts have also been concerned that rules excluding married and pregnant
students not result in the permanent exclusion from public school of persons of school
age. See, e.g., Alvin Indp. School Dist. v. Cooper, 404 S.W.2d 76 (Tex. Civ. App.
1966).
.
604. 361 F. Supp. at 298-99. See also State ex rel. Idle v. Chamberlain, 12 Ohio
Misc. 44, 175 N.E.2d 539 (C.P. 1961) (upholding rule excluding pregnant student
on grounds of student's "physical well-being," student morale, and effect on orderly
daily routine in the school).
605. See, e.g., Indiana High School Athletic Assn. v. Raike, _ Ind. App. - ,
329 N.E.2d 66 (1975) (invalidating on equal protection grounds a rule excluding
married students from extracurricular activities).
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of parents in nurturing their children cannot encroach unduly on the
free expression rights of other members of the school community. 000
Similarly, although recognition of the right of privacy would allow
a particular student to decide whether to marry or to procreate, it
may be necessary to accommodate this interest with the desire of
parents to insulate their own children from those who make such
decisions at an early age.
3.

Procedural Rights in Discipline and Conduct Decisions

The multiplicity of interests that have been accommodated in determining the scope of substantive rights have also been appraised
and balanced in delineating procedural guarantees. The right of
teachers to procedural due process in connection with dismissal or
nonrenewal of contracts is well established constitutionally 007 and is
also protected under state tenure laws. 008 Moreover, other interests
of teachers are protected by unions or other organizations. 000 Until
recently, however, the scope of the procedural due process right for
students was not well defined. Although it was firmly established
that a public school student was entitled to notice and a rudimentary
hearing before expulsion or suspension for a period tantamount to
expulsion, 610 district and circuit courts were split on whether due
process protections applied to a shorHerm removal from school. 011
This conflict was resolved in Goss v. Lopez. 012
In a five-four decision, the Court held rudimentary due proc606. See text at notes 349-51 supra.
607. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972) (although upholding
dismissal of untenured teacher, court, in dictum, indicated a tenured teacher could
demand due process) •.
608. See note 746 infra.
609. See section IV-B infra.
610. See Fielder v. Board of Educ., 346 F. Supp. 722 (D. Neb. 1972); DeJesus
v. Penberthy, 344 F. Supp. 70 (D. Conn. 1972); Vought v. Van Buren Pub. Schools,
306 F. Supp. 1388 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
611. Courts of appeals had held the due process clause applicable to a ten-day
suspension, Black Students of North Fort Myers Jr.-Sr. High School v. Williams,
470 F.2d 957 (5th Cir. 1972), to a three-day suspension, Shanley v. Northeast Indp,
School Dist, 462 F.2d 960, 967 n.4 (5th Cir. 1972), and to ·"mild" suspensions,
Farrell v. Joel, 437 F.2d 160 (2d Cir. 1971), but inapplicable to a suspension for
not more than a few days, Murray v. West Baton Rouge Parish School Bd., 472
F.2d 438 (5th Cir. 1973 ), to a seven-day suspension, Linwood v. Board of Educ.,
463 F.2d 763 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1027 (1972), and to a three-day
suspension, Dunn v. Tyler lndp. School Dist'., 460 F.2d 137 (5th Cir. 1972), District courts had held the due process clause applicable to a ten-day suspension, Banks
v. Board of Pub. Instruction, 314 F. Supp. 285 (S.D. Fla. 1970), vacated, 401 U.S.
988 (1971), affd., 450 F.2d 1103 (5th Cir. 1971) (mem.), but inapplicable to a
suspension of eight days, Hatter v. Los Angeles High School Dist., 310 F. Supp.
1309 (C.D. Cal. 1970), revd. on other grounds, 452 F.2d 673 (9th Cir, 1971), and
to a suspension of ten days, Baker v. Downey City Bd. of Educ., 307 F. Supp, 517
(C.D. Cal. 1969).
612. 419 U.S. 565 (1915),
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ess was required for such suspensions from public school. The
plaintiffs, high school students in Cleveland, Ohio, were suspe!lded
for ten days for disruptive conduct and disobedience during a period
of widespread student unrest. The Court found that the students
had both "property" and "liberty" interests under the fourteenth
amendment. Because Ohio had extended the right to a public education to all people of the plaintiffs' class, the court concluded that
"the State is constrained to recognize a student's legitimate entitlement to a public education as a property interest which is protected
by the Due •Process Clause . . . ." 613 In addition, the Court noted
that recording the charges in a permanent record could damage reputation, relationships with teachers and other students, and later opportunities for employment and further education, and therefore
could result in "arbitrary deprivations of liberty." 614
Having established what the dissent referred to as a "new constitutional right," 615 the Court proceeded to determine the scope of
that right by defining "what process is due": 616 "[D]ue process requires, in connection with a suspension of 10 days or less, that the
student be given oral or written notice of the charges against him
and, if he denies them, an explanation of the evidence the authorities have and an opportunity to present his side of the story." 617
Generally, the notice and hearing should precede any disciplinary
action. However, the Court recognized that in dangerous or disrup613. 419 U.S. at 574. The holding was over an objection that the Ohio compulsory education statute defines its own due process requirements: "The Court • . .
disregards the basic structure of Ohio law in posturing this case as if Ohio had conferred an unqualified right to education, thereby compelling school authorities to conform to due process procedures in imposing the most routine discipline." 419 U.S.
at 587 (Powell, J., dissenting). In a footnote, Powell distinguished Goss from Arnett
v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974), a civil service case in which he had taken exactly
the opposite position on statutorily defined due process: "There simply is no analogy
between termination of nonprobationary employment of a civil service employee and
the suspension of a public school pupil for not more than 10 days." 419 U.S. at
587 n.4 (emphasis original).
614. 419 U.S. at 574. The Court held neither interest to be de minimis: "Neither the property interest in educational benefits temporarily denied nor the liberty
interest in reputation, which is also implicated, is so insubstantial that suspensions
may constitutionally be imposed by any procedure the school chooses, no matter how
arbitrary." 419 U.S. at 576. The dissent objected to this reasoning as well on the
ground that the infringement that arguably existed as a result of the short suspension
was "too speculative, transitory, and insubstantial to justify imposition of a constitutional rule." 419 U.S. at 586 (emphasis original).
615. 419 U.S. at 585.
616. 419 U.S. at 577, quoting Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471,481 (1972).
617. 419 U.S. at 581. The Court ruled out more sweeping forms of procedural
safeguards like right to counsel, right to cross-examine witnesses, and right to call
witnesses in the case of short suspensions, for practical reasons of administrative feasibility and cost as well as for the reason that such sweeping procedures would destroy
the effectiveness of disciplinary measures as part of the teaching process. 419 U.S.
at 583.
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tive situations, immediate removal would be justified. 618 In those
cases, due process would only be postponed, not eliminated. Defining the kind of situation that presents an "ongoing threat of disrupting the academic process" 610 obviously requires the exercise of discretion that could be abused by school authorities. 626 Even if school
officials circumvented the requirement of prior due process, however, the Court noted that they would be obligated to fulfill the notice and hearing requirements as soon as practicable after the suspension. 621
The real significance of Goss is that it indicates a pronounced
shift in the judiciary's proclivity to interfere in the public schools.
Instead of simply setting limits on the actions of school officials, Goss
tells administrators how they must proceed in certain situations. The
Court was less willing to defer to the "expertise" of community authorities; indeed, the Court expressed concern that school authorities
may take "erroneous action" 622 in discipline cases. In effect, the
Court has dictated the manner in which the educational authorities
perform their discretionary function 623 by requiring "at least an informal give-and-take between student and disciplinarian." 624 The
holding, by giving the pupil "the opportunity to characterize his conduct and put it in what he deems the proper context," 02 G also encourages students not to capitulate to authority. While this is not
likely to invite challenges to the disciplinary authority of teachers as
feared by the dissent, 626 it does represent a change in how schools
618. "[T]here are recurring situations in which prior notice and hearing cannot
Students whose presence poses a continuing danger to persons or
property or an ongoing threat of disrupting the academic process may be immediately
removed from school." 419 U.S. at 582.
619. 419 U.S. at 582.
620. See, e.g., Sweet v. Childs, 518 F.2d 320 (5th Cir. 1975). Initially decided
prior to Goss, Sweet was relitigated to test for consistency with the Supreme Court's
guidelines. The court held that the Black public high school students' sitdown, class
disruption, and walkout which resulted in their suspension was "more than an
'ongoing threat of disrupting the academic process.'" 518 F.2d at 321. The
post-suspension conferences, in tum, fulfilled Goss' postponed hearing requirement.
Thus, no violation of procedural due process was found. See also Note, Procedural
Due Process and Short Suspensions from the Public Schools: Prologue to Goss v,
Lopez, 50 NOTRE DAME LAW. 364 (1974).
621. 419 U.S. at 582-83:
622. 419 U.S. at 583.
623. "[R]equiring effective notice and informal hearing permitting the student
to give his version of the events will provide a meaningful hedge against erroneous
action. At least the disciplinarian will be alerted to the existence of disputes about
facts and arguments about cause and effect . . . . [H]is discretion will be more
informed and we think the risk of error substantially reduced." 419 U.S. at 583be insisted upon.

84.

624. 419 U.S. at 584.
625. 419 U.S. at 584.
626. ''When an immature student merits censure for his conduct, he is rendered
a disservice . . . if procedures • . • are so formalized as to invite a challenge to
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will henceforth perform their socialization functions.
Virtually any routinized procedure in the schools has some socialization effect. Prohibition of violent conduct to prevent harm to persons and property socializes toward peaceful behavior; stressing a
calm atmosphere in class socializes toward personal discipline and
achievement; even the chosen procedure for disciplining proscribed
conduct may socialize toward a particular model of problem solving.
The procedure of judicial intervention required by Goss emphasizes
an adversarial system and thus promotes many of the same values
that were evident in the free speech cases. s2.7 If the schools seek
to communicate the value of free expression of ideas, an informal
adaptation of judicial decision-making that stresses rational disagreement seems highly appropriate.
Although the Goss majority did not allude to the socialization aspects of judicial intervention, the four dissenters recognized that the
decision might change the process and the results of decision-making
in the public schools. Justice Powell, w:citing for the dissenters, argued
that because education attempts to further "the inculcation of an understanding in each pupil of the necessity of rules and obedience
thereto," the Supreme Court should not have altered the "lesson of
discipline" by imposing an adversarial framework on routine classroom problems. 628 Such an approach, he argued, "misapprehends
the reality of the normal teacher-pupil relationship. There is an ongoing relationship, one in which the teacher must occupy many roles
-educator, adviser, friend, and, at times, parent-substitute. It is
rarely adversary in nature except with respect to the chronically disruptive or insubordinate pupil whom the teacher must be free to discipline without frustrating formalities." 629 In contrast, Justice White
argued for the majority that the required procedures would not be
inappropriate in the classroom and would, "if anything, [be] less
than a fair minded school principal would impose upon himself in
order to avoid unfair suspension." 630
Although Justices White and Powell clearly differ in their perceptions of what is proper disciplinary practice in the public
schools6 :11 and disagree about whether courts should intervene in adthe teacher's authority-an invitation which rebellious or even merely spirited teenagers are likely to accept." 419 U.S. at 593 (Powell, J., dissenting) (footnote
omitted).
627. See text at notes 518-19 supra.
628. 419 U.S. at 593 (Powell, J., dissenting).
629. 419 U.S. at 594 (footnotes omitted).
630. 419 U.S. at 583.
631. Justice Powell's perceptions may be based on personal experience, since he
served on the Virginia State Board of Education. However, another experienced educator, formerly a teacher, principal, superintendent, and deputy state superintendent,
argues that the procedures outlined in Goss- merely reflect good administrative
practices. Interview with Dr. Robert H. Jerry, Professor of Education, Indiana State
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ministrative problems, 632 neither seriously contended that the majority imposes an unusual requirement on the schools. The decision
simply demands that school authorities adhere to the same standards
of conduct as officials of other public institutions, notwithstanding
the dissent's position that the "unique nature of public education"
requires limited judicial supervision. 633 The Court apparently concluded that neither the need for discretion to maintain order, long
recognized as a legitimate state interest, 634 nor the socialization interest in "the lesson of discipline" justified risking arbitrary and possibly erroneous disciplinary judgments.
A most important question generated by Goss is what other types
of decisions by school officials, if any, might be subjected to judicial
superns1on. The dissent expressed concern that students in many
other situations might claim infringements that would receive constitutional protection:
Today's ruling appears to sweep within the protected interest in education a multitude of discretionary decisions . . . that may have serious consequences for the pupil. They must decide, for example,
how to grade a student's work, whether a student passes or fails a
course, whether he is to be promoted, whether he is required to take
certain subjects, whether he may be excluded from interscholastic
athletics or other extracurricular activities, whether he may be removed from one school and sent to another, whether he may be bused
long distances when available schools are nearby, and whether he
should be placed in a "general," "vocational," or "college-preparatory" track. 635
University. See also WASH. AD. CODE ch. 180-40 (1972). Enacted before Goss
and Baker, the statute commands the state board of education to promulgate rules
and regulations concerning substantive and procedural rights of public school students. Subsequently, the board promulgated rules uniformly applicable from kindergarten to the twelfth grade. The portion of the Washington framework concerning
procedural rights specifies disciplinary authorities, procedural due process for severe
penalties (suspension and expulsion), and summary procedures for emergency situations. While this framework anticipated Goss, enactment of a similar (or broader)
provision subsequent to Goss in other states would effectively convert that decision
into a mere statement of the constitutional limits on legitimate discipline rather than
an affirmative source of authority on the question of appropriate due process. In
addition to obviating dangers of hostility on the part of educational personnel to
judicial infringement of their functions, such an approach would avoid the need for
the kind of judicial line-drawing suggested by Justice Powell. See text at note 635
infra. For an appraisal of the Washington system, see Note, Due Process for Washington Public School Students-Wash. Ad. Code ch. 18040, SO WASH, L. REV. 675
(1975).
.
632. The majority opinion represents a departure from traditional judicial reluctance to intervene in local school matters, see text at notes 622-24 supra, while the
dissent attempts to justify deference to local school boards and school administrators.
See Note, Right to Due Process Attaches to School Suspensions, 24 KAN. L. REV.
202, 218 (1975).
633. 419 U.S. at 590.
634. See text at notes 493-95 supra.
635. 419 U.S. at 597 (footnotes omitted).
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The Supreme Court has already interpreted Goss to require due
process in cases of corporal punishment. 636 It is arguable that this
extension, which mandates that due process be provided in any disciplinary action regardless of whether exclusion from school is the
punishment, should become the outside limit of the scope of Goss.
This would restrict the holding to disciplinary decisions that involve
a determination of wrong-doing and the fashioning of a remedy to
punish the wrongdoer. Thus, a purely academic judgment such as
grading would not require due process protection unless, for example, a poor grade were given for misconduct. 637 Similarly, other decisions such as exclusion from athletics or transfers to other schools
would require due process safeguards only if these actions were intended to be punitive. 638
Although the general reluctance of courts to question "academic" or "professional" judgments would suggest that the scope of
Goss was not intended to be overly broad, the language of the decision provides no limiting principle. 639 Certainly it is not absurd to
argue that rudimentary due process guarantees should accompany
nondisciplinary school decisions. In fact, "later opportunities for
higher education and employment," 640 which can be as seriously
damaged by an adverse academic judgment as by a disciplinary action, were included in the liberty interest. The deprivation of privileges may portend as significant an infringement of a student's property and liberty interests as suspension from school. For example,
636. Baker v. Owen, 423 U.S. 907 (1975) (mem.), affg. 395 F. Supp. 294 (M.D.
N.C. 1975). The three-judge district court held that a liberty interest was involved.
Due process required that (1) corporal punishment be a policy approved by the principal; (2) the student know that the act in question could occasion corporal punishment; (3) a teacher or principal administer corporal punishment only in the presence
of another school official who is informed in advance, and in the presence of the
pupil, of the reason for the punishment; and (4) upon request by the parents, the
disciplinarian inform them in writing of his reasons for the use of corporal punishment and the name of the second official. 395 F. Supp. at 303.
637. See Buss, Procedural Due Process for School Discipline: Probing the Constitutional Outline, 119 U. PA. L. REV. 545, 585 (1971). Cf. Developmellts, supra
note 281, at 1139.
638. See, e.g., Dallam v. Cumberland Valley School Dist., 391 F. Supp. 358
(M.D. Pa. 1975), finding, after Goss, that a rule which automatically barred from
interscholastic athletic competition for one year any student who transferred from
one school district to another but who did not reside in the transferee district with
his parents is nonviolative of procedural due process. The underlying objective was
to prohibit athletically motivated transfers and athletic recruiting. The court said
that the property interest recognized in Goss extended only to total exclusion from
the educational process, and that the liberty interest in reputation was irrelevant.
639. As the dissent stated: "If the Court perceives a rational and analytically
sound distinction between the discretionary decision by school authorities to suspend
a pupil for a brief period, and the types of discretionary school decisions described
[in text at note 635 supra] .•. it would be prudent to articulate it . . . ." 419
U.S. at 599 (Powell, J., dissenting).
640. 419 U.S. at 575.
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the promising athlete who is not allowed to participate in school
sports could lose his opportunity for a college scholarship and
eventual employment. 641
Goss also affirmed the lower court's order that all references to
the plain~'s suspension be removed from school records, 642 implying that due process attaches to all permanent notations of censure
in a student's file. However, as one district court observed, 043 it is
difficult to distinguish between a professional judgment recorded for
the benefit of future teachers that a child is a discipline problem,
and a notation that disciplinary action for punitive purposes has occurred. Because such a notation arguably serves an informational
function in all cases, it seems impossible to avoid some overlap with
the professional function of evaluating students. Judicial intrusion
into the making of these professional judgments might well produce
ludicrous results. However, since Goss requires only a very informal
notice and hearing, this conclusion is not self-evident. It is not an
intolerable burden to require a teacher to explain why a child is a
discipline problem or why the student has been assigned to a vocational track. Indeed, it may not be unreasonable to require the
teacher to explain why a student received a poor grade. Since due
process is a flexible right in the sense that the severity of the notice
and hearing requirements varies with the strength of the entitlement
that is infringed, the procedure used to ensure due process need not
impose an onerous burden on school administrators. 844
In Tinker, the first case to recognize substantive constitutional
rights in the school, Justice Black voiced his concern in dissent that
the decision was the harbinger of "an entirely new era in which the
power to control pupils by the elected 'officials of state supported
public schools .. .' in the United States is in ultimate effect transferred to the Supreme Court.'' 640 In his dissent in Goss, Justice
Powell reiterated Black's prophecy646 and expressed his own fear
that "one can only speculate as to the extent to which public education will be disrupted by giving every school child the power to control in court any decision made by his teacher which arguably in641. See Buss, supra note 637, at 584-85; Recent Developments, 20 VILL. L. Rav.
1069, 1080 (1975).
642. 419 U.S. at 571.
643. Einhorn v. Maus, 300 F. Supp. 1169 (E.D. Pa. 1969).
644. In the case of a grade or transfer to a new curriculum, the notice requirement would be met when the student is given his grade or informed of the change.
The hearing requirement would presumably be met if it was explained to the student
that he could express objections to those who made the decision. Of course, to pro, tect the student adequately, the notice should also be sent to the parent, as in the
case with notices of suspension.
645. 393 U.S. 503, 515 (1969) (Black, J., dissenting) (footnote omitted).
646. 419 U.S. at 600 n.22 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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fringes the state-conferred right to education." 647 Justice Powell, in
arguing that active judicial intervention on behalf of the children is
improper, predicted that "[t]he discretion and judgment of federal
courts across the land will be substituted for that of the fifty state
legislatures, the 14,000 school boards, and the 2,000,000 teachers
who heretofore have been responsible for the administration of the
American public school system." 648
It is unlikely that parents will bring a sufficient number of suits
to threaten seriously the discretionary powers of the schoolboards.
A judicial remedy is likely to serve merely as a valuable, though not
extensively used, check on the small minority of administrators, who,
in their zeal to preserve order, needlessly infringe on such basic values as free expression and equitable treatment of precocious students.
Still, the number of cases in which students allege violations of
their constitutional rights is increasing, and the prophecies of Justices
Black and Powell are being at least partially fulfilled. Those who
believe that the educational system should carry out the indoctrination of passive students with state-defined values and norms undoubtedly will find this tendency unfortunate.
If, however, ·as Barnette established, students are not mere receptacles of state-imposed wisdom; 649 and if, as espoused in Tinker,
the school is a community in which certain fundamental collectivist
values are accommodated with individual rights; 050 and if the judiciary is sensitive in avoiding the usurpation of the functions of professional educators, then good faith challenges of school decisions that
infringe upon basic constitutional rights should be encouraged and
not feared.
IV.

CONTROL OF EDUCATIONAL DECISION-MAKING

The two preceding sections of the Project have demonstrated
that the educational system must accommodate a multiplicity of interests. Judicial intervention is sought when the policies of educational decision-makers, either on questions of exposure to the system
itself or of specific content of the school experience, intolerably infringe on the interests of one or more groups within the educational
community. The final section of the Project, in contrast, will deal
with efforts of members of the community to affect educational decision-making through alteration of the institutional structure or
through exertion of political and economic pressure. Subsection A
647.
648.
649.
650.

419
419
See
See

U.S. at 600 n.22 (emphasis original).
U.S. at 599 (footnote omitted).
text at notes 476-80 supra.
text at notes 490-98 supra.
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will focus on decentralization of the schools while subsection B will
briefly examine unionization of teachers.

A.

Demands for Community Control

All school-district organization schemes attempt to establish
school boards that are directly responsible to and controlled by the
general public, of which parents are certainly the most important subgroup. In practice, however, the ideal of effective local control of
educational policy is rarely realized. Shortcomings endemic to almost all political institutions pervade the school board and make it
unresponsive to its constituents. 651 First, the apathy that is common
in our political system except at times of particular controversy affects the system of choosing educational authorities. Thus, in most
districts, school board positions are not the object of vigorous competition. Board candidates often run unopposed, thereby avoiding any
necessity for discussion and critical analysis of educational issues.
Second, elected school board members are constantly tempted to
defer to appointed staff personnel who are believed to have superior
educational experlise. Most school board members ·are not professional educators but instead are laypersons drawn from a fairly narrow
stratum of the population. 652 The increasing complexity of administrative and policy problems generates the attitude among elected
board members that they lack the competence to make policy decisions. The result is deference to an even narrower and less responsive circle of experts who frequently believe that they alone are
capable of making policy. 653 This has had the effect, particularly
in large cities, of virtually excluding elected representatives, let alone
parents, from a significant role in the educational system, thus undermining one of the traditional bases of the public school system. 064
The unresponsiveness of school boards to the surrounding communities derives not only from reliance of the boards on unelected
experts but from the structure of the school district scheme itself.
Ostensibly, if defects in the system's structure could be corrected,
some of the general problems of bureaucratism might be alleviated.
The physical boundaries of the school district, as is the case with
almost all governmental units, are fixed by "self-conscious legal and
651. See generally Eliot, supra note 39, at 1032-36.
652. G. LANoVE & B. SMinr, supra note 39, at 12-13. See also Eliot, supra
note 39.
653. See M. GIITELL, PARTICIPANTS AND PARTICIPATION: A STUDY OF SCHOOL
POLICY IN NEW YoRK CITY 55 (1967); Eliot, supra note 39, at 1032-36; Lyke, supra
note 40, at 138, 167.
654. M. GITIELL & T. HOLLANDER, supra note 5, at 196; see Eliot, supra note
39, at 1032-33. See generally Wertheim, The Myth of Local School Control, 102
INTELLECT 55, 59 (1973).
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historical considerations. " 655 Although these boundaries determine
the territorial effect of a school board's decisions, they may not be
coterminous with the residential locations of particular class, ethnic,
and racial groupings. Each grouping typically embraces different
values that it desires the school to reflect. When the physical boundaries of any one school district encompass several groupings or "communities," all values cannot be fully and absolutely represented.
Groups with less power whose interests are ignored or superseded
may feel frustrated and betrayed. It is not surprising, therefore, that
various socioeconomic 1and :racial groups claim that school boards are
not responsive to their interests.
It should be m?ted, however, that how responsive a school board
is to its constituents depends in large part on the nature of the district. For example, the nature of citizen control of board policies
in a school district composed of the entire metropolitan area of Detroit, which has more students than the entire state of Mississippi,
is substantially different from citizen control in a small, rural village
with a one-room school attended by a few dozen students. 656 In the
latter case, it is much more likely that the functional community
boundaries will be coterminous with the physical, legal boundaries
of the school district. In the former case, such a result is assuredly
impossible. 657
Thus, the demand for increased citizen contol of schools through
decentralization is articulated, for the most part, only in urban areas
in which the vastness of the metropolis has obliterated any semblance
of parental supervision of the schools. 658 It is in these areas that
655. See Pfantz, The Black Community, the Community School, and the Socialization Process: Some Caveats, in CoMMUNI1Y CONTROL OF ScHOOLS 13, 16-17 (M.
Levin ed. 1970).
Although essentially fixed, school district boundaries are not totally static. History evidences a natural tendency toward fewer and larger school districts-partly
as a response to population shifts to metropolitan areas and partly from a need to
both avoid duplication and offer specialized services. See G. JOHNSON, supra note
34, at 15, 25 n.24; PRESIDENT'S COMMN. ON SCHOOL FINANCE, supra note 5, at 127.
656. J. KOERNER, supra note 8, at 120. The author also points out that neither
the size of the state nor the population of school age children is significantly related
to the number of school districts. Id. at 118-19.
657. The problems of differing local conditions and attitudes within a large urban
school district have been widely noted. See, e.g., M. Gl'ITELL, supra note 653, at
50-51: "While parent associations are active in individual schools with regard to
localized and personalized problems, the highly centralized organization of the school
system is a serious deterrent to communication between parent groups and policy
makers."
658. See D. TYACK, supra note 43, at 284. Historically, decentralization movements have appeared sporadically. Demands for community control of schools are
generally part of efforts to exert greater citizen influence over gqvemment. See
Mills, Community Schools: Irish, Italians and Jews, 11 Society 76 (1974); Elazar,
School Decentralization in the Context of Community Control: Some Neglected
Considerations, in STATE, ScHOOL AND POLITICS 179, 184 (M. Kirst ed. 1972).
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parents are most frustrated because of their apparent inability to influence or alter prevailing school board policies. 1159
As articulated by its proponents, decentralization involves a reallocation of power between the central authorities, usually a city-wide
board, and local boards established in the neighborhoods. 1100 Usually
these proposals envisage substantial autonomy for the local boards
in such areas as curriculum, budgeting, teacher negotiation, and hiring and releasing of personnel. Essentially, those who support decentralization are attempting to assert greater control over educational policy by moving the locus of power closer to the citizenry. 11111
In particular, those parents who support decentralization desire
greater control of the socialization of their children. It has been observed that decentralization "has implications for the school's political socialization role. . . . [T]he public schools have historically
inculcated Americanism and allegiance to certain generalized political norms. . . . Some of the advocates of community control, however, reject the white middle-class character of the socialization process and clearly hope to use the schools to encourage ethnic solidarity
and challenge traditional American myths. " 1162 Yet for the most
659. See M. GITIELL & T. HOLLANDER, supra note S, at 196-201. School
boards may be unresponsive to parental demands for a number of reasons. Members
are often uncomfortable with their responsibilities because they lack training in educational policy and, therefore, prefer to occupy themselves with housekeeping details.
In some cases such outside influences as state boards or departments, professional
associations, or unions act to prevent innovations. J. KoERNER, supra note 8, at
124-27.
660. There are several general approaches to effecting decentralization of schools.
One approach involves creating local school boards and providing them with substantial decision-making powers, although some sort of city-wide coordination is usually
retained. This is the pattern in New York City. See text at notes 667-76 infra.
Another approach is to subdivide the city-wide district into independent, autonomous
local districts, which have total responsibility for the schools within the district. A
final approach envisions the development of "education parks," which are groups of
schools constructed in one large, central campus. This approach has been suggested
as one means to increase desegregation but has the obvious problem of the high
costs involved in constructing the necessary facilities. See U.S. COMMISSION ON
CIVIL RIGHTS, EDUCATION PARKS (1967).
661. This reflects the idea that citizens themselves should set the goals of education and the experts should develop means to accomplish them. More often today's
experts are telling the society or the community what its educational goals should
be. J. KOERNER, supra note 8, at 160-61.
Suburbanization of our metropolitan cities is, in effect, another form of decentralization. Suburbanization has a political meaning: It can be viewed as another example of individuals attempting to exert greater influence over their government by
moving out of the city and forming smaller communities. This enables them to make
choices on such subjects as tax rates, types of city services, and, of course, educational
policy, that would not be possible in the larger city. In part, this ability to make
one's government more accountable is a result of relative suburban homogeneity, See
Elazar, supra note 658, at 181.
662. G. LANovE & B. SMITH, supra note 39, at 19. School boards have traditionally been dominated by the middle- and upper-middle classes and have consequently served as a forum for middle-class values. Id. at 15-23. See text at note
652supra.
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part, proponents of community control do not seek to establish a separate polity. Instead, these individuals seek to establish and preserve their own identity within the framework of the political system:
"Most Americans of whatever race, creed or ethnic origin, share
common values and goals as Americans. What they seek are variations on 'the American way of life,' not completely separate ways.
Thus they strive for the kind of local control that makes the maintenance of those variations possible, not local separatism." 663 When
viewed in this manner, it is clear that community control is not
intended to infringe upon the core interests of the state, namely a certain minimum level of socialization to those consensus values referred to above, but instead intends only to express pluralistic interests of ethnic, racial or other groups. 664
Certainly any effort to shift educational decision-making power,
even when the underlying motivation is not inconsistent with collectivist interests, will meet with resistance from groups that have a
vested interest in maintaining the status quo. 665 In those areas in
which decentralization has occurred, almost all members of the
school community-administrators, teacher organizations, lay members of the boards, and even some of the organized parent groupshave opposed it. High-level administrators tend to resist the transfer of their power to local authorities while lower-level managerial
personnel oppose decentralization because they perceive no net increase in their influence when substantial power is transferred to
nonadministrative community groups. Teacher unions, for the most
part, prefer to assert their influence at one central location rather
than to negotiate with a large number of small districts. Unions gain
strength from centralization and naturally oppose plans that allow
districts to establish separate policies affecting teaching responsibilities, class size, and other working conditions. 666 Finally, because
major interest groups typically are organized on a city-wide basis,
their ability to influence policy would diminish if decision-making
power were less concentrated.
Many of these difficulties were evidenced during the major de663. Elazar, supra note 658, at 181.
664. For a discussion of core collectivist interests, see text at notes 95-126 supra.
665. M. GITIELL, supra note 653, at 57-58. Any plan for change must have as
its first objective the diminution of the power of the professional bureaucracy. In
large city systems decentralization of the bureaucratic authority is a prerequisite to
increased influence of citizen groups. M. GITIELL, supra note 653, at 57. Cf.
M. COHEN, B. LEVIN & R. BEAVER, THE POLITICAL LIMITS TO SCHOOL FINANCE
REFORM 21-23 (1973).
666. G. LANOVE & B. SMITH, supra note 39, at 233. Unions may also correctly
perceive a major threat to members from increasing demands for greater returns on
the educational dollar and the general call for teacher accountability. See M. CoHEN, supra note 665, at 28; THE PRESIDENT'S COMMN. ON SCHOOL FINANCE, supra
note 5, at xvii-xviii, 58-62.
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centralization experiment of the last decade implemented in New
York City in accordance with a 1969 plan of the state legislature. 007
The city school district, which included the entire city of New York,
was divided into about thirty community districts 008 of at least twenty
thousand pupils. 669 Each district was to be governed by a community school board composed of elected nonprofessionals. 070 Included
in the broad mandate671 of each community board was the power
to frame the curriculum and choose textbooks, 672 to name a community superintendent673 and hire teachers, 674 to allocate funds and supervise their expenditure, 675 and to launch building programs. 070
Not surprisingly, the city school board was reluctant to surrender its
authority to the community districts. Diffusion of control was hampered by provisions in the enabling statute that gave the city
board, 677 through the chancellor, 678 power to set minimum standards
in areas such as textbook selection. 679 Effective decentralization of
power to citizens of small neighborhood units was also impeded by
teachers' strikes and racial tension. 080
The New York plan, which has been met with varying appraisals
as to its success, 681 epitomizes many of the uncertainties raised by
the debate over decentralization. Even when decentralization is effectively carried out against its many obstacles, it is unclear whether
the basic problems of individual participation and institutional re667. N.Y. Eouc. LAw § 2590 (McKinney 1970). For a history of the New York
experiment, see G. LANOVE & B. SMITH, supra note 39, at 153-224.
668. Criteria for division included "the common and special educational needs
of the communities and children involved, transportation facilities, and existing and
planned school facilities"; the appropriate scale needed for efficient policy making
and economic management; convenience of location for pupil attendance; a reasonable number of pupils and heterogeneity of the pupil population; and the relationship
to the geographic areas for which the city of New York plans and provides services.
N.Y. Eouc. LAw § 2590-b.3 (McKinney 1970).
669. N.Y. Eouc. LAw § 2590-b.2(b) (McKinney 1970).
670. N.Y. Eouc. LAW § 2590-c.4 (McKinney 1970). In practice candidates endorsed by unions or by religious groups were more successful than candidates of parent associations. G. LANovE & B. SMITH, supra note 39, at 193.
671. N.Y. Eouc. LAW § 2590-e (McKinney Supp. 1975).
672. N.Y. Eouc. LAW § 2590-e.3 (McKinney 1970).
673. N.Y. Eouc. LAW § 2590-e.l (McKinney Supp. 1975).
674. N.Y. Eouc. LAW § 2590-e.2 (McKinney 1970).
675. See N.Y. Eouc. LAW§ 2590-i.8 (McKinney 1970).
676. N.Y. Eouc. LAW § 2590-e.ll (McKinney 1970).
677. N.Y. Eouc. LAw § 2590-g.1 (McKinney 1970).
678. N.Y. Eouc. LAw § 2590-h.8 (McKinney 1970).
679. See Rebell, New York's School Decentralization Law: Two and a Half
Years Later, 2 J. LAW & ED. 1, 8 (1973).
680. See N.Y. Times, March 1, 1973, at 45, col. 1 (late city ed.). See generally
M. BERUBE & M. GITIELL, CONFRONTATION AT OCEAN HILL-BROWNSVILLE 215-46
(1969).
681. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 10, 1973, at 35, col. 1 (late city ed.).
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sponsiveness are alleviated. Community control assumes that a substantial consensus about values exists among members of the community, a consensus that is assuredly absent in the large metropolitan districts 682 in which certain groups have been visibly "disenfranchised." The rationale underlying decentralization is that small
units can be responsive to particular groups-an unrealizable result
when a few large districts embrace a large proportion of the student
population. 683 Yet it is very dubious that metropolitan districts can
be subdivided884 so that each community district will reflect a homogeneous constituency with similar demands and expectations. 685 In
New York, even in the small school districts, various interest groups
waged intensive and divisive campaigns to elect people to the boards
who would be favorable to their positions.888 That experiment failed
to erase all feelings .that ,the educational structure was unresponsive. 887
Even if decentralization accomplishes the goal of greater individual and group involvement in educational decision-making, it is by
no means certain that basic state interests do not suffer too severely
in the process. First, opponents of decentralization assert the collectivist interest in ensuring that the educational system adequately prepares citizens to function effectively in society, and claim that with
neighborhood controls on schooling, this aim cannot be achieved. 688
It is beyond dispute that financial resources are not evenly distributed among existing school districts, let alone among neighborhoods
682. See text at note 656 supra. But see A. ALTSHULER, COMMUNITY CONTROL:
THE BLACK DEMAND FOR PARTICIPATION IN LARGE AMERICAN CITIES 131 (1970) (author suggests that proponents of community control should avoid homogeneity even
if neighborhood lines could be drawn to roughly fit ethnic, class or racial groups
because of the potential explosiveness of the homogeneity question).
683. One author has observed that half of the nation's local school boards have
fewer than 300 students, but nearly 200 boards have over 25,000 students apiece.
New York City's board alone has over l million students, which is a greater student
population than is found in a majority of the states. He notes that nearly half of
all U.S. students are under the control of less than 3 per cent of the nation's school
boards. J. KOERNER, supra note 8, at 120.
684. See G. LANovE & B. SMITH, supra note 39, at 115-52.
685. See A. ALTSHULER, supra note 682, at 124-34; Elazar, supra note 658, at
182-84.
686. N.Y. Times, April 29, 1973, § IV, at 11, col. 1 (late city ed.). See M.,
March 1, 1973, at 45, col. 1 (late city ed.).
687. However, the New York experiment clearly eliminated the apathy surrounding school board elections, see text at notes 651-52 supra, and apparently shifted
school board deference as to educational policy from educational experts, see text at
notes 652-54 supra, to community interest groups. Thus, it clearly seems reasonable to
argue that the New York experiment erased the unresponsiveness of the educational
structure, discounting, of course, the inevitable unresponsiveness of any democratic
structure to voters who supported losing candidates.
688. There is virtually no evidence that increased parental participation in school
policy results in increased student achievement. There is a similar absence of evidence that smaller school districts, presumably less bureaucratic, are able to produce
higher levels of student achievement See G. LANoVE & B. SMITH, supra note 39,
at 212-15.
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within those districts. 689 Certain neighborhoods may be so poor that
they are unable to support a school system that is capable of providing even a minimal educational program. It is certainly in the state's
interest to avoid massive discrepancies in the quality of educational
training, but to prevent such a development, it would be necessary
for the state to provide financial support to the underdeveloped communities. It is unlikely that central educational authorities will elect
to underwrite these localities and at the same time surrender control over how such monies are expended. 690 Although such criticisms of community control have not gone unchallenged, 001 it seems
clear that any decentralization plan that sacrifices this collectivist interest will be strongly resisted by the school board and other authorities.
Another concern is that decentralization will impair the state's
interest in integration. 692 Because community schools would be
small and local, many of them would be within predominantly Black
neighborhoods. It has been argued, in response, both that neighborhood boundaries need not be drawn to preserve racial, ethnic or class
689. See THE PRESIDENT'S COMMN. ON ScHOOL FINANCE, supra note 5, at
30; San Antonio Indp. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 11-16 (1973). See
generally Berke & Callahan, Inequities in School Finance, in SENATE SELECT COMM,
ON EQUAL EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNI1Y, 92D CONG., 2D SESS., ISSUES IN SCHOOL FINANCE 129-63 (Comm. Print 1972).
690. See K.irp, Community Control, Public Policy, and the Limits of Law, 68
MICH. L. REV. 1355, 1360 (1970). But cf. Campbell & Gilbert, supra note 34, at
200-05 (suggesting no direct relationship between the extent of state funding and
state control).
691. Gittell, Three Demonstration School Districts in New York City, in
LoCAL CONTROL IN EDUCATION 39 (1972); A. ALTSHULER, supra note 682, at 1961.
692. Integration, as a collectivist interest, was clearly identified by the President's
Commission on School Finance: "In any reorganization of school districts .•.
[a] prime [consideration] . . . is the attainment of diveniity in the school population. The most important resource of any distrcit [sic] is the people who are served.
Economic or ethnic isolation of children reduces the ability of school systems to
provide equal education opportunity and quality education." THE PRESIDENT'S
COMMN. ON ScHOOL FINANCE, supra note 5, at xix.
The reasons for pursuing integration in public scho.ols are compelling. According
to the widely publicized Coleman Report, the educational achievement of minority
pupils, with some exceptions, is lower at every level than the performance of White
pupils. Furthermore, the difference in achievement widens as grade levels increase.
See J. COLEMAN, supra note 149, at 20-21. The Report found that Black educational
achievement can be increased by sending Blacks to schools that are integrated. Moreover, the Report found that sending Blacks to integrated schools could mitigate racist
attitudes, see id. at 28-30, thereby furthering the state's socialization interests. See
M. Katz, supra note 43, at 133-34. See generally Symposium-Milliken v. Bradley
and the Future of Urban School Desegregation, 21 WAYNE L. REV. 751 (1975).
The controversial findings of the Coleman Report have been widely discussed
and critically reviewed. See, e.g., ON EQUALITY OF EDUCATIONAL OPPORTUNITY (F.
Monteller & D. Moynihan eds. 1972); THE "INEQUALITY" CONTROVERSY (D. Levine
& M. Bane eds. 1975).
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homogeneity693 and that community schools would have no greater
segregation effects than the present centralized systems. 694 If that
were true, the same dissatisfaction that caused decentralization to be
demanded initially, namely ·that certain groups have relatively less
power than others and consider .themselves left out of the decisionmaking process, 695 would again be generated. After ,all, much of
the appeal of decentralization rests on its promise of allowing
-individual groups to control schools that serve their particular racial or ethnic orientation. 696 In reality, it appears that community
control and racial balance in the schools are incompatible. 697 Indeed, as a purely practical matter, it would be easier for dissatisfied
families to move out of a neighborhood district than it would be to
leave an entire metropolitan area. If families who consider themselves disenfranchised were to flee their districts, then residential
housing patterns would become even more segregated. Charges
that decentralization could lead to increased class separation698 were
buttressed by evidence in New York that the population of some
community school districts fell after the educational system's reorganization. 699
Since decentralization may very well ,be counterproductive to integration, the obvious question is whether community control is constitutional. Indeed, the recent interpretations of the fourteenth
amendment by the Supreme Court suggest that it may not survive
judicial scrutiny.
The objective today remains to eliminate from the public schools
all vestiges of state-imposed segregation. Segregation was the evil
struck down by Brown I as contrary to the equal protection guarantees of the Constitution. That was the violation sought to be corrected by the remedial measures of Brown II. That was the basis
for the holding in Green that school authorities are "clearly charged
with the affirmative duty to take whatever steps might be necessary
693. See A. ALTSHULER, supra note 682, at 131-34.
694. Id. at 19-28.
695. See text at notes 658-61 supra. See also N.Y. Times, Jan. 14, 1973, at
118, col. 2 (late city ed.) (Blacks complaining that their power had been diluted
by decentralization).
696. See id., Jan. 14, 1973, at 118, col. 2 (late city ed.) (proposal for an allBlack district).
697. "Community control and integration are incompatible, and for anyone who
wants both that is a very hard fact to admit. Decentralized community schools must
of necessity be small and local." M. KATZ, supra note 43, at 133. But cf. A. ALTSHULER, supra note 682, at 131-34 (sugges.ting that boundaries need not be drawn
to create ethnically homogeneous neighborhoods).
Many supporters of community control admit the incompatibility but think integration is often impossible in any case. See COMMUNITY CONTROL OF ScHOOLS 6-7
(M. Levin ed. 1970).
698. See N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1973, at 41, col. 1 (late city ed.).
699. See id., Feb. 5, 1975, at 34, col. 3 (late city ed.).
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to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimination would
be eliminated root and branch. . . ."
If school authorities fail in their affirmative obligations under
these holdings, judicial authority may be invoked. 700

It is certain that if a White-dominated school board were to use
community control to establish or to perpetuate a system of segregated schools, the board action would violate the fourteenth amendment. 701 It is less clear whether a community control scheme administered in a racially neutral manner is constitutionally impermissible. This was the specific question left open in Keyes v. School
District No. J: 102 "We have no occasion to consider in this case
whether a 'neighborhood school policy' of itself will justify racial or
ethnic concentrations in the absence of a finding that school authorities have committed acts constituting de jure segregation." 703 The
Sixth Circuit has found constitutionally permissible a board action
that results in a racial imbalance so long as the action was not intended to have a segregative effect. As rthat court concluded in Deal
v. Cincinnati Board of Education, 704 nondiscriminatory implementation of a neighborhood school policy does not possess the "arbitrary,
invidious characteristics of a racially restrictive system." 706 The necessary element of a constitutionally impermissible school board action, it stated, is a racial imbalance intentionally caused by discriminatory practices of the board. "When no discrimination is shown,
racial imbalance alone is no warrant for relief. " 700 This view has
700. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) (citations omitted).
701. See Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 212 (1973). The majority
recognized a distinction between de jure and de facto segregation based on "purpose
or intent" to segregate. 413 U.S. at 208 (emphasis original). In Keyes, the neighborhood school scheme was promulgated by authorities who were found to have the
requisite intent to avoid integration. Keyes explained that a school board can rebut
a prima facie case of de jure segregation by showing either that "segregative intent"
was not among the factors that motivated its actions or "that its past segregative acts
did not create or contribute to the current segregated condition." 413 U.S. at 211.
Thus, for de jure segregation, at least a finding of segregative intent is necessary.
See United States v. School Dist. 151, 404 F.2d 1125 (7th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
402 U.S. 943 (1969).
702. 413 U.S. 189 (1973 ). In Keyes, the petitioners sought desegregation of
the public schools in the Denver, Colorado, school district. The Court remanded
for further findings but held that a finding that school authorities practice de jure
segregation in a "meaningful portion of the school system" creates a prima facie
case of intentional segregation in the remaining schools. 413 U.S. at 212. See text
at notes 192-95 supra.
703. 413 U.S. at 212.
704. 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 847 (1967).
705. 369 F.2d at 60.
706. 369 F.2d at 63:
Appellants' right to relief depends on a showing of more than mere statistical
imbalance in the Cincinnati schools. They must also expose that added quantum of discriminatory state action which deprives them of their constitutional
right to freedom of choice. If the school officials, through overt practice or
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recently been reaffirmed by the Sixth Circuit. 707
Other courts, however, have taken a different approach. Both
the Eighth Circuit, in United States v. School District of Omaha,708
and the Second Circuit, in Hart v. Community School Board of Education, 700 held that segregative intent, and therefore de jure segregation, exist when school authorities engage in acts or omissions, the
natural, probable and foreseeable consequence of which is to cause
or to maintain segregation. Such a definition of de jure segregation
would have profound implications for many systems of community
control. Decentralization of schools, even though administered in
a rijcially neutral manner, could well have racial imbalance among
the districts as a "foreseeable consequence" 710 and, accordingly,
would be constitutionally impermissible if segregation resulted.
The viability of a community control scheme thus depends on
which definition of de jure segregation is used by the courts. It is
very unlikely that an urban area could be decentralized without reinforcing racial divisions. Under the Hart and Omaha test, such an
effort would likely be barred, but under the Deal test, which at least
is not inconsistent with the Supreme Court's decision in Keyes, 711
if a community control scheme has segregative tendencies but no discriminatory purpose, the plan could be upheld.
by subterfuge, have treated students differently solely because of race, then they
not only must cease doing so, but also must take affirmative action to remedy
the condition which they have caused. Thus, even if the Negro students were
distributed uniformly in the schools, if other forms of discrimination were used
against them they would still be entitled to the aid of the law. When no discrimination is shown, racial imbalance alone is no warrant for relief.
707. See Higgins v. Board of Educ., 508 F.2d 779, 792-93 (6th Cir. 1974); Bronson v. Board of Educ., 525 F.2d 344, 345-47 (6th Cir. 1975). In Higgins, Black
students and their parents brought a class action charging that the Board was operating the Grand Rapids schools in a manner designed to perpetuate a segregated system. The Board had decided to retain the concept of a neighborhood school system
to meet the needs of the district, the lines of which were coterminous with the city
limits. The court found that the school board's decisions were not motivated by
segregative intent even though many of the schools were predominantly Black. Instead, the racial imbalance in the schools was attributed to segregative acts in the
housing market. The court stated that such a racial imbalance need not be remedied:
"[T]he law imposes no affirmative duty upon school officials to correct the effects
of segregation resulting from factors over which they have no control." 508 F.2d
at 790.
708. 521 F.2d 530 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 946 (1975).
709. 512 F.2d 37 (2d Cir. 1975).
710. See note 697 supra and accompanying text.
111. Keyes clarifies how a school board can rebut a prima facie showing of segregative intent, not whether a remedy is necessacy in the absence of intent. The latter
question was squarely posed in Deal, and the court held that a remedy was not required. See Higgins v. Board of Educ., 508 F.2d 779, 792-93 (6th Cir. 1974). However, some doubt has been cast on the Deal test of intent by Milliken v. Bradley, 418
U.S. 717 (1974). In Milliken, the Court affirmed district court findings of de jure
segregation, some of which were based on the "foreseeable consequence" test. 418
U.S. at 725-28, 738 n.18. See United States v. School Dist., 521 F.2d 531, 536
n.10 (8th Cir. 1975).
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One commentator has suggested another distinction between
permissible and impermissible community control schemes that focuses on whether the central school board has actually relinquished
decision-making power. No transfer of power has occurred, for example, when the school board, without the consent of affected communities, simply assigns teachers or adjusts boundaries in a manner
that has racially predictable consequences. If the school board
transfers power to local boards with concentrated ethnic and racial
constituencies, however, it has not acted in the same ove1"t, 1."acially
motivated manner. 712 Although this distinction is tenuous, it does
highlight the difference between a racially oppressive plan and one
which, though leading to the same racial isolation, involves a genuine
transfer of power and authority.
It has also been suggested that because integration as mandated
by Brown v. Board of Education713 does not prohibit voluntary racial
isolation, community control that results in de facto segregation may
be possible. 714 Thus, the segregation proscribed in Brown was involuntary, since the plaintiffs had been forced to send their children
to an all-Black school. On the other hand, a community control plan
that allows parents to choose as an alternative an integrated education at a school other than the one in the neighborhood might not
be unconstitutional. 716 However, this conclusion is by no means assured. In Green v. County School Board, 716 the Supreme Court
held that a desegregation plan under which students were allowed
to choose their school was unconstitutional. The system in question
had only two schools on opposite sides of the county. One was previously all-Black and the other all-White, though housing patterns
were not segregated. To remain eligible for federal aid, the school
board was required to develop an integration plan. The "freedomof-choice" plan adopted by local authorities was struck down because
it failed to take "whatever steps might be necessary to convert to
a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated
root and branch." 711
A plan that provides an alternative to the segregated school in a
community control scheme is very similar to the freedom-of-choice
plan in Green. It is true :that ithe situations can be distinguished. In
Green, the politically dominant White community supported a plan
that had the effect of perpetuating a dual system of education that in712.
713.
714.
715.
716.
717.

Kirp, supra note 690, at 1372. See note 707 supra.
347 U.S. 483 (1954).
Kirp, supra note 690, at 1362.
See id. at n.27.
391 U.S. 430 (1968).
391 U.S. at 437-38.
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herently deprived Blacks of ·both power and a quality education~ while
the underlying rationale of a system of community control is that the
quality of education will be raised through the involvement of Black
parents. If isolation of the races ~s to be eliminated, however, this distinction should not be •adequate to validate ,the scheme. Decentralization plans should be upheld only if sufficient numbers of both races
choose to be educated out of their distci.ct, thereby eliminating segregation.
In his opinion in Keyes, Justice Powell urged that the de jurede facto distinction be abolished. 718 At first glance, this would have
the effect of invalidating any community control scheme, since all
such plans are likely to result in de facto segregation. Justice Powell
noted, however, that "Swann itself recognized limits to desegregative
obligations. . . . Particular schools may be all White or all Black
and still not infringe constitutional rights if the system is genuinely
integrated and school authorities are pursuing integrative steps.
710
"
In fact, he specifically recognized the vitality of the
neighborhood school concept: "Neighborhood school systems, neutrally administered, reflect the deeply felt desire of citizens for a
sense of community in their public education." 720 In referring to
the close relationship between the concept of community control and
the rights and duties of parents with respect to their children's education, Justice Powell concluded that the "Court should be wary
of compelling in the name of constitutional law what may seem to
many a dissolution in the traditional, more personal fabric of their
public schools." 721 He thus would accommodate the state's collectivist interest in integration with the parent's interests in running local
schools and in supervising more directly the upbringing of their children. This process is not unlike the balancing of interests in other
educational contexts. The unique feature here, however, is that the
process involves the power to make educational decisions rather than
the content of the decisions themselves. The outcome of this contest will determine the nature of the institutional framework in
which educational decisions are made. 722
718. 413 U.S. at 219-36. See text at notes 196-99 supra.
719. 413 U.S. at 244.
720. 413 U.S. at 246.
721. 413 U.S. at 246.
722. Decentralization is bµt one proposal to increase citizen participation in public school policy. Another suggestion is the utilization of parental advisory committees. See generally J. KOERNER, supra note 8, at 146-54; Murphy, supra note 5,
at 90-91. Many schools have established parent groups, many of which are connected with the Parent-Teacher Association (PTA). Such committees rarely possess authority over fundamental policy matters but do serve the important function
of facilitating communication. With the exception of civil rights groups, most organized parental interest groups are hesitant to be critical of established policies.
M. GITIELL & T. HOLLANDER, supra note 5, at 199.
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B. Teacher Unionization
Parents disenchanted with the unresponsiveness of educational
decision-makers to their interests urge alteration of the institutional
framework through decentralization. Teachers, on the other hand,
have sought to protect their own interests not through institutional
reform but through the collective pressure of unions on educational•
authorities. Although teachers have had professional organizations
for over one hundred years, 728 they have only recently affiliated with
unions-organizations that engage in collective bargaining and utilize the strike to support their demands. 724 Through unions, teachers are increasingly requesting additional economic and professional
benefits and demanding a broader role in fundamental policy decisions.
It is only relatively recently that teachers have been able to bargain with school boards. Initially, the boards possessed virtually absolute power to control the working conditions of their employees.
Courts held that the school board was "sovereign" in the sense that
it had to be free to exercise the power, entrusted to it by the citizenry, to control education. To bargain with, let alone capitulate
to, teacher organizations on matters of educational policy would, pur723. The National Education Association (NEA) is the largest and oldest of the
professional teacher organizations. It was organized in Philadelphia in 1857 by a
group of superintendents, principals, college presidents and professors. Perry & Wildman, The Impact of Negotiations in Public Education, in EVIDENCE FROM nm
ScH:ooLS 25 (1970). For a detailed history, see E. WESLEY, NEA: THE FIRST HUN•
DRED YEARS, TuE BUILDING OF nm TEACHING PROFESSION (1957). Because it was
predominately composed of administrators instead of classroom teachers, early NEA
efforts were not specifically directed at helping the classroom teacher. See id. at
329. See also J. KOERNER, supra note 8, at 32. The majority of the NEA's 1.8
million current members are classroom teachers, Economic Crisis in Schools Threatens the Nation, 14 NEA RPTR. 3 (1975), indicating a change in the organization's focus.
724. In contrast to the NEA's concern for professionalism, the American Federation of Teachers (AFT) has been deeply influenced by organized labor. The AFT
was founded in 1902 in San Antonio, Texas, and was chartered by the AFL in 1916.
Because the AFT associated teachers with blue collar workers, it had to overcome
adverse public, school board, and even teacher opinion. Perry & Wildman, supra
note 723, at 7-8, 18. In the 1950s, the AFT increased in importance as public sector
bargaining increased in acceptance. The AFT has been successful in large cities,
including New York, Philadelphia, and Chicago. The AFT is organized specifically
for the benefit of classroom teachers. M. MosKOW, TEACHERS AND UNIONS 98
(1966). See also R. DOHERTY & W. OBERER, TEACHERS, ScHOOL BOARDS, AND COLLECTIVE BARGAINING: A CHANGING OF nm GUARD 32-33 (1967).
The NEA responded to AFT breakthroughs by becoming more activist and by
attempting to strengthen its union identification. See generally E. SHILS & C. WmTTIER, TEACHERS, ADMINISTRATORS, AND CoLLECTIVE BARGAINING 21-92 (1968), The
right to organize a labor union in the public sector was given constitutional protection in McLaughlin v. Tilendis, 398 F.2d 287 (7th Cir. 1968). Under certain circumstances, however, courts have circumscribed this right. See Elk Grove Firefighters Local No. 2340 v. Willis, 400 F. Supp. 1097 (N.D. Ill. 1975). See also Local
No. 201 (AFL-CIO) v. City of Muskegon, 369 Mich. 384, 120 N.W.2d 197, cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 833 (1963); Perez v. Board of Police Commrs., 78 Cal. App. 2d
638, 178 P.2d 537 (1947).
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suant to this theory, amount to an unauthorized delegation of power.
This approach, which minimized the influence of teacher organizations, has, however, been eroded in recent years. Courts initially
recognized in states without bargaining statutes that school boards
could voluntarily negotiate with teachers and that agreements would
not be per se illegal. 725 It is now firmly established that a school
board may negotiate and bargain with a teachers' organization.
The extent to which teachers' unions will be allowed to bargain
about and thereby influence educational policy depends largely on
the statutes authorizing negotiations that have been passed in many
states. 726 Where such statutes exist, the school board will generally
have a duty to bargain over traditional contract items-wages, hours,
pensions, transfers, conditions of employment-that are within the
teachers' "worker interest." 727 Demands that fall within these categories may very well have a profound impact on the educational system, for the allocation of resources to meet these needs necessarily
precludes other possible expenditures. 728 Additionally, the specialized training that teachers receive gives them a "professional interest" in participation in the selection of teaching materials, the planning of curriculum and other matters requiring expertise and professional judgment. 729 These policies may, however, be considered to
725. See, e.g., Minneapolis Fedn. of Teachers Local 59 v. Obermeyer, 275 Minn.
347, 147 N.W.2d 358 (1966) (suggesting, however, promulgation of a statute for
procedural purposes); Norwalk Teachers' Assn. v. Board of Educ., 138 Conn. 269,
83 A.2d 482 (1951).
The right of public employees once organized to bargain collectively has not been
accorded constitutional stature, however, and courts have upheld statutes that prohibit
public employees from engaging in collective bargaining. See Winston-Salem/Forsyth County Unit v. Phillips, 381 F. Supp. 644 (M.D.N.C. 1974); Atkins v. City of
Charlotte, 296 F. Supp. 1068 (W.D.N.C. 1969). Thus, in order to have bargaining,
either a statute mandating it or a willing employer must exist. See 14 NBA RPTR.,
supra note 723, at 4 (NEA to lobby for federal statute guaranteeing teachers right to
negotiate).
726. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. §§ 14.20.550-.610 (1975); MINN. STAT. ANN. §§
179.61-.76 (Supp. 1976); ORE. REV. STAT.§§ 243.650-.782 (1975).
727. Prior to the emergence of formal negotiations, school board-teacher communication was conducted on an informal consultation and suggestion basis, in
which the superintendent was frequently the dominant factor. Gradually, teachers
began to have more input in school policy. See A. ROSENTHAL, PEDAGOGUES AND
POWER, TEACHER GROUPS IN SCHOOL POLITICS 3-6, 19 (1969).
Some states have had systems that involve more than mere consultation but less
than bargaining. Perhaps the most notable of these schemes was the "meet and confer" system of bargaining in California. See Law of July 23, 1965, ch. 2041, § 2,
[1965] Cal. Stats. 4660 (repealed 1976); Comment, California's Alternative to Collective Bargaining for Teachers: The Winton Act, 1965-1974, and Proposals for
Change, 5 PACIFIC LJ. 698 (1974).
728. See C. PERRY, THE LABOR RELATIONS CLIMATE AND MANAGEMENT RIGHTS
IN URBAN SCHOOL SYSTEMS: THE CASE OF PHILADELPHIA W (1974).
729. See A. ROSENTHAL, supra note 727, at 5-6; National Educ. Assn. v. Board
of Educ., 212 Kan. 741, 752, 512 P.2d 426, 434 (1973). Cf. Wollett, The Coming
Revolution in Public School Management, 67 MICH. L. REv. 1017, 1019-22 (1969).
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be at the core of school board discretion in a manner analogous to
management rights in the private sector that "lie at the core of entrepreneurial control" and are not mandatory subjects of collective
bargaining. 730 It is not infrequent that the teacher's "worker interest" will justify bargaining where the "professional interest" would
not, as, for example, in the case of appropriate class size which affects teachers' conditions of employment. 731 Courts have been inconsistent in their determinations of proper bargaining scope, 732 with
some insulating school boards733 and others more willing to find particular areas mandatory subjects of bargaining. 734
In asserting their interests through collective bargaining teachers
frequently infringe on -the interests of particular members of the educational community, who may then challenge the negotiation process
in court. 735 Courts, however, have recognized that collective bargaining is most effective when citizen input is limited. 736 An additional conflict may arise when a teachers' union, in attempting to organize, takes actions that jeopardize the interests of other teachers
or their organizations. 737 Finally, the interests of the union may con730. Fibreboard Paper Prods. Corp. v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964)
(Stewart, J., concurring). See PENN. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 1101.702 (Supp. 1976)
(excluding from bargaining "matters of inherent managerial policy").
731. See West Hartford Educ. Assn. v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 295 A.2d 526
(1972); West Irondequiot Teachers Assn. v. Helsby, 35 N.Y.2d 46, 315 N.E.2d 775,
358 N:.Y.S.2d 720 (1974). But cf. Susquehanna Valley Cent. School Dist. v. Susquehanna Valley Teachers' Assn., 37 N.Y.2d 614, 339 N.E.2d 132, 376 N.Y.S.2d
427 (1975).
732. See generally Note, Determining the Scope of Bargaining Under the Indiana
Education Employment Relations Act, 49 IND. LJ. 460,481 (1974),
733. See, e.g., School Comm. v. Curry, _ Mass. App. _, 325 N.E.2d 282
(1975) (decision to abolish a position); Dunellen Bd. of Educ. v. Dunellen Educ.
Assn., 64 NJ. 17, 311 A.2d 737 (1973) (decision to consolidate departments).
734. See, e.g., Clark County School Dist. v. Local Govt. Employee-Management Relations Bd., 90 Nev. 442, 530 P.2d 114 (1974) (class size, professional
improvement, student discipline, school calendar, teacher performance, differential
staffing, teacher load, instructional supplies, and classroom preparation time); West
Irondequoit Teachers Assn. v. Helsby, 35 N.Y.2d 46, 315 N.E.2d 775, 358 N.Y.S.2d
720 (1974); Joint School Dist. No. 8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Bd., 37
Wis. ~d 483, 155 N.W.2d 78 (1967) (school calendar).
735. See, e.g., City & County of San Francisco v. Cooper, 13 Cal. 3d 898,
534 P.2d 403, 120 Cal. Rptr. 707 (1975).
736. See Bassett v. Braddock, 262 S.2d 425 (Fla. 1970) (collective bargaining
could proceed privately); Talbot v. Concord Union School Dist., 114 N.H. 532, 323
A.2d 912 (1974) (negotiations could be private but final approval must be in public
session). But see Summers, Public Employee Bargaining: A Political Perspective,
83 YALE L.J. 1156, 1195 (1974) (arguing that allowing closed sessions prevents the
full airing of opposing viewpoints).
737. See Louisiana Teachers' Assn. v. Orleans Parish School Bd., _ La. _, 303
S.2d 564 (1974). See also S. COLE, TuE UNIONIZATION OF TEACHERS 19-20, 16473 (1969); C. PERRY, TuE WOR RELATIONS CLIMATE AND MANAGEMENT RIGHTS
IN URBAN ScHOOL SYsrnMs 88-89 (1974).
Competition between the NEA and the AFT has been widely publicized and stud-
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flict with those of the entire community. An example was the
widely discussed controversy at Ocean Hill-Brownsville in 1968, precipitated by the New York City decentralization plan.738 In giving
control over personnel to local community boards to enhance the
quality of education, certain rights bargained for by the teachers'
union at the city-wide level were compromised. In this instance,
teachers whose methods and approach did not comport with the community board's impressions of proper pedagogy were dismissed.
Thus, the "worker'' and "professional" interests of the teachers were
pitted against the community's interest in supervising the entire educational environment.
The growing power of teachers' ·unions has been sustained, in
part, by the availability of the ultJimate weapon~the strike. 739 It
is true that many statutes expressly prohibit strikes by public employees740 and that, in the absence of such language, courts will generally
enjoin strikes under traditional equitable principles. 741 Injunctive
relief, however, is not automatic, 742 for school boards can only obtain
it if they have "clean hands" and have fulfilled other requirements. 743 Moreover, the threat of illegal strikes is a potent weapon
that lies below the surface of negotiations. Still, the restrictions on
strikes, when combined with statutes governing procedures for colied. One result of the competition has been a growing militancy of both groups.
Ironically, the dispute has sometimes caused both postponement of a union election,
because one group or the other believed it would lose, and the defeat of school legislation. Teachers as a whole may well have suffered from the battle of the rivals
contending to help them by representation. See M. LIEBERMAN & M. MosKoW, COL•
LECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS FOR TEACHERS 401-06 (1966); E. SHILS & C. WHITIIER, SU·
pra note 724, at 539-41.
738. For general discussions of the Ocean Hill controversy, see Mayer, The Full
and Sometimes Very Surprising Story of Ocean Hill, the Teachers' Union and the
Teacher Strikes of 1968, N.Y. Times, Feb. 2, 1969, § 6 (Magazine), at 18, col.
1; M. BERU13E & M. GrrrELL, supra note 680; B. CARTER, PICKETS, PARENTS, AND
POWER: THE STORY BEHIND THE NEW YORK CITY TEACHERS' STRIKE (1971). For
other aspects of the New York decentralization plan, see text at notes 667-80 supra.
739. See generally Anderson, Strikes and Impasse Resolution in Public Employment, 61 MICH. L. REV. 943 (1969); Kheel, Strikes and Public Employment, 61
MICH. L. REV. 931 (1969); Note, Teachers' Strikes-A New Militancy, 43 NOTRE
DAME LAW. 367 (1968); Recent Development, Legislative Silence and the Function
of Courts in Teachers' Strike Injunction Suits, 51 WASH. L. REv. 186 (1975).
740. See, e.g., CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN.§ 10-153e (Supp. 1976); DEL. CooE ANN.
tit. 14, § 4011(c) (1975); !ND. ANN. STAT. § 20-7.5-1-14 (Bums 1975); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN.§ 423.202 (1967).
141. See, e.g., School Comm. v. Pawtucket Teachers Allience, Local No. 930,
101 R.I. 243, 221 A.2d 806 (1966).
742. See, e.g., School Dist. v. Holland Educ. Assn., 380 Mich. 314, 157 N.W.2d
206 (1968).
743. See Timberlane Regional School Dist v. Timberlane Regional Educ. Assn.,
114 N.H. 245, 317 A.2d 555 (1974); School Comm. v. Westerly Teachers Assn.,
111 R.I. 96, 299 A.2d 447 ( 1973). But cf. State v. Delaware State Educ. Assn.,
_Del.Cb._, 326 A.2d 868 (Ch. 1974).
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lective bargaining744 and the duty of school boards to protect their
entire constituency, 745 serve to limit somewhat the power of unions
to place the interests of teachers above those of the educational community. 746
744. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, §§ 4001-4013 (1975); IOWA CODE ANN.
20:1-.27 (Supp. 1976); Mo. REV. STAT. §§ 105.500-.530 (1969); WIS. STAT. ANN.
111.80- .97 (1974). The Connecticut law, for example, provides that the public
employer has a duty to bargain over "salaries and other conditions of employment."
CoNN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-153d (Supp. 1976). The omission of hours from this
formulation is significant; it has been interpreted to exclude discussions over hourrelated matters that otherwise might be considered conditions of employment, such
as the durations of the class day and school year. West Hartford Educ. Assn., Inc.
v. DeCourcy, 162 Conn. 566, 579-80, 295 A.2d 526, 534 (1972). However, specific
conditions of employment, including hours, are part of several state statutes. See,
e.g., CAL. GoVT. CoDE § 3543.2 (West Supp. 1976); HAWAll REV. STAT. § 89-9 (Supp.
1975).
745. B. EPSTEIN, WHAT Is NEGOTIABLE? 22-23 (1969); Perry & Wildman, supra
note 723, at 217.
746. It is important to note that teacher organizations are not the only agencies
that accord protection to teacher interests. States also play an important role
through legislative enactments. See generally NATIONAL EDUCATION ASSOCIATION
OF THE UNITED STATES, THE TEACHER AND THE LAW 30-73 (1959). Civil seivice
laws may specify certain procedures for hiring, firing and promotion policies. See,
e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 10-151 to -15lb (Supp. 1976), amending CoNN.
GEN. STAT. ANN. § 10-151 (1967). More important, however, has been the protection of teachers through tenure statutes. See generally NATIONAL EDUCATION Assoc1ATION OF THE UNITED STATES, TRENDS IN TEACHER TENURE THRU LEGISLATION AND
COURT DECISION (1957); L PETERSON, supra note 9, at 528-66; H. PUNKE, Tun
TEACHER AND THE COURTS 399-462 (1971). These statutes were originally designed
to reduce the large turnover in the teaching profession, which was caused in part
by widespread discharges for political and disciplinary reasons. See Comment,
Teachers' Tenure Legislation, 37 MICH. L. REv. 430 (1939). Of course, tenure
relationships between the teacher and the school district may be a product of contract Most teachers, however, are protected by specific statutes. H. PUNKE, supra,
at 407-13. Tenure provides teachers with a property right in their job; this entitles
them to a due process hearing pursuant to the fourteenth amendment before their
job may be taken away. See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 601-03 (1972).
Nontenured teachers do not have this property right in their jobs. See Board of
Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). See also Lanzarone, Teacher TenureSome Proposals for Change, 42 FORDHAM L. REV. 526, 532-35 (1974); Sietz, Due
Process for Public School Teachers in Nonrenewal and Discharge Sitllations, 25
HASTINGS L.J. 881 (1974).
These statutes, of course, do not eliminate the need for union protection. Those
areas not affected by the statutes, most obviously the rights of nontenured teachers,
are vital areas of union concern.
§§
§§

